Robert J. Buck

Thrasybulus and the Athenian Democracy

The Life of an Athenian Statesman

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CONTENTS

Chapter 1
Introduction: Sources and Scholarship 7
The Age of Thrasybulus 8
Sources 12
Modern Scholarship 17

Chapter 2
Thrasybulus: His Early Life and Career, ca. 450–407 B.C. 19
Birth and Family 19
Revolution of the Four Hundred 21
Cynossema 31
Abydos 33
Cyzicus 36
Campaigns to 406: Notium 39
Thrasybulus' Character 47

Chapter 3
Arginusae and the Thirty, 407–403 B.C. 49
Arginusae 51
The Aftermath: the Shipwrecked Sailors and the Trial of the Generals . 53
The Peace and the Thirty 60
The Purges 63
Thrasybulus in Exile 64
Boeotia cools to Sparta 68
Boeotia and Athens 69

Chapter 4
The Overthrow of the Thirty and the Restoration of Democracy, 403–396 B.C. 71
Phyle 71
Logistics 73
First Skirmishes 74
Battle of Acharnae 74
Massacre at Eleusis 75
Battle of Munychia 77
The Ten 79
Spartan Intervention: Lysander and Pausanias 80

The Reconciliation (Sept. 403) 82
Renewed Democracy: Archinus 84
Factions at Athens 86
Dominance of Thrasybulus 87
Relations with Sparta 88
Socrates 90
Thrasybulus the Moderate 91
Persia and Sparta 92

Chapter 5
The First Two Years of the Corinthian War: Haliartus, Nemea, and Coronea, 395–394 B.C. 95
Timocrates of Rhodes 95
The Outbreak of War 96
The Athenian Alliance 96
Battle of Haliartus 98
The Congress and Alliance 100
Battle of Nemea 101
Battle of Coronea 103

Chapter 6
The Corinthian War: Thrasybulus and the New Athenian Empire: 393–389 B.C. 107
Conon Triumphant 107
The Downfall of Conon 109
The Situation in the Aegean 110
Affairs at Athens 113
The Campaign of Thrasybulus 115
After Thrasybulus' Death 118

Chapter 7
Thrasybulus and Athens, 450–389 B.C. 121

Appendix
Chronology 125

Bibliography 129

General Index 135

Index of Ancient Authors and Sources 141

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION: SOURCES AND SCHOLARSHIP

Modern historiography is grappling with the problem of how to place the individual in proper relationship to his community and his times, in both social and economic terms.[1] It is easy to over-emphasize the importance of an individual and to neglect the limitations imposed upon him by the framework of his society, by the economic situation, by the culture in which he lives, and by the *Zeitgeist:* e.g., to blame Hitler for all the evils of the Third Reich. It is equally easy to pass the responsibility from the individual to his times, to his society, to his upbringing, to various historical trends: to blame the world of the twentieth century for the rise of the Third Reich and its excesses.

Ancient history faces similar problems of interpretation. The problem is how to put any leader into his proper relationship to his community in the light of the limitations imposed by economics, by the *Zeitgeist*, by cultural and social constraints. Was Pericles the one who made Athenian democracy in its greatest period really work? Or did he simply lead the state in an exceptionally vigorous and democratic time? Was Cimon the architect of the Athenian Empire, or was he a prominent leader of a vigorous people at a fortunate time?

Thrasybulus son of Lycus,[2] of the deme Steiria,[3] a politician of the end of the fifth century B.C. and the early fourth, is worthy of study in this regard. He is an exceptional individual who is credited with twice leading the democratic elements that defeated oligarchic regimes at Athens and restored democracy. He twice re-established Athenian authority in the north Aegean. He at least twice led the Athenians to brilliant victories over the Peloponnesians. He played a major and influential role in the turbulent politics throughout the period from 411 to 389 B.C. In his last years he made significant progress toward re-establishing an empire. For all these great deeds he should have been remembered and revered. But the ancient sources we have largely pass him by, possibly because of their anti-democratic bias, or possibly because they did not regard what he did as significant. He did not restore the Athenian Empire, and he did not even rebuild the fortifications of Athens that were demolished after the Peloponnesian War. The moderns have not done much

1 See, e.g., Kershaw 1993; Jäger 1994.
2 Paus. 9.11.6.
3 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25.

for him, either. He is a little late for the great days of the fifth century and a little early for the age of Demosthenes; but he still deserves study.

This essay will try to place Thrasybulus in the context of the lively history of the period between 411 and 389 B.C. It will look at his career critically and show his personal virtues and shortcomings, his remarkable contributions to Athens and his failures, to see why he was comparatively neglected. It will also look at the events and his role in them, what was happening to Athens at the time, that is, how he acted within the framework and limitations of the culture of the period, and when he did his deeds. The chronology of the period has not as yet been completely agreed upon, but it is well enough understood in its broad outlines. Only at a few points does it provide problems.

THE AGE OF THRASYBULUS

Thrasybulus was active from at least 411 to his death in 389, a little longer than the two decades around the turn of the fifth to the fourth century. It was very different from the time before the Peloponnesian War in which he grew up. The first decade or so saw revolutions at Athens, the collapse of the Athenian Empire, and the city go down to defeat before Sparta and her allies. It saw the Thirty Tyrants, civil discord, and the ultimate restoration of democracy under the leadership of Thrasybulus. It saw Sparta victorious and increasingly arrogant, and her allies increasingly disaffected, with Persia poised to recover its control over the Greek cities of Asia Minor. The second decade saw the partial recovery of Athens from its near death. It saw Athens and many of Sparta's erstwhile allies joined together with Persia in a bloody war against Sparta. It saw Athens make a determined effort to recover the Empire and fail.

Athens had previously suffered two appalling disasters, the great plague at the outset of the Peloponnesian War, in 430 and 429, and the utter destruction of the Sicilian expedition in 413. The plague, if it was as bad a pandemic as the Black Death, might have killed about one-third of the population;[4] the Sicilian Expedition cost Athens itself 4,000 hoplites and cavalry plus an unknown number of Athenian sailors, plus thousands of allies, and some 200

4 For the plague, Thuc. 2.47–54 and Gomme et al. 1945–81, ad loc. See also, e.g., Hammond 1986, 351. No one knows what the plague was. Popular guesses include typhus, measles, and some lethal viral mutation of some childhood disease like chicken-pox on its first visit. For the level of fatalities in the Black Death, see, e.g., Platt 1996. No one knows the size of the population of Athens before the Peloponnesian War. Estimates vary, with Hornblower's (1983, 172) 258,000 below average, Gomme's (1933, 26) 315,500 about average, and Hammond's (1986, 329) 400,000 above average. A loss of one-third would be something around 100,000 people, very roughly.

ships.[5] Athens continued to suffer a steady drain of its manpower until Aegospotami. These losses must have been traumatic to Athenian society. Virtually no family was spared, and some families simply disappeared. Casualties on such a scale must surely have shaken the morale of the population and the faith of many in the existing system.[6] Socrates and the sophists would not have had such a profound influence in a serene, unshaken society, or aroused such hostile reactions among self-confident citizens.

In these two decades from 410 to 390 Athens was practically bankrupt. The reserves of about 9,700 talents accumulated by the state before the Peloponnesian War[7] were virtually all disbursed by the end of the Sicilian expedition, except for the emergency fund of 1,000 talents, and this was spent by 411. There was no deficit financing, since no one would be insane enough to lend money to a state, even to Athens. The state eked out a hand-to-mouth existence, once the accumulated reserves were spent. It cost from half a talent to a talent a month, depending upon the pay offered the crew, to keep a trireme at sea, and so a fleet of eighty would cost anywhere from forty up to eighty talents a month.[8] With the reserves gone, the exigencies of keeping a fleet in being explain the constant efforts of the various Athenian fleets to gather 'contributions' from allies and to loot rebel and Persian territory, efforts that have been called by later historians extortion, robbery, and racketeering, with some justice.

Loss of family, loss of security, loss of faith in this society and even in the gods, it is not surprising that there was loss of confidence in the institutions that many considered had brought Athens into its sad condition, its democracy and the polis structure itself – as well as the politicians. It may be unreasonable to blame democracy for the plague, or the ill-luck and misfortunes of the Sicilian campaign, but blaming governments for what cannot be helped is a human failing. After the death of Pericles Athens had been guided by such men as Cleon, a capable administrator but brutal, vulgar, vain and short-sighted; Nicias, who met his end in Sicily through his own indecision; Alcibiades, a genius whose egoism led him almost to destroy his country; such double-dealing, unscrupulous, and treacherous men as Theramenes and Andocides; and others, like Androcles, who put their own interests and passions before the welfare of the state. A man like Thrasybulus, honourable, honest, and sincere, is a considerable contrast, but one that must have given his contemporaries pause and made them wonder whether he was really what he seemed to be, or whether there was something wrong with him.

5 For the losses in Sicily see, e.g., Hammond 1986, 400.

6 See, e.g., Hammond 1986, 351; Bury 1955, 407f.

7 Thuc. 2.13.3; see also Meritt et al. 1939–53, 3:118–132.

8 Pritchett 1971–85, 1:4–29, for costs of keeping a trireme afloat and the problems of financing a navy.

Naturally, many people turned to examine other, and possibly better, modes of organizing society and state. The Spartans were obviously very successful; it seemed to some a good idea to copy their way of life and be like the Lacedaemonians. The Boeotian hoplite oligarchy had made that fractious people disciplined and victorious; some thought that an oligarchy on the Boeotian model would be good for Athens.[9] The poor manned the navy but had to be paid for the various jobs assigned by lot at Athens, especially in the huge juries; some considered that they should be excluded from governing and deliberation because of the expense. There had been discontent with democracy among prosperous Athenians from at least the time of Ephialtes in the 460s, but this discontent did not gain wide support until after the Syracusan disaster.

The Athenians were quite capable of committing atrocities against their 'allies,' as Thucydides makes graphically clear, but their brutality reached its peak in the period from 411 to 403, when they turned savagely on one another, until Thrasybulus overthrew the Thirty and re-established law and order. I suspect that in the Athens of this period, in the Athens of Alcibiades, Andocides, and Theramenes, the Athens sliding slowly down to bankruptcy and defeat, Thrasybulus still saw in memory the glorious Athens of Pericles.

Athens of 410 to 390 was a violent place, where abrupt changes and sudden disasters of the type we see in Greek tragedy were all too common. Hunger and death were not very far away from most people. Infant mortality was high. If one survived the rigours of childhood, childbed for women and warfare for the men were serious hazards, even if, on the average, a battle killed only five per cent of the victors and about fourteen percent of the vanquished.[10] Military writers tell us that any spear or sword thrust deeper than about four cm was well-nigh fatal, and wound infections were untreatable.[11] Prisoners, as the fate of the Athenians at Syracuse makes clear, had a bad time of it, and the diseases worried about in modern military handbooks on health in the field must have taken their toll, as they did until the development of modern field sanitation. There are numerous memorials for women who died in childbirth,[12] and several studies of skeletal remains indicate that females had a considerably shorter life-span than males, by about five to ten years.[13]

9 Buck 1981, 47–52.

10 Hanson 1989, 89, 209 and Krentz 1985, 18, make the case that deaths in battle were on the scale of 5% to 14%. This probably does not include fatalities later from wounds or sickness. Hanson, loc. cit., makes the point that the chances were very good that a man would become a casualty eventually, since a hoplite could serve for over forty years, with a battle to be faced once every couple of years.

11 Vegetius 1.11, 12. Hanson 1989, 217f., for gravity of wound infections.

12 Pomeroy 1975, 84f.

13 Pomeroy 1975, 68f.

Athens at this period was heartily disliked by most of Greece as a tyrant state that kept its predominance over its allies by brute force. Pericles could call Athens the school of Hellas, but most Greeks regarded it as a kind of Dickensian Dotheboys Hall. The immediate neighbours of Athens, Boeotia and Megara, hated and despised her, and were in turn brutalized when the opportunity offered, as the comic playwright Aristophanes in the *Acharnians* makes clear for Megara, and as Thucydides indicates for Boeotia. Sparta was regarded by many as a liberator. The beauty of Greek art, architecture and literature should not blind us to other less comely aspects of life in the fifth century.

The late fifth century was the sort of time when beliefs became polarized and emotions became raw, just as Thucydides says in a famous passage about the way words were changing their meanings.[14] Athens had been continuously at war, with long lists of casualties, grim even in their mutilated state,[15] for just about all of Thrasybulus' adult life. And all the misfortunes, the plague and the Sicilian defeat, came to pass under the sign of democracy at Athens.

Democracy, as the Greeks thought of it, was the direct participation of all male citizens in setting state policy, law-making and in the work of the courts.[16] It was a comparatively rare phenomenon in the Greek world of the fifth and fourth centuries, since most people, then as now, were normally quite willing to let someone else do it. The usual form of government was an oligarchy of one type or another. Democracies had a perennial problem with voter apathy, and Aristotle tells us that pay for attendance at the assembly was introduced to ensure a quorum.[17] In fact, pay for public service was a hallmark of democracy from the time of Pericles' reforms in the middle of the fifth century. Oligarchies normally did not pay the members of the government, except occasionally for expenses. This made government cheaper, but led to corruption in high places as far back as Hesiod's 'gift-devouring kings.'[18]

Democracy as practiced at Athens was expensive, and a considerable proportion of Athenian income went to pay for public service. The annual income at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War was 1,000 talents,[19] of which 600 was from the Empire in tribute or other payments, some of which could be used for war.[20] The remaining 400 was earmarked for games, festivals, and other internal government purposes, not for war. Thucydides says

14 Thuc. 3.82.

15 *IG* 1^3. 1179–1192. The list from the battle of Cynossema (?) shows a Eupolis who may be the Comic poet, 1190, line 52, cf. Suidas, *s.v.* Εὔπολις.

16 Aristot. *Pol.* 1290b1–3.

17 *Ath. Pol.* 41.3.

18 Hes. *Op.* 263f., βασιλῆες ... δωροφάγοι.

19 Xen. *Anab.* 7.1.27.

20 Meritt et al. 1939–53, 3:333f. on Thuc. 2.13.3–5.

that at the time of the Sicilian expedition it cost about a talent a month to keep a trireme afloat and the crew paid.[21] An Athenian fleet of 100 ships afloat for only two months would use up 200 talents, one-third of the Imperial income. Once all the reserves were exhausted there was no deficit financing available. The Empire, in other words, spelled the difference between carrying on a war and even accumulating reserves, and a desperate search for funds, failure in which meant being unable to fight at all. For the Athenian democracy to survive in the environment of war the Empire was believed essential. With no income from the Empire, the only way to make funds available was to cut funds at home. To cut sacred funds might insult the gods, something no one was desirous of doing, especially in wartime; to cut the pay of the naval crews, to abolish pay for juries and other government jobs would save a considerable amount; to abolish democracy would do even more. Hence a good democrat like Thrasybulus was also an ardent supporter of the concept of the Empire, while oligarchs were not nearly as enthusiastic for it.

It is true that democratic Athens in the fourth century got on without the Empire, but not very well. There were chronic shortages of funds, and desperate shifts and contrivances whenever war had to be carried on, as a reading of the speeches of Demosthenes makes all too clear. In fact, Thrasybulus lost his life in an effort to gather funds from a reluctant area. The Second Athenian Confederacy, and other Athenian efforts to revive the Empire, indicate the bent of Athenian democratic policy – to procure a source of disposable income.

SOURCES

Generally speaking, the ancient sources for the life and times of Thrasybulus are all too brief, and they are often contradictory. Their historical merits vary widely.

Thucydides tells us something about Thrasybulus in the context of the Revolution of the Four Hundred. Unfortunately his narrative breaks off before he does much more than give a brief outline of Thrasybulus' actions, with very little on his motives. He does depict him, however, as a firm and vigorous supporter of democracy and a competent admiral. What he says is unimpeachable, but all too little.[22]

Xenophon, especially in the *Hellenica*, is one of the major sources for the life of Thrasybulus. From him we see a leader struggling to maintain the Athenian Empire, one who twice led the resistance against oligarchy, a com-

21 Thuc. 6.8.1; see Pritchett 1971–85, 1:4–29 for the changes in military pay.

22 See Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5.1–4, 264f.

petent general before being replaced in the limelight by Alcibiades and later by Conon. He is clearly a fervent patriot determined to see Athens keep her greatness. He extorts Xenophon's reluctant admiration, expressed in a comment on his death (*Hell.* 4.8.31) : μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, 'with the reputation of being a really good man.' This encomium on him is somewhat surprising, since Xenophon is normally not fond of democrats.

Xenophon as a historian is deeply flawed. His *Hellenica* has been criticized for being 'essentially memoirs,'[23] or political propaganda,[24] or, in parts, what we would now call docudrama, where events are bent to make a good story, and Xenophon is a superb story-teller.[25] Xenophon is, however, as far as we can observe, usually basically truthful in what he tells us, but unfortunately he omits a great deal, especially if he dislikes the people concerned, or if the happenings distressed him overmuch. He is often careless in checking his facts, relying too much on a faulty memory, and his interpretation of events is often biased by his obvious admiration for the Spartans. He normally leaves out, for instance, the name of any Spartan commander who gets disgraced. He is also anti-democratic and anti-Boeotian.[26] As an anti-democrat he is no great admirer of Thrasybulus' actions in restoring the democracy twice, though he seems to respect the man himself and his pan-Hellenism. As an anti-Boeotian Xenophon skims over many of the activities of a major player in the events of the times, although, to be fair, he does treat some incidents in considerable detail. He ignores, however, any links Thrasybulus may have had with Thebes, and he plays down the Theban support for the counter-revolt against the Thirty. Although he is guilty of bias, carelessness, and *suppressio veri*, he never, as far as we know, deliberately tells lies. There are distortions and lapses of memory, but no deliberate falsehoods.

Xenophon does try to bring out any moral element that he perceives in historical happenings, and this seems to be in consonance with his purpose in writing the *Hellenica*.[27] The *Hellenica* is, therefore, by any standard not a particularly good historical work, whatever its literary merits may be, and whatever the quality of its moral purposes. It is, then, a measure of the merits of the historical sources for this period that the *Hellenica* is one of the best we have. The general rule that I shall follow is that when there is a discrepancy in the facts as related to us by Xenophon and another historian, Xenophon is to be preferred, unless there are compelling reasons to the contrary. If there is a gap in the evidence as relayed to us by Xenophon, then the other historian may be used to supplement Xenophon's narrative, but with caution.

23 Cawkwell 1979, 28.
24 Tuplin 1977, 26f.
25 E.g., Henry 1967, 198f. and Krentz 1989b, passim.
26 See, e.g., Henry 1967, 205; but cf. also Skoczylas 1993, 22–24.
27 Gray 1989. Skoczylas 1993, 92–96.

Diodorus Siculus, the other main source, fills in many incidents in the career of Thrasybulus, giving us a slightly different picture, one of a decent and honourable man and a competent general, some of whose credit was stolen by Alcibiades, and who was pushed out of the picture by Conon. But Diodorus was a compiler of the first century B.C., who has to rely heavily on his sources, at least for the narrative. He has been undergoing a critical re-assessment, especially for his treatment of non-narrative material, and his stock, at least in this respect, has risen considerably.[28] His main source for the period concerned is Ephorus, a historian of the mid-fourth century, one prone to moralize.[29] Ephorus is careless[30] and sloppy,[31] doubling incidents, for example, if he finds two slightly discrepant versions in his sources.[32] He, like most of his own sources, was not particularly fond of democracy, and he relied over-much on tendentious fourth-century pamphleteers, particularly Isocrates.[33] But Ephorus does use as one of his sources the Oxyrhynchus Historian, commonly termed P for short, considered by many as quite competent. He wrote a history of Greece continuing from where Thucydides stopped, a *Hellenica,* of which we have fragments dealing with the period from 411 to 394.

Many authorities regard P as the principal exception to the rule that I have followed that Xenophon takes priority.[34] There is no agreement about who he is. In spite of nearly a century of efforts to identify him, he remains anonymous.[35] Whoever he was, many critics consider him a very good and careful historian, superior to Xenophon, although it must be emphasized that this view is not unanimous, especially among more recent researchers.[36] He is partial to the propertied class, and not averse to skewing interpretation in its

28 See, e.g., Sacks 1990, esp. 5, 19–22, 23–54.

29 Skoczylas 1993, 127–167; Cartledge 1987, 68; Sacks 1990, 19f., 26.

30 Ephorus was criticized for carelessness in Antiquity; cf. Strab. 7.3.9, Diod. 1.37.4, Josephus, *Contra Apionem* 1.67.

31 E.g., Ephorus' claim that Pericles started the Peloponnesian War to cover his embezzlements, Diod. 12.38–41; his attribution of the invention of coinage to Pheidon, Figueira 1991, 65–80; his mangling of the Oxyrhynchus Historian, Gray 1987, 72–89.

32 Buck 1979, 145–147.

33 Cartledge 1987, 68, refers to his style as 'frosted with the glitter of Isokratean rhetoric.' Sacks 1990, 32, with comment on how Diodorus adds certain sentiments not found in Isocrates or Ephorus.

34 Bruce 1967, for an excellent historical treatment. Most recently McKechnie and Kern 1988. Cartledge 1987, 66f., e.g., for a brief summary of the standard evaluation.

35 Bruce 1967, 22–27, Harding 1987, 101–104, and Shrimpton 1991, 183–195, suggest he might be Cratippus, as does Pesely 1994, 43f., but it is impossible to prove.

36 Cf. McKechnie and Kern 1988, 14–16; Gray 1979. For the older view, Bruce 1967, 20–22.

favour. He has a slight pro-Spartan bias.[37] His views on democracy are such that the great German historian Ed. Meyer felt no unease in identifying P as the arch anti-democrat Theopompus.[38] The problem is to identify when Ephorus is using P and not being rhetorical. He seems to do so for some parts of the of the battles in the Hellespont, and for certain other parts of Diodorus, Book 13.[39] It is generally agreed that in this book Diodorus is somewhat better than he is in the adjacent books. I do, however, regard P with considerable reserve, as very difficult to recover from the rhetoric of Ephorus and somewhat biased himself and so only to be used cautiously to fill in gaps in Xenophon. This is an approach fairly widely used, as by Kagan and Westlake.[40]

Two recent studies, however, would reject the use of Diodorus entirely.[41] Whatever the merits of P, they argue that Ephorus has too much of a reputation for modifying what his sources say for his material from P to be acceptable. The problem is compounded because, as Sacks has shown,[42] Diodorus himself did considerable revising, and much of the vocabulary, even in sections credited to Ephorus, is late Hellenistic.

The orators, especially Lysias, tell us a good deal about Thrasybulus. Lysias gives a mordant and brilliant portrait of Theramenes,[43] and at times treats Thrasybulus harshly, too.[44] He depicts him as opportunistic and bad-tempered, surrounded by corrupt colleagues. Lysias had served in the resistance movement against the Thirty, when it was headed by Thrasybulus; but his admiration for him seems not to have lasted much beyond the restoration of democracy. Thrasybulus is sketched by his pen as jealous of his rivals, often naïve, and rather old fashioned. But the evidence of orators like Lysias must be treated with some reserve, since they were not writing history or biography, but constructing cases to persuade jurymen or the assembly to certain courses of action. Their facts are often much twisted and their characterizations biased by the particular aims of a given speech. Of course they could not say things that the audience found incredible, especially if some of them had been participants in the events referred to; but they could and did

37 Bruce 1967, 9–11.

38 Meyer 1909, following Grenfell and Hunt; cf. Bruce 1967, 9f.

39 Andrewes 1982, 15f., 1992, 471–481; Bruce 1967, 20–22 and others argue he is the main source for Diodorus between 411 and 386.

40 Kagan 1987, and Westlake 1985.

41 Gray 1987 and Tuplin 1986.

42 Sacks 1990, 11, 101–116.

43 Lysias 12.62–78.

44 See especially Lysias 16.75 and 28.8. A Lysian speech 'Against Thrasybulus' no longer extant was rejected as spurious by the ancients. Blass 1887, 456; Frohberger 1861, 449 thought it referred to Thrasybulus of Collytus, but mentions of Seuthes, our Thrasybulus' Thracian friend, in the notices make this unlikely.

stretch and twist the truth quite extensively. The other orators, such as Andocides, add little to our picture of Thrasybulus, though they sometimes give a lively depiction of the times. Andocides and Antiphon are particularly interesting and instructive for this.

The other ancient sources are secondary. Plutarch has some material on Thrasybulus in his lives of Lysander and Agesilaus, and he seems to use as sources Xenophon and Callisthenes, as well as the egregious Ephorus, and so indirectly P. Nepos has a brief and rhetorical *Life of Thrasybulus,* a similar *Life of Alcibiades,* with a few interesting points, drawn from unknown sources. In the former, however, he does praise Thrasybulus warmly, *neminem huic praefero fide, constantia, magnitudine animi, in patriam amore* (*Thras.* 1.1), and he implies that Alcibiades got credit that really belonged to Thrasybulus. The *Constitution of the Athenians*, the *Athenaion Politeia*, credited to Aristotle by some, or to one of his pupils by others,[45] gives us something on chronology of dubious merit and little else of any value for the life and career of Thrasybulus, whatever its other virtues. There are a few remarks of importance to us in Justin, sources unknown.

Pausanias (1.29.3) has a fine passage of praise for the great liberator.

> Ἀνδρὸς τῶν ὕστερον καὶ ὅσοι πρὸ αὐτοῦ γεγόνασιν Ἀθηναίοις λόγιμοι τὰ πάντα ἀρίστου – παρέντι δέ μοι τὰ πλείω τοσάδε ἐς πίστιν ἀρκέσει τοῦ λόγου· τυραννίδα γὰρ ἔπαυσε τῶν τριάκοντα καλουμένων σὺν ἀνδράσιν ἑξήκοντα τὸ κατ' ἀρχὰς ὁρμηθεὶς ἐκ Θηβῶν, καὶ Ἀθηναίους στασιάζοντας διαλλαγῆναι καὶ συνθεμένους ἔπεισε τοῖς νόμοις ἐμμεῖναι.
>
> A man in every respect the best of all the famous men of Athens before or after him. To prove what I say it will be enough for me, omitting most of his deeds, to mention these. He put down the tyranny of the so-called Thirty, setting out from Thebes with sixty men, and he persuaded the Athenians to cease from their quarrels and to remain within their constitution.

Epigraphic evidence is very valuable, but only a handful of inscriptions have any bearing on the time when Thrasybulus was active. The most important include the decrees honouring those who served at Phyle and treaties of alliance with Boeotia and Locris.[46] Unfortunately, most of them are badly mutilated, and so have had to undergo considerable restoration. In that case the restorer's views will colour his reconstruction, and the contents as restored must be treated with caution.

45 Rhodes 1981, 58–63.

46 Decrees: Raubitschek 1941, 284–295; Krentz 1980, 298–306, both in Harding 1985 as nos. 7 and 3. Treaties: *IG* 2^2. 14 and 15, both in Harding as nos. 14 and 16, with literature.

MODERN SCHOLARSHIP

It is surprising how little modern scholarship has to say about Thrasybulus. There is only one monograph on him,[47] and the articles in Pauly-Wissowa and the *Kleine Pauly* are somewhat limited.[48] Thrasybulus is normally dealt with in relation to someone else, or in relation to various political events or battles, the Four Hundred, Thirty Tyrants, Alcibiades, Conon, the Arginusae affair, political changes, factions, and the new democracy.

Opinions about him vary widely. He has fared quite well at the hands of a few modern scholars. Grote[49] says about him:

> But the feature which stands yet more eminent in his character, – a feature infinitely rare in the Grecian character, generally – is, that the energy of a successful leader was combined with complete absence both of vindictive antipathies for the past, and of overbearing ambition for himself. Content to live himself as a simple citizen under the restored democracy, he taught his countrymen to forgive an oligarchical party from whom they had suffered atrocious wrongs, and set the example himself of acquiescing, in the loss of his own large property. The generosity of such a proceeding ought not to count for less, because it was at the same time dictated by the highest political prudence.

Bury[50] says, 'He strikes us – we know too little of him – as an eminently reasonable citizen, one of those men who command general confidence and are not biased by prejudice or ambition.' De Ste. Croix[51] terms Thrasybulus 'highly intelligent.' But these are exceptional. The present general view is, at best, lukewarm.

Paul Cartledge[52] is more in line with current thinking on him, as a kind of blunderer:

> But it was Thrasyboulos who had brought the Corinthian War to its penultimate stage by destroying the last vestiges of Artaxerxes' resistance to full co-operation with Sparta against her Greek enemies. For Thrasyboulos had not just greatly improved the economic and political position of Athens at Sparta's expense. In fostering democratic revolutions in Byzantion and Klazomenai and in speaking the language of control rather than equal alliance at Thasos (and elsewhere no doubt), he had come suspiciously close to commencing the re-

47 Saur 1978, primarily on his oratory.
48 Schwahn 1936; Kinzl 1975.
49 Grote [1850] 1900, 9.367.
50 Bury 1955, 550.
51 Ste. Croix 1981, 605, n. 29.
52 Cartledge 1987, 367.

> creation of Athens' fifth-century Aegean empire, from which Persia had suffered no less than Sparta.

So much for the efforts of Conon's faction to support Evagoras and for the 'triumph of principle over expediency in the hearts of the Athenian people,' so praised by Grote[53]. Hornblower[54] casts him as a kind of extortioner (76f.), and Seager,[55] like Cartledge, has him recklessly offending Persia. Hammond[56] is kind only to be harsh:

> His energy in these years [sc. the Corinthian War] won Athens her greatest successes; his methods alienated many potential allies; and his failure to concentrate on attacking Dercyllidas a serious error in strategy.

Kagan[57] goes so far as to suggest that in 411 the great arch-democrat was really prepared to overthrow the democracy and replace it with an oligarchy, if it would get Alcibiades back. Krentz[58] has it that the rule of the Thirty would not have been nearly so brutal and fatal for so many people, especially the Eleusinians, had Thrasybulus not invaded Attica and occupied Phyle, though elsewhere he quotes approvingly the encomium from Pausanias. From all this it is clear that even now Thrasybulus engenders controversy.

He needs to be looked at in relation to his times, but with the main focus on him and how he acts and reacts in his milieu.

53 Grote [1850] 1900, 9:365.
54 Hornblower 1994, 76f.
55 Seager 1994, 114.
56 Hammond 1986, 464.
57 Kagan 1987, 115.
58 Krentz 1982, 130.

CHAPTER 2

THRASYBULUS: HIS EARLY LIFE AND CAREER CA. 450–407 B.C.

BIRTH AND FAMILY

Since he died in 389 as a general, assassinated in his tent while on a campaign, Thrasybulus was obviously still of an age to be a leading political and military figure, probably in his late fifties, or, possibly, in his sixties.[1] He was named general in 411, and normally he should have been at least thirty,[2] though perhaps this requirement might have been waived in the circumstances. All this means that most likely he was born after 455, probably before 441, conceivably even as late as the early 430s.[3] A date ca. 450–445 B.C. seems as reasonable an approximation as we can have.

We know next to nothing about his personal life. He was himself well-to-do, since he could afford to be a trierarch. He was obviously married properly and advantageously, since at least two of his children were prominent and married well. His son, Thrasybulus II, was rich enough to be fined ten talents shortly before 343;[4] his daughter (name unknown) was married to the grandson of the famous Athenian leader Nicias.[5] His family, then, was probably aristocratic. Though we have no anecdotes of the type retailed by Plutarch, we may infer a good deal about him as a person from his actions and attitudes and from what such contemporaries as Lysias have to say about him, or omit saying. His political views and his deeds are fairly well documented.

All told, he seems to have been an honorable politician of high intelligence and a convinced and fervent democrat. Like many Athenians of his time, he still took for granted the existence of the Athenian Empire and its importance and beneficence for all of Hellas, especially for Athens. He was probably not too far removed from the average upper-class Athenian in most

1 For the elderly and old as hoplites and as generals, even in their seventies and eighties, Hanson 1989, 92f.

2 The general opinion is that generals, like other officials, had to have a minimum age of thirty. Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 30.2, 31.2, 63.3, and Rhodes 1981, 510f., though there might be exceptions, cf. Pritchett 1971–85, 2:63 and Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:264f.

3 Davies 1971, 240f., no. 7310.

4 Dem. 19.280, 290; [Dem.] Ep. 3.19; Davies 1971, 241.

5 Dem. 19.290; Davies, loc. cit. for marriage; Lewis 1955, 30; Singh 1971, 92f., 108f.

of his other social attitudes and beliefs, except in his almost Periclean devotion to democracy. He worked hard to keep the Empire alive in the latter part of the Peloponnesian War and equally hard to revive it during the Corinthian War.

He had the gift of working effectively with people of varied political and personal backgrounds; he showed himself an outstanding naval commander; he was, to judge from what Xenophon has him say, and what Plutarch tells us, at the least a competent orator with the loudest voice of any Athenian politician. All in all we have the impression of a courageous man, a team leader of considerable finesse, but one who was not averse to ignoring laws and rules he thought were inconvenient or wrong, or to taking short cuts to what he doubtless regarded as laudable ends. None the less, he kept Athenian hopes and dreams alive in a particularly dark time in Athenian history, and he informed Athens with his own belief in democracy and with his own generosity.

Nothing is known about his early life, education, military career or social relations. He must have been of some political prominence well before 411, certainly by the time of the end of the Sicilian disaster, to have gained enough of a reputation as a staunch democrat to be one of the leaders of the democratic counter-revolution in Samos at the time of the Four Hundred. Many elements of the Athenian populace became convinced after the Sicilian debacle that vigorous measures were required to cope with the crisis, and a special board of *probouloi* was appointed, especially as the financial prospects for carrying on the war became desperate.[6] A strong faction advocated some sort of oligarchy. The meetings of the assembly must have been lively. A strong supporter of democracy, who had never wavered, would soon become well known in the debates in Athens after 413. He probably did not serve in Sicily.

He seems to have been on close working terms with Alcibiades between 411 and 406, but we do not know whether this was as a result of earlier acquaintance, or friendship, or because of the satisfactory outcome of the negotiations for Alcibiades' recall in 411. A good deal has been made of this close relationship between Alcibiades and Thrasybulus by some authorities,[7] but there is no real evidence about what sort of relationship it was. It may not have been too amiable. Nepos says,

> *Primum Peloponnesio bello multa hic sine Alcibiade gessit, ille nullam rem sine hoc: quae ille universa naturali quodam bono fecit lucri.*
> 'In the Peloponnesian War Thrasybulus gained many victories without Alcibiades, but Alcibiades accomplished nothing without Thrasybulus: yet Alcibiades, by some natural gift, obtained all the credit.'[8]

6 Thuc. 8.1.3. Kagan 1987, 4–6.
7 E.g., Andrewes 1953, 4–6.
8 Nepos, *Thras.* 1.3

A working partnership implies little about personal friendship, or political alignments. My own guess would be that they had previous acquaintance in that aristocratic milieu of which both were members, but that they were not particularly close. Stealing credit is apt to strain relationships.

Thrasybulus obviously had to be something of an orator to be a prominent democrat before 411. If Xenophon's version of his speeches is anything to go on, he was a little old-fashioned, using a style reminiscent of that of Pericles. Plutarch says he was 'possessed of the loudest voice' (μεγαλφωνότατος) among the Athenians.[9] As a strong pro-democratic patriot he demonstrated his patriotism by performing public service. He was named a trierarch in 412/11, if not earlier, and by early 411, at the latest, he was with the fleet at Samos.

THE REVOLUTION OF THE FOUR HUNDRED

Oligarchs had played a baneful role in Athenian politics from at least the time of the democratic reforms of Ephialtes in 462/1, and in the extreme passions they aroused.[10] The earliest essay on Athenian politics is a document written from such a strong oligarchic viewpoint that the author is often referred to as 'the Old Oligarch.'[11]

After the defeat in Sicily there was widespread disillusionment over democracy, with many holding it responsible for what happened. The advocates of oligarchy were quick to exploit such feelings.[12] There was another factor, the collapse of the Athenian Empire and Athenian finances in 412. There was virtually no Athenian navy left after the defeat at Syracuse to enforce Athenian authority. The Athenian allies were ready and eager to defect, and a good chance was offered.[13] The Persians saw an opportunity to regain the coast of Asia Minor and to cancel their treaty with Athens, especially as the Athenians were supporting the rebel Amorges, who was active in western Asia Minor.[14] By early 412 delegations from various Athenian allies had gone to Sparta or to king Agis, and most had received assurances of aid. Persia and Sparta were

9 Plut. *Alc.* 26.6. The context makes it clear that decibel level more than grandiloquence is meant here.

10 See *Ath. Pol.* 25.1–4; Rhodes 1981, 311–322.

11 For oligarchs intervening in 457, Thuc. 1.107.4; the Old Oligarch's work is [Xenophon] *Athenian Constitution.* Though his work is in the Xenophontic corpus, his identity is unknown. Cf. Frisch 1942, 103–105; de Ste. Croix 1972, 307–311.

12 Ostwald 1986, 337f., 344.

13 Thuc. 8.2.2.

14 Kagan 1987, 29–32, points out that the date of the treaty between Amorges and Athens is unknown, and that the alliance could have been signed as late as 412, a view not widely shared.

soon in conversations, and a series of treaties, with financial guarantees for Sparta, was eventually signed by Sparta with the local satrap Tissaphernes. The price was the turning over of the Asia Minor coast to the Persians.[15]

First Lesbos, then Chios, Erythrae, Clazomenae, Teos, and, a little later, Ephesus and Miletus broke away from the Empire, like so many dominoes falling over.[16] The main Spartan fleet was bottled up by a desperate Athenian squadron, but a few ships, and Alcibiades, got loose with devastating effect, joined later by Syracusan ships and other reinforcements.[17] They went around liberating cities from the Empire. The sources of Athenian income began drying up.[18]

The Athenians were not idle. After Chios rebelled (in late spring of 412), the last Reserve Fund of 1,000 talents was opened.[19] This permitted the mobilization of a fleet of about one hundred ships. We may assume that Thrasybulus was appointed trierarch of one of these. But it took the Athenians some time to get them all afloat and in operating condition. Eight were sent out at first,[20] and others as they were readied. They began, bit by bit, to try to extinguish the rebellion. They were doing quite well, with Chios and Lesbos being largely recovered, at least temporarily, until the attempt to take Miletus miscarried. The Peloponnesian fleet got loose, and the Argive allies of Athens went home in disgust. Miletus became the main Peloponnesian naval base. The general Phrynichus was generally held responsible for the débacle.[21] On the other side, Alcibiades gained considerable prestige, at least with the Persians, for his able handling of the Peloponnesian fleet off Chios in July. Amorges, the Athenian ally on the mainland, was captured and his revolt against the Persians ceased.[22] This meant, for practical purposes, the virtual disappearance of the income from the Empire for Athens, and the consequent difficulty in funding the fleet and continuing the war. The Athenians desperately tried to restore the situation. Their success was limited, and funds were henceforth always short. From this time on until the end of the War the chronic shortage of funds was a constant feature of operations, and considerable time and effort had to be spent by the fleet commanders in collecting funds and supplies from allies of varying degrees of reluctance rather than in fight-

15 First treaty right after the revolt of Miletus, Thuc. 8.17.4–18.3. Second treaty late in 412, 36.2–37.5. Third treaty, early in 411, 58.1–7. Only the last was the official treaty, the others being drafts with perhaps local validity. Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:143–146.

16 Thuc. 8.14–17. See, e.g., Kagan 1987, 43–46.

17 Kagan 1987, 38–45.

18 Cf. Meritt et al. 1939–53, 3:358.

19 Thuc. 8.15.2; Meritt et al. 1939–53, 3:356; Kagan 1987, 51f.

20 Thuc. 8.16.1.

21 For the fighting at Miletus, Thuc. 8.25.1–27.6; Kagan 1987, 60–68.

22 Kagan 1987, 64.

ing the Spartans. At this juncture, after the reverse at Miletus, if not earlier, many of the leaders began to question the utility of democracy. With pay for juries and various offices it was expensive, and the assembly was apt to be stern and arbitrary with the leaders.

The island of Samos became the main Athenian base in the eastern Aegean in the summer of 412, after the arrival of Strombichides with the eight ships mentioned above, followed shortly by twelve with Thrasycles and sixteen with Diomedon.[23] Samos was at the time controlled by an oligarchy.[24] Shortly after the arrival of Diomedon there was a popular revolt against the oligarchs with the co-operation of the three Athenian ships in the harbour at the time. The remaining thirty-three ships were presumably on operations elsewhere. Two hundred Samian oligarchs were slain, four hundred exiled, and their property was confiscated.[25] Democracy was re-established with some effort and bloodshed. After this Leon arrived from Athens with ten more ships.[26] By the end of the summer of 412 forty-eight more ships, with 1,000 Athenian and 1,500 Argive hoplites, arrived under the command of Phrynichus, Onomacles and Scirinus, for a total of ninety-four ships, some of which were simply transports.[27] During the winter of 412/11 another thirty ships arrived under Charminus, Euctemon, and Strombichides.[28] Presumably Strombichides had previously returned to Athens with some units, since Thucydides gives the total of fighting ships after his arrival as 104. Thirty were detached for duty at Chios, leaving seventy-four at Samos.[29] Thrasybulus was presumably one of the trierarchs among these various arrivals and detachments for various duties. Since there seems to have been considerable activity, it is unlikely that he was at Samos for much time.

Already some limitations had been placed on the democracy in Athens by the installation of the ten *probouloi*, but the pay for the courts and the Council continued. The feelings of disillusionment and discontent with democracy came to a head among the leaders of this fleet at Samos in late 412, a little after the time of their defeat at Miletus. They are the ones whom Thucydides calls οἱ ἐν τῇ Σάμῳ τριήαρχοί τε τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ δυνατώτατοι, 'the trierarchs and the most powerful men among the Athenians in Samos.'[30] Thucydides has been interpreted by Kagan[31] as including *all* the trierarchs present. Presum-

23 Thuc. 8.17.3, 8.19.2.
24 Thuc. 8.21; cf. Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:44–47.
25 Thuc. 8.21.
26 Thuc. 8.23.1.
27 Thuc. 8.25.1.
28 Thuc. 8.30.1.
29 Thuc. 8.30.2.
30 Thuc. 8.47.2.
31 Kagan 1987, 113–117.

ably among these was Thrasybulus, if he was there. They were already contemplating some sort of coup when Alcibiades intervened. Thucydides claims that Alcibiades had plans to gain influence with Tissaphernes, the Persian satrap, and to engineer his own return to Athens. Life was getting too risky and unpleasant for him among the Spartans. He was, *inter alia*, on very bad terms with King Agis. Rumour had it that Alcibiades' affair with Agis' queen was not unconnected with Agis' hostility.[32]

Alcibiades got in touch with these powerful men at Samos and let it be known that the price for his good offices with Tissaphernes (and consequent funding from the Persians) was the overthrow of the democracy that had exiled him. The majority of the leaders at Samos accepted his terms, though one of the opponents was Phrynichus. They got in touch with discontented elements in Athens, and a delegation was sent to negotiate with Alcibiades. In Athens, the δυνατώτατοι, the 'most powerful,' began to be enthusiastic about the idea of overthrowing democracy.[33] The soldiers and sailors at Samos were informed and voted to support the deal with Alcibiades and the necessary change to oligarchy, especially as it presented the prospect of regular pay, though apparently they did so with some hesitation.[34]

Pisander, a radical democratic politician, and a considerable orator who had been one of the trierarchs,[35] was sent to Athens by the leaders of the fleet. He persuaded the reluctant assembly that if Athens wanted financial and military aid from Tissaphernes and the Persian King (via Alcibiades), then they had to install an oligarchy.[36] The assembly gave way, and authorized him, with ten others, to negotiate with Tissaphernes at Sardis.

Before he left, Pisander did two things. First, he obtained the dismissal of Phrynichus from his generalship because of his handling of the Miletus affair; Phrynichus and another dismissed general, Scironides, returned home in Pisander's absence and soon became deeply involved in promoting the oligarchy. Diomedon and Leon, supporters of democracy, were sent out to replace them.[37] Second, Pisander made contact with the *synomosiai* (συνωμοσίαι), the political clubs, and organized them to subvert the democracy.[38]

32 Plut. *Alc.* 24.2.

33 Thuc. 8.48.1.

34 Thuc. 8.48.3. Note Thucydides' contemptuous dismissal of the 'mob,' ὁ ὄχλος, and their reactions.

35 Ostwald 1986, 351, for a sketch of Pisander.

36 Thuc. 8.54.1.

37 Thuc. 8.54.3; Andrewes 1992, 472f. According to Thucydides Phrynichus had been involved in a very complicated double-cross of Alcibiades that did not work and need not be entered into here.

38 Thuc. 8.54.4. For the clubs see Calhoun 1913.

Pisander then departed with ten colleagues to Asia Minor to confer with Tissaphernes and Alcibiades during the winter of 412/11. In the negotiations the Athenians agreed to surrender all of Ionia and the offshore islands, but balked at the demand that the King should have unlimited access with his fleets to the Aegean coast and broke off the talks.[39] They returned to Samos, and the oligarchic element reinforced its hold on that island, putting in train plans to overthrow the Samian democracy. The leaders also concluded that Alcibiades was not a proper person to join the oligarchy, and that he really did not want to join them, and so decided to leave him alone.[40] Pisander and half the delegates thereupon returned to Athens, setting up oligarchies on every island they visited on the way.[41]

Meanwhile the democracy at Athens was being steadily undermined. The *synomosiai* had murdered 'without being detected' the democratic leader Androcles (who was responsible for exiling Alcibiades) and other prominent democrats. They also put forward a programme that would entrust the government of the state to a body of unpaid members of the more prosperous classes, those who could afford armour, the hoplites, a minimum of five thousand. According to Aristotle the Five Thousand would be divided, on the Boeotian pattern, into four councils, each of which would take its turn in acting as an Executive Council, with the other three acting as a kind of Assembly.[42] But the Five Thousand, however organized 'was merely a piece of propaganda (εὐπρεπές) designed for the general public, since the revolutionaries themselves were going to take over power.'[43] The city was ripe for an oligarchy.

After Pisander and his colleagues arrived back, they persuaded the assembly to form a committee to draw up proposals for the best possible government (oligarchic, of course) to be presented on a certain day. The committee was, obviously, hand-picked. When the day arrived the assembly met outside the city at Colonus.[44] The committee suggested suspending the *graphe paranomon*, the indictment for promulgating unconstitutional laws, and other safeguards against motions that would subvert the constitution, and their recommendation was approved. Pisander himself[45] then moved a proposal

39 Thuc. 8.56.4; Andrewes 1992, 475.

40 Thuc. 8.63.4.

41 Thuc. 8.65.1.

42 *Ath. Pol.* 30.3. Andrewes 1992, 476, argues that the Five Thousand as described here was a fiction of oligarchic propaganda, since it did not become established before the fall of the Four Hundred; but, as Thucydides makes clear, it was persuasive propaganda.

43 Thuc. 8.66.1.

44 Andrewes 1992, 475, n. 17, points out that the usual reason advanced by historians for the location, that only armed men could attend, really is not very convincing, and that the real reason is unknown.

45 Thuc. 8 68.1. For the contradiction with *Ath. Pol.* see Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:217.

that passed: it established a new council of four hundred in place of the democratic five hundred, the infamous Four Hundred; it enacted the dismissal of the present Council and executive; the abolition of pay; it laid out a complicated and doubtless 'fixed' way of choosing the Four Hundred; it outlined their 'temporary' powers; and indicated the eventual formation of the Five Thousand.[46] The old Council was dismissed shortly thereafter, with the aid of several hundred armed men.[47]

Pisander was ably abetted by a very competent orator, Antiphon. His old fellow-general, whom he had succeeded in getting dismissed, Phrynichus, became a remarkably enthusiastic leader among the oligarchs of the Four Hundred. They were joined by one of the most slippery and treacherous of the slippery opportunists of the time, Theramenes, son of Hagnon, a fellow-demesman of Thrasybulus.[48] Their switch from being democrats to becoming oligarchic leaders of the Four Hundred is a phenomenon all too familiar to students of twentieth century history, where Communists have become Fascists and vice versa with considerable facility. The absence of both Pisander and Phrynichus from Samos, for they were capable men, no doubt materially weakened the leadership of the oligarchic supporters there and gave the democratic opposition a better chance.

Eventually it emerged that the oligarchs at Athens were not at all interested in getting aid from the Persian King or in getting Alcibiades back. They did not want to carry on the war. They wanted peace with Sparta and power for themselves in a narrow oligarchy. They did not want or need Alcibiades in the least. Nor did they want to install the Five Thousand. They pushed through changes to the constitution, aided by a judicious use of intimidation and terror. The Four Hundred were not as secure, however, as they might have seemed to be, and their rule was brief, about four months.

Though the coup succeeded at Athens, it did not do well in Samos, where it began. Though the sailors and soldiers had voted to support the change, by the time that the Four Hundred were installed in Athens, by March 411, opinion was turning against the idea of oligarchy.[49] Thrasybulus, as well as others, had presumably been speaking out against oligarchy vigorously, and he and Thrasyllus, a hoplite presumably representing the army, were recognized as the leaders of the democrats.

The newly established democracy among the inhabitants of Samos found itself in an increasingly awkward position, with the Athenian leadership on

46 Thuc. 8.67.3; Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:168f.; Kagan 1987, 147–149; Ostwald 1986, 364–387.

47 Thuc. 8.69.1–4.

48 Thuc. 8.68.1–4. For Theramenes see Buck 1995, 14–23 and Ehrhardt 1995, 125f.

49 Thuc. 8.73.1.

the island turning oligarchic. Some three hundred of the democrats had been won over to oligarchy by Pisander before he left for Athens, and to show their enthusiasm for the new government of the Four Hundred they murdered an Athenian political exile, Hyperbolus, the last man ostracized. This was at the behest of other Athenian oligarchs, including the general Charminus, who presumably had taken over on the departure of Pisander. They did other acts of violence for the Athenian oligarchic conspirators and so gained their support. They then were ready to install their own Samian oligarchy, with attendant massacres of the Samian democrats.[50] The latter learned of these plans and approached two of the generals, Leon and Diomedon, who did not support any oligarchy, and also Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus, as well as some others known to be deeply opposed to the activities of those endeavouring to subvert democracy and establish oligarchy. It is significant that Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were already well known as opponents of the oligarchy and were important and influential enough to be approached along with the generals. The Samians besought them not to let them be destroyed and Samos, the main base for regaining the empire, alienated.[51]

Thrasybulus and the others acted promptly. They must have been men of considerable political prominence to have had the prestige and authority to accomplish what they did. Thucydides says that Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were instrumental in rallying the sailors and the Samian democrats. They were the instigators of the counter-revolution (προειστήκεσαν τῆς μεταβολῆς).[52] They did some vigorous campaigning among the Athenian soldiers and sailors, especially the crew of the *Paralus*, the Athenian state trireme, the flagship, so to speak, and Leon and Diomedon earmarked some (pro-democratic) ships to stay as guards in case the rest of the fleet had to sail off. The result was that when the Samian oligarchs made their attempt, the Athenians aided materially in crushing it, thirty of the three hundred Samian conspirators being killed and three of the most guilty being exiled.[53] Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus must have been very much involved in the fighting that stopped the oligarchs. They gained considerably in prestige among the troops, so that they, instead of the generals Diomedon and Leon or the others approached, became the popular leaders.

If Thucydides is taken correctly by having *all* the trierarchs on Samos involved in the conspiracy in the previous year, then it follows that either Thrasybulus had changed his views since then,[54] or he was not at Samos at a

50 Thuc. 8.73.2–3.
51 Thuc. 8.73.4.
52 Thuc. 8.75.2.
53 Thuc. 8.73.4–6.
54 So Kagan 1987, 113–117.

time appropriate to become involved in the conspiracy.[55] It is possible that he was absent with his ship on various missions at the critical times, perhaps under Diomedon or Leon, or that the interpretation is unduly strained. If he had originally supported the oligarchs, then he rapidly changed his mind and stayed consistently and sturdily pro-democratic for the next twenty-three years, the rest of his life. It seems more likely that he was always a supporter of democracy, as Thucydides implies, and so either was away from Samos at the time of the negotiations or one of the minority of trierarchs in opposition.

The *Paralus* had been sent to Athens to tell the people about the failed coup on Samos. Thucydides notes that the news that the Four Hundred were now in power had not reached Samos when the ship was despatched. The oligarchs imprisoned some of the crew and transferred the rest to a guard-ship off the coast of Euboea, but one Chaereas, a fervent pro-democrat, escaped and got back to Samos with the news of what had happened and horror stories about the rule of the Four Hundred.[56] The reaction of the soldiers and sailors was predictably violent; they desired to lynch the promoters of oligarchy and anyone else sharing their views. Gradually they were calmed down by those less infuriated, no doubt including Thrasybulus. They pointed out the risk of losing everything, with the enemy close at hand and ready to fight. At any rate, the oligarchic supporters of the Four Hundred in the fleet at Samos were overborne. Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus thereupon made all the sailors and soldiers, 'and especially those of the oligarchy,' swear binding oaths to support the democracy, to avoid dissension, and to carry on the war against the Peloponnesians.[57] Thrasybulus was clearly no 'moderate.' The Samians of military age joined in swearing the oath, as if they were honorary Athenians. This treatment of the Samians foreshadows what Thrasybulus wanted for the metics and his foreign supporters after the overthrow of the Thirty.

Meanwhile the Four Hundred had sent ten delegates to meet with the fleet at Samos to explain their position, but they got no further than Delos when they learnt of the situation at Samos. There they stayed for some time.[58]

The troops then held an assembly, and they dismissed all their previous generals, including Diomedon and Leon, and several trierarchs (they were taking no chances). They elected other trierarchs and generals, of whom Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were the chiefs.[59] Clearly Thrasybulus was a very

55 So McCoy 1991, 303–323. He argues that Thrasybulus was absent with Diomedon (306f.), and had been an important figure in suppressing the previous Samian revolt. As such he was not involved with the oligarchs and so Kagan's idea that he had changed his mind is wrong.

56 Thuc. 8.74.1–3 intimates they were much exaggerated.

57 Thuc. 8.75.2.

58 Thuc. 8.77.

59 Thuc. 8.76.2. Andrewes in Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:268, suggests that among the

able politician and could and did manoeuvre effectively both to overthrow the supporters of oligarchy on Samos and to gain power for himself as a supporter of democracy. Thrasyllus must have been of the same sort.

Various speeches were delivered at this assembly by speakers not identified by Thucydides, possibly Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus among them. They encouraged the troops and pointed out, with a little sophistry, that they were in a better position than the oligarchs in Athens, since they had the navy and the ability to collect funds; Samos was a strong base; they controlled the sea; Athens was useless, as it had no money; they were in a good position to deal with Alcibiades; all they had to do was to guarantee his security and recall him from exile, and the money would come pouring in from the King. There was no mention of any oligarchy in place of the democracy; that idea was tacitly dropped. The summary of the speeches sounds like the 'pep-talk' of generals and politicians, perhaps including Thrasybulus, though it may be a little too smooth and sophistic for him.[60]

After overcoming some vigorous opposition, Thrasybulus and the other leaders managed to get a decree passed to recall Alcibiades. Thrasybulus himself then sailed to Tissaphernes and brought Alcibiades back to Samos to address an assembly. The speech was very powerful and moving, and it was very well received; Alcibiades was promptly elected general.[61] He then managed to put a stop for the time being to any wild ideas of crossing the Aegean and attacking the Piraeus, and leaving their more immediate enemies behind. He then went off to visit Tissaphernes and, he said, to make arrangements about the conduct of the war, but really, says Thucydides, 'he succeeded in making Tissaphernes afraid of the Athenians and the Athenians afraid of Tissaphernes.'[62]

Shortly after Alcibiades' return from Tissaphernes the delegates from the Four Hundred who had delayed at Delos finally arrived at Samos. Their arguments for the oligarchy, which were heard only with some difficulty over the heckling and barracking from the audience, were violently rejected by the members of the Assembly, who were all for sailing immediately to attack the Piraeus. Alcibiades was able to talk them out of this, since Ionia and the Hellespont would have been left completely unprotected. It must have been a superb speech, and Thucydides says that only he could have done it.[63]

other generals elected were Chaereas, Eumachus, Diodorus, and Mantitheus. Presumably a full slate of all ten was not elected, since Alcibiades was later named a general.

60 Thuc. 7.76.3–7; cf. Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:268–270. Kagan, 1987, 115; McCoy 1991, 313 and n. 37.

61 Thuc. 8.81.1–82.1.

62 Thuc. 8.82.1–3.

63 Thuc. 8.86.1–5.

Doubtless somewhat shaken by their reception, the delegates returned to Athens and reported what happened. They also delivered Alcibiades' message that the Four Hundred had to go and be replaced by the Five Thousand. The oligarchy was already in difficulties, and some of its leaders, such as Theramenes and Aristocrates, were deserting its cause and ultimately were responsible for bringing it down.[64] The democrats at Samos did not intervene. There is no need here to go into the machinations by which Theramenes and his colleague Aristocrates overthrew the Four Hundred and saw to the installation of the Five Thousand in September, 411. It is clear that Theramenes ceased to have any enthusiasm for the Revolution after the democrats headed by Thrasybulus prevailed in Samos, as Thucydides (8.89.1–3) makes perfectly plain. Theramenes made his move as soon as an opportunity presented itself.

The Five Thousand and the democrats at Samos soon arrived at a *modus vivendi* in the fall of 411.[65] It was this new government that was visited by Thrasyllus later on, after the battle of Abydos, and which sent out Theramenes with a force of some thirty ships.[66]

Thrasybulus had been a strong advocate for Alcibiades throughout the negotiations leading up to his recall and was the one who fetched him to Samos. Both later worked well together in operations against the Lacedaemonians and their allies. It is worth emphasizing that there is nothing about this in Diodorus, who concentrates on the virtues of Theramenes and merely has Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus elected generals and exercising the fleet.[67] Nothing about the intrigues of Phrynichus, nothing about the attempted oligarchic coup at Samos thwarted by the two, or about the problems they faced in getting Alcibiades to the fleet.

A few authorities claim that at this point, if not earlier, Thrasybulus joined the faction of Alcibiades and continued to remain loyal to him.[68] This ignores the remark in Nepos that claims that Alcibiades after Cyzicus took credit properly belonging to Thrasybulus. An inference from that would be that the relationship was strictly business. It almost looks as if there was a conscious effort to keep Thrasybulus out of the limelight until 406. There are some hints that among Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Thrasyllus there was at first a divi-

64 Thuc. 8.89.1–3; Diodorus 13.38.1–2 makes Theramenes responsible for overthrowing the oligarchy and recalling Alcibiades, and heaps praise upon him. If his source here is P, then we have a strong pro-Theramenes bias here. Buck 1995, 17f. For more favourable interpretations, Ostwald 1986, 426f., Adeleye 1973, 77–80.

65 Thuc. 8.97.3; Busolt 1893–1904, 3:1510, n. 2; Kagan 1987, 204.

66 Kagan 1987, 234 and n. 83.

67 Diod. 13.38.3, no doubt stemming back to Ephorus, and with the pro-Theramenes bias from P.

68 Strauss 1984, 42 and nn. 21, 22, following an idea adumbrated by Beloch 1884, 118f., in the context of explaining why there was coolness between Conon and Thrasybulus.

sion of responsibilities, whereby Alcibiades was to deal with the Persians and the Ionians, and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were to fight the Peloponnesians. It seems that the original plan was for a triumvirate to direct affairs in the northern Aegean.[69]

After his election as general Thrasybulus probably did exercise the fleet, since training and practicing various fleet evolutions were doubtless necessary for the newly mobilized ships, many of which had been on detached duty after being sent out piecemeal from Athens as their ships were readied. He did it again before Cynossema.

Meanwhile the Spartans had built up a considerable fleet at Miletus by the summer of 411, some 112 ships.[70] Mindarus, the new commander, was following a strategy of detaching squadrons to start rebellions here and there in the Empire, brush-fires with which the Athenians could not cope.[71]

By August 411, ten ships under Helexus of Megara had arrived at the Hellespont and raised rebellions at Byzantium and in neighbouring towns.[72] They were later reinforced by sixteen more, who gained part of the Chersonese, modern Gallipoli. Mindarus also detached Dorieus with thirteen ships to deal with a rebellion on Rhodes.[73]

The Athenians had sent twenty ships to the Hellespont, and these skirmished with the Spartan fleet. Thirteen were with Alcibiades.

CYNOSSEMA

From Thucydides[74] we learn that some weeks after his election as general Thrasybulus took a squadron of five ships to Eresus in Lesbos. Eresus had been brought to rebellion by the attack of a mercenary force hired by some Mytilenean aristocrats. They were commanded by a Theban, Anaxarchus, in honour of the ancient connection between Lesbos and Boeotia. The force had attempted to capture Methymna and had been repulsed before it turned its attentions to Eresus.[75] Meanwhile Thrasyllus went with the main squadron from Samos to blockade the Peloponnesian fleet at Miletus. He seems to have been a better hoplite than sailor. The Peloponnesians slipped past him and got out of Miletus; Thrasyllus led his force in pursuit and finally joined Thrasybu-

69 Cf. Bloedow 1991, 26f.
70 Kagan 1987, 214.
71 Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:66.
72 Thuc. 8.80.3–4.
73 Diod. 13.38.5. Thucydides does not mention this incident.
74 Thuc. 8.100.4.
75 Thuc. 8.100.3.

lus off Lesbos. Thrasybulus assumed command of the whole Athenian fleet.[76] Alcibiades was off negotiating with Tissaphernes.

The Peloponnesian fleet under Mindarus moved up into the Straits. It soon cleared the small Athenian squadron out of the area and gained control of the vital grain route. This undermined the very existence of Athens and put great pressure on Thrasybulus to do something very quickly.[77]

The Athenian fleet, after it was further reinforced by various scattered units, moved to the Hellespont, where it made its base at Elaeus. Here Thrasybulus gave the fleet practice in tactics for five days.[78] When he was ready he led his seventy-six triremes toward Sestos and the main Spartan base at Abydos. As the commander-in-chief he commanded the right wing of the fleet.[79] He has been criticized for his strategy in fighting in the narrow waters off Gallipoli, but it is clear that he had little choice, since the Peloponnesian fleet was in the Straits blocking the grain route and had to be dealt with; he made the best of an unsatisfactory situation. He was attacking a larger Peloponnesian fleet of eighty-six ships, and this fact should indicate a certain amount of confidence on the part of the Athenians.

The battle, fought in late September, 411, was a near-run thing. As the Athenian fleet rounded the cape of Cynossema on the Gallipoli coast, the Peloponnesians attacked. Thucydides implies that Thrasybulus showed great intelligence in his handling of the situation.[80] The Peloponnesians hit the centre, while the left wing, under Thrasyllus, was fully occupied and out of sight, but Thrasybulus was able to extend the right wing, and, when the enemy became disorganized, was able to strike a decisive blow. It is not completely clear how Thrasybulus was able to rout the Peloponnesian ships that were pressing him so hard, though Kagan gives a reasonable picture,[81] but all the sources say that his manoeuvres were instrumental in defeating the Peloponnesian fleet. The Athenians captured twenty-one of the Peloponnesian ships, losing fifteen of their own. Though it was not a decisive victory, it is obvious that Thrasybulus was a very competent officer. He led an Athenian fleet that was smaller than the enemy's to the first major Athenian victory since the Sicilian expedition. He then won, in November 411, a second victory near the Spartan base at Abydos.

76 So Kagan 1987, 215–218. Thuc. 8.100.
77 Kagan 1987, 217–220, gives a clear summary of the strategic situation.
78 Thuc. 8.102.2–103. Cf. Kagan 1987, 218.
79 Thuc. 8.104.2.
80 Thuc. 8.104.4.
81 Cf. Thuc. 8.105.2 and 3; Kagan 1987, 221–223.

ABYDOS

Thrasybulus with his fleet went up to Cyzicus in the Propontis a few days after Cynossema. It had recently revolted from Athenian rule and needed to be brought back into the fold. There he overwhelmed a small enemy squadron and reattached the town to the Athenian Empire.[82] This may not have been a wise move, although any actions to keep the fleet in fighting trim and to gain funds were probably necessary. It did, however, enable Mindarus, the Spartan commander, to slip down the Hellespont from Abydos and raid the Athenian base at Elaeus while Thrasybulus was further north. He recaptured several of the ships previously taken by the Athenians at Cynossema, and he got away to Abydos before the Athenian fleet could return and catch him.[83]

Mindarus then began to concentrate his forces, which took some time. He summoned two squadrons to join him in the Hellespont: the fifty ships commanded by Agesandridas operating around Euboea; and the fourteen or so ships in the Rhodian area under Dorieus. The Athenians also began concentrating their forces. Thymochares, with the remnant of an Athenian squadron defeated by Agesandridas off Euboea, some fourteen ships, came up from Euboea. The Spartan squadron under Agesandridas is said to have had heavy losses rounding Mount Athos in a storm,[84] but apparently enough survived to enable Agesandridas to defeat Thymochares again, this time off the Hellespont.[85] Alcibiades with an Athenian squadron of thirteen ships had been watching Dorieus.[86] The latter slipped by him and headed for the Hellespont, with Alcibiades in pursuit.

The broad outline of the battle, fought in November, 411, is much the same in both Xenophon and Diodorus.[87] Xenophon, however, is very brief. Both say that Dorieus on his arrival at the Hellespont was spotted by the Athenians. They tried to catch him before he could join the main force under Mindarus at Sestos, and they managed to drive him ashore. Mindarus came to the rescue, and a lively battle ensued. Then Alcibiades came up with his squadron, and the Peloponnesians withdrew. The Athenians won, and they captured several enemy ships and recovered some of their own damaged ones. Beyond this the two sources agree on nothing.

In Xenophon Dorieus had fourteen ships, in Diodorus thirteen. Twenty Athenian ships attacked Dorieus in Xenophon, while the whole fleet of seven-

82 Thuc. 8.107.1.
83 Thuc. 8.107.2.
84 So Diod. 13.41.3, citing Ephorus and an epitaph.
85 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.1. Krentz 1989a, 10–14.
86 Thuc. 8.108.1. We lose Thucydides at this point and henceforth have to rely principally on Xenophon, Diodorus, and P when he can be identified.
87 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.1–7, Diod. 13.45.1–47.2.

ty-four does in Diodorus. The main Athenian fleet was deployed at Madytus in Xenophon, but came up from Sestos in Diodorus. Alcibiades appeared with eighteen ships in Xenophon, but twenty in Diodorus. He sails to the rescue in the historical present in Xenophon, but his appearance is 'unexpected' in Diodorus. The main battle was around Abydos in Xenophon, but around the Dardanian promontory, near where he says Dorieus' ships were beached, according to Diodorus. Mindarus was at Ilium sacrificing according to Xenophon, apparently already in Sestos in Diodorus.

Each gives details omitted by the other. Xenophon says that a coast watcher gave the alarm about the approach of Dorieus; that Pharnabazus in fighting against the Athenians rode his horse out into the sea; and that the Peloponnesians pressed their ships close together and drew them up in a line along the shore. Diodorus says that Thrasybulus led the right wing and Theramenes the left, implying that Thrasybulus was the commander; that both fleets used signals and trumpet calls; that 'Alcibiades ran up a red flag on his own ship, which was a signal arranged beforehand;' that the Athenians erected a trophy for the victory.

As noted in the first chapter there are some studies that would reject the use of Diodorus entirely,[88] but if some details supplementing Xenophon are acceptable, a reconstruction might be made. But Xenophon is not entirely error-free. To have Mindarus at Ilium is an impossibility given the times claimed for the battle;[89] and he does make Alcibiades the hero of the action, coming to the rescue like the U.S. cavalry in a bad Western movie. Still, a few additions from Diodorus seems reasonable to add to the narrative based on Xenophon, a narrative with some excrescences eliminated.

Action was started after Athenian coast-watchers spotted Dorieus and his ships nearing the Hellespont and informed the generals, presumably including Thrasybulus.[90] The Athenians attacked with twenty ships, as Xenophon says, not the full fleet of Diodorus. Dorieus, outnumbered, beached his triremes near Rhoetium, rather than Dardanus as Diodorus states, and defended them from the land. The Athenians drew back. Meanwhile Mindarus came from Abydos to the rescue of his beached squadron with eighty-four ships, as Diodorus states. The Athenians had previously moved their remaining ships down from Abydos to Madytus; now they came out with their full force, seventy-four ships according to Diodorus. By the time battle was joined, Dorieus had been rescued, and Mindarus had ninety-seven ships to deploy, not far from Abydos.

88 Gray 1989 and Tuplin 1986.
89 Tuplin 1986, 54f.
90 Diod. 13.45.2; Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2; see Krentz 1989b, 86–93.

Xenophon gives virtually no details of the battle, but Diodorus does give some, as well as a rather rhetorical description of the actual fighting. Thrasybulus was in command of the Athenian right wing, Thrasyllus of their left. The commander of the right wing is normally the supreme commander of the fleet. Diodorus observes that both sides made use of flag signals and trumpets to control their tactics.

> 'When they were drawn up in this way, the leaders on each side flew the signal for battle, the trumpeters on the command began to give the battle call. None of the oarsmen were lacking in enthusiasm, and the helmsmen were guiding their vessels skillfully. From this a savage battle ensued...' (Diod. 13.45.8). 'For quite a while the battle was even, because of the great courage of both sides. But then Alcibiades appeared unexpectedly (παραδόξως) from Samos with twenty ships, sailing by chance into the Hellespont. When he was far off, each side was hoping that he was bringing reinforcements to them, and with great expectations and much encouraged ran all sorts of risks. But when his squadron was closer, there was no signal for the Spartans, but instead Alcibiades ran up a red flag on his own ship, which was a signal arranged beforehand. Some of the Peloponnesians became demoralized and turned away, and the Athenians, elated by their advantage, pursued with enthusiasm those retiring' (Diod. 13.46.2–3).

Diodorus seems to be in error about Alcibiades appearing unexpectedly at the Hellespont, unless he means that he luckily arrived at the right time. Clearly, since the signals were co-ordinated, Alcibiades was expected, though of course no one knew exactly when. Pharnabazus, says Xenophon, in desperation tried to help the Peloponnesians, riding right out into the sea. The Peloponnesians used a tactic they repeated again and again; they fought along the shore, jamming their ships together and drawing them up in line.[91] It was a handy victory, with the Athenians capturing thirty Peloponnesian ships and recovering the fifteen triremes captured at Elaeus.[92] Thrasybulus should be given the credit for the victory.

91 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.7. Cf. Kagan 1987, 232.

92 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.2–7; Diod. 13.45–46. Diodorus is preferred nowadays for this battle by many authorities, since his version seems to be based on P, even though P, as indicated above, has some peculiarities. Cf. Kagan 1987, 230, n. 69. For the battle, 230–233. See also Ellis 1989, 82. How much of P is transmitted by Ephorus and was not corrupted by him is still an open question.

CYZICUS

After the victory at Abydos the Athenians were very short of funds, according to Alcibiades.[93] Many men of the fleet had gone for months without pay and consequently the generals found themselves under great pressure to collect money for the sailors from the 'allies.' At a talent, or even half a talent, a month to keep a ship afloat, fed, and paid, the pressure was enormous. The closing phases of the Peloponnesian War are marked by the almost continuous, but not especially successful, efforts by Athens to collect money, so as to keep its fleets in being. With most of the Ionian coast gone, it was a very difficult task, as the *Athenian Tribute Lists* makes clear.[94] The intense Athenian searches for money and supplies left only forty ships to watch the Hellespont after the victory. Thrasyllus, the most inexperienced general, at least at sea, was sent to Athens to report to the Five Thousand and ask for reinforcements.[95] Thrasybulus went to the coast of Thrace to gather tribute and to Thasos, which had recently rebelled, probably to collect booty.[96] It is also clear that gathering the tribute implies that Thrasybulus was rebuilding the League in that area, a task that he seems to have carried out successfully. This task apparently occupied him for several months. He was presumably confirmed in his generalship by the government in Athens.[97]

Thrasyllus, incidentally, was a great success back in Athens as a general on land. He managed to send Agis retreating hurriedly from the area of the Lyceum, and so impressed the Athenians that they voted him command of an expedition to Asia Minor.[98] They had already sent out Theramenes with thirty ships, according to Diodorus; he campaigned off Euboea and eventually came up to Thrasybulus in the north Aegean by the spring of 410.[99]

Thrasybulus was one of the generals in command at the battle of Cyzicus, which was fought in March or April, 410.[100] The versions of this battle given by Diodorus and Xenophon are so discrepant that they could be describing two different battles. The two authors have been the subject of searching analysis by Andrewes and Gray, as well as others.[101] There is no consensus.

93 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.14. Krentz 1989b, 93, 97.
94 Cf. Meritt et al. 1939–53. 3:359–366.
95 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.8.
96 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.12; Krentz 1989b, 97.
97 Ostwald 1986, 427.
98 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.33–34; Krentz 1989b, 106f. He was voted 1,000 hoplites, 100 cavalry, and fifty triremes, Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.34.
99 Diod. 13.47.4–8, 49.1. He gives Theramenes thirty ships, but Xenophon has him with only twenty for Cyzicus. Diodorus has him restoring democracy at Paros!
100 Kagan 1987, 247, n. 1; Sealey 1976, 275.
101 Andrewes 1982, 15–25; Gray 1987, 82–84. See also Kagan 1987, 236–246, and 236, n.

According to Xenophon, while Thrasybulus was in the northern Aegean, Alcibiades went in a trireme with suitable gifts to visit Tissaphernes in the Hellespont and to negotiate, doubtless about money. Tissaphernes promptly arrested him and imprisoned him at Sardis along with another Athenian official caught in Persian territory, Mantitheus. Tissaphernes' explanation was that the King had ordered him to declare war on the Athenians. Alcibiades and Mantitheus managed to escape after a month or so; Alcibiades made his getaway by horseback to Clazomenae, and ended up with a small squadron off Lesbos.[102] The adventure demonstrated that Alcibiades really had no influence with Tissaphernes.[103] In fact, Tissaphernes' remark that the Persian King had commanded him to make war on the Athenians means that the King had decided to reject the Athenians and to support the Spartans consistently. Pharnabazus, the other Persian satrap in western Asia Minor, had already been active on behalf of the latter.

Mindarus began concentrating a large Peloponnesian fleet, drawing units from far afield. The Athenian generals at Sestos, with their small and outnumbered squadron, withdrew from the Hellespont to Cardia on the west side of the Gallipoli peninsula. Alcibiades, Thrasybulus, and Theramenes rejoined the fleet. From here on the sources disagree about who took charge, where the detached units rejoined the fleet, whether there was a landing on the territory of Cyzicus, just exactly how the battle was won, whether any fighting took place at sea, and whether Pharnabazus took part.

Andrewes concludes that Diodorus' source here was P, and that P gives a more coherent and accurate version than Xenophon, who leaves several loose ends in his highly dramatic version, one that in supporting Alcibiades has some improbable happenstances and chronological difficulties. Gray, however, argues that Ephorus rewrote his material, including what he got from P, according to a conventional programme based on rhetorical principles, a standard one used for several land- and sea-fights, the pattern including an abrupt turn to face the enemy, their encirclement, their fear and flight and pursuit with heavy casualties. Ephorus' evidence from P, therefore, is so modified that it is a worthless fantasy, as Busolt argued long ago.[104] Krentz suggests that Xenophon may have relied on a Spartan informant, who downplayed Mindarus' falling into an Athenian trap and 'omitted Pharnabazus'

95; Ellis 1989, 84 and n. 82; Littman 1968, 265–272; Tuplin 1986, 60–62; Krentz 1989b, 95–102; Bloedow 1991, 24–27. For the chronology, Kagan 1987, 247, n. 1.

102 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.9–10, followed by Plutarch *Alc.* 26,1. Ellis 1989, 83f., suggests it may be slightly misplaced chronologically for dramatic reasons. No one seems to disbelieve the story, which sounds like something that Hollywood, or Alcibiades, would do. It is not recorded by Diodorus.

103 Kagan 1987, 236.

104 Gray 1987, 78–84; Busolt 1893–1904, 3.2:1588–1609.

involvement to make their defeat less discreditable.' He also built up the role of Alcibiades because of his own prejudice in favour of him.[105]

In my view the role of Alcibiades as the saviour of the fleet should be rejected. His concentration of the fleet at Sestos, the fortuitous arrival of Thrasybulus and Theramenes there, the move to Parium, and the dash through a lucky storm to catch the Peloponnesian fleet, all these are unconvincing. Diodorus – or Ephorus – should be given a little more weight than Gray is willing to give, but only as a supplement for Xenophon, with avoidance of Ephorus' rhetorical programmatic parts.

The Athenian squadron had withdrawn to Cardia from Sestos for fear of being trapped in the straits by the larger Peloponnesian fleet. Mindarus, the Peloponnesian commander, laid siege to Cyzicus, which was still loyal to Athens, with Pharnabazus' army in support and took it. Alcibiades, apparently off Lesbos with five or so triremes, was called in to Cardia, not Sestos, as were Thrasybulus and Theramenes. The combined fleet was, no doubt, in some degree influenced by the ideas of Alcibiades, but he had not yet obtained the pre-eminence he later achieved. Thrasybulus was 'in command of the whole fleet' of eighty-six ships (...Θρασύβουλον τὸν ἀφηγούμενον τοῦ στόλου παντός).[106] He also took command of one of the three divisions, with Theramenes and Alcibiades in charge of the other two. Thrasybulus and Theramenes had the bigger squadrons, while Alcibiades commanded a much smaller one. The fleet sailed around to Elaeus in the Hellespont, then by night to Proconnesus (a good way to avoid discovery), within striking distance of Cyzicus, where Mindarus and the Peloponnesian fleet were based. Thrasybulus divided his forces, using Alcibiades' small squadron as bait to entice the Peloponnesian fleet out of harbour, while the other two squadrons hid behind neighbouring promontories.[107] A rainstorm helped the arrangements, and Mindarus and his sixty ships were actually out exercising when Alcibiades hove into view. When the Peloponnesian fleet pursued far enough, Alcibiades raised a signal. His squadron stopped retreating, while Theramenes' and Thrasybulus' squadrons formed the jaws of a trap that cut off the enemy's path of retreat to the city (Diod. 13.50.3).

105 Krentz 1989b, 99.

106 Diod. 13. 49.1. P's version seems more likely, at least on this point, since Xenophon has already over-emphasized Alcibiades' position. The fact that the Athenians attacked on Alcibiades' signal could well be the starting-point for the idea that he was in command. Cf. Kagan 1987, 238 and Bloedow 1991, 25–27. Nepos, 1.3, notes a tradition that Alcibiades was given – or seized – credit properly belonging to Thrasybulus. Andrewes 1982, 20, n. 12, takes the phrase in Diodorus as meaning that Thrasybulus was in charge of the squadrons operating in the north Aegean, since they had not joined the main fleet. But Diodorus does say 'the whole fleet.'

107 Frontinus 2.5.44. Andrewes 1982, 20.

Mindarus was surrounded in a double envelopment. Nonetheless he managed to fight through to ground his ships on a suitable beach. Here they did what they had done before, moored their ships together in a tight-packed mass and fought off the attackers. The Athenians (no doubt directed by Thrasybulus) had already landed a force under Chaereas to march toward Cyzicus (Diod. 13.49.6). When this force was threatened with being overwhelmed, it was Thrasybulus who landed more marines and ordered Alcibiades and Theramenes to do the same, no doubt by some system of signals. The section of Diodorus dealing with the land fighting is remarkably confused, as one might expect if it is Ephorus being rhetorical. It is clear from Xenophon that the Athenians landed – he mentions only Alcibiades – and there was a fierce fight in which Mindarus was slain and his troops scattered. Pharnabazus withdrew and Cyzicus was retaken. The Athenians raised large sums of money from the citizens. They also intercepted a mournful message from Mindarus' second-in-command to the Spartan administration: 'Ships sunk. Mindarus dead. Men starving. Don't know what to do.'[108]

It is clear from this that if Thrasybulus was then the Athenian commander-in-chief in the Hellespont, he did a brilliant job. Though Xenophon gives all the credit to Alcibiades, it is clear that overmuch has been given to him for his role in this campaign in the Hellespont. Alcibiades achieved leadership in the Aegean later, but perhaps we see here the earliest example of his appropriating credit that properly belonged to Thrasybulus.[109] In fact, Kagan regards Thrasybulus as the ablest commander in all the campaigns in the Hellespont,[110] in my opinion rightly.

CAMPAIGNS TO 406: NOTIUM

In general the Athenian situation looked promising. Much of the Empire was being recovered, especially in the northern Aegean, and there seemed to be good prospects of getting control of such islands as Rhodes and perhaps even of some of the key cities on the coast of Asia Minor. The Athenians began to nurse hopes of complete recovery of the Empire, and of making a deal with the Persians, even of getting some financial aid from them. We can be sure that Alcibiades and his partisans did nothing to discourage such dreams. After Cyzicus, some ten months from the time that they had been installed, the Five Thousand surrendered their powers to the democracy once again, in the

108 Xen. *Hell.* 1.1.23. Ἔρρει τὰ κᾶλα. Μίνδαρος ἀπεσσύα. πεινῶντι τῶνδρες. ἀπορίομες τί χρὴ δρᾶν.

109 Lengauer 1979, 71f.; Bloedow 1973, 84, 86.

110 Kagan 1987, 323f. This is not a commonly shared opinion. Cf., e.g., Hammond 1986, 412; McGregor 1965, 27–42; Ellis 1989, 85f.

summer of 410.[111] Whatever else it may be, the restoration is a mark of the return of self-confidence and of some financial resources to the Athenian people.

By this time Alcibiades had now clearly become the general to whom all Athens looked, and Thrasybulus and Thrasyllus were being relegated to less prestigious positions, whatever their official standings might have been.

Between 411 and 407/6 Thrasybulus apparently was re-elected general several times, probably every year, at least in some instances *in absentia*.[112] He seems to have been, like Alcibiades, away from Athens on operations for most of this period.

We cannot trace Thrasybulus' activities in 409 and 408 with any precision. The problem is not helped by Xenophon's lack of a clear chronology here.[113] Diodorus says that in 409 he returned to the Thracian area, where he brought several more states back under Athenian authority.[114] Krentz suggests that he was elected to govern the Thraceward region, as Diitrephes had been earlier.[115] He continued to act in Thrace with a squadron of thirty ships for the next year, since he is credited with bringing Thasos and Abdera under Athenian control again, probably in 408, possibly in 407.[116] The rather detailed account of some clandestine communication in *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* 6.2 Chambers, 5.2 Bartoletti *may* be an incident of the siege of Thasos.[117] Thra-

111 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 33.2–34.1; Rhodes 1981, 415; Ostwald 1986, 412. Sealey 1975, 291f., argues that the changeover was more apparent than real. Only the Five Thousand could hold office, unpaid, and the Assembly of the People actually governed. Kagan 1987, 253f., argues that the Spartan offer of peace was the catalyst that brought about the move to restore the democracy. There is really no evidence.

112 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.10. Fornara, 1971, 68f. suggests that his generalship, and those of Alcibiades and Theramenes, were not 'official' in 409/8 and 408/7, while Ostwald 1986, 427 is sure they were not elected. They pay too much deference to the arguments of Andrewes 1953, 2–9, on which see Sealey 1975, 288f. and Kagan 1987, 265–268, especially 267, n. 85. Kagan points out that there is no sign in the sources that the three were operating with any change in their status. In fact, Lysias (19.52) has one of his speakers refer to Alcibiades' tenure of the generalship for 'four or five years in succession, being victorious over the Lacedaemonians.' See also Krentz 1989b, 88f.

113 Krentz 1989b, 11–14, gives an excellent summary of the chronological problems.

114 Diod. 13.64.1–3. Diodorus has carelessly confused Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus as the leader of the operations on the coast of Asia Minor. See Xen. *Hell.* 1.2.1–10; Krentz 1989b, 110–115. *Hell. Oxy.* Cairo Frag. 1.8–11, 14–17, 2.2 Chambers; McKechnie and Kern 1988, 118 ad 1.10.

115 Krentz 1989b, 127.

116 Diod. 13.72.1–2 says fifteen ships, but Xenophon, *Hell.* 1.4.9 says thirty. Kagan 1987, 287. Diodorus, as Krentz 1989b, 127, points out, has Thrasybulus taking Thasos at the time of Notium, probably by some chronological telescoping.

117 So Accame 1950, 30–49, though Bruce 1967, 45f. prefers Byzantium. A less likely choice is Chios, Bartoletti 1950, xiii–xiv.

sybulus was probably not involved in the campaign in the Hellespont in 408,[118] and was certainly not at Andros, where Diodorus erroneously places him, but at Thasos.[119]

In the spring of 407 the generals sailed from the Hellespont, leaving Diodorus and Mantitheus behind with a guard.[120] Alcibiades arrived at Athens accompanied by Theramenes and Thrasybulus,[121] but he might as well have been alone for all the attention paid to the other two.[122] Thrasybulus had already been, according to Xenophon, re-elected general *in absentia*, along with Alcibiades,[123] and doubtless Theramenes as well. Alcibiades was triumphantly received, but Xenophon hints at the bitterness of the opposition to him, when he points out his hesitation about coming ashore, and the need for an escort of friends to prevent his arrest.[124] He was named ἡγεμὼν αὐτοκράτωρ, leader with power to act without reference back.[125] Xenophon (1.4.21) says he enrolled an army of 1,500 hoplites, 150 cavalry, and one hundred ships, with Adeimantus and Aristocrates as junior colleagues. Presumably Thrasybulus and Theramenes had independent commands in the northern Aegean and returned there after the visit to Athens.

Alcibiades, Adeimantus, and Aristocrates returned to Samos after an attempt on Andros, where they were unable to take the city, although they had defeated the Andrians in a land battle.[126] The Andrians, who had warmly supported the Four Hundred,[127] apparently revolted after their overthrow and admitted some Spartan troops. Conon, who had also been elected general, was left in charge of the Athenian besiegers.[128]

118 McCoy 1971, 134; Bloedow would place him among the commanders at the siege of Byzantium, Bloedow 1991, 27f., but this seems unlikely.

119 Diod. 13.69.5 for Andros, and 13.72.1 for Thasos. The latter seems more probable. See also Kagan 1987, 308f., and n. 65. He suggests the governor may have been Conon.

120 Diodorus 13.68.1. He puts this under 408, but 407 is the accepted date. See, e.g., Krentz 1989b, 12–14, 128f.; Kagan 1987, 285, n. 38.

121 Nepos *Alc.* 6.3. Krentz 1989b, 129, suggests that Thrasyllus should be read, but he had returned earlier, Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.10. Ostwald 1986, 429, rejects the presence of the two accompanying Alcibiades.

122 The versions of the return in Diodorus (13.68.3–69.2) and Nepos (*Alc.* 6.3–4) are so similar that they should derive from a common source, probably Ephorus and beyond him P.

123 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.10.

124 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.13–20.

125 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.20. Diod. 13.69.3. Ostwald 1986, 429.

126 Xen. *Hell.* 1.,4.21–23; Diod. 13.69.4–5.

127 Thuc. 8.69.3, where the Andrian hoplites aid in the coup of the Four Hundred.

128 Diod. 13.69.4 says that Thrasybulus was left in charge, but Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.18 says that Conon sailed from Andros to take over the fleet on Alcibiades' dismissal. Diodorus 13.72.1 has Thrasybulus at the same time campaigning in the north Aegean, as well as being a subordinate to Alcibiades. Diodorus on Thrasybulus is even more confused

The Spartans had not been idle after Cyzicus. They spent much of 409 and 408 in rebuilding their fleet, and early in 407 a new navarch was sent out, Lysander. Plutarch (*Lysander*) portrays him as a brilliant general and diplomat, ambitious, charming, and unscrupulous.[129] As a navarch he was extremely dangerous, in Athenian eyes. He gathered a fleet of seventy ships at Ephesus.[130] He then visited the new satrap, Cyrus, and obtained handsome subsidies for paying the fleet, which became much more enthusiastic about the war and about following him.[131] Cyrus, younger son of the King, had been sent out to sort out the tangled affairs in western Asia Minor, replacing Tissaphernes.[132]

Alcibiades from here on did not have any successes with which to keep his opponents at bay. The negotiations with the Persians fell through; the word of the increase in pay for the rowers in the Spartan fleet must have added to any discontent and to a drift of personnel to the other side.[133] He was not able to proceed immediately against the Spartan base at Ephesus, but apparently had to raid various rebellious islands and levy 'contributions' to pay his own forces, or so Diodorus says.[134] This effort to pay his troops is surely the basis of the charges that he 'cruised about collecting money and getting roaring drunk and visiting the whores of Abydos and Ionia, while the enemy fleet was stationed just a little away.'[135] The lack of funds, as so often in the closing phases of the War and in the fourth century, was severely hampering Athenian

than usual, and his identification of Thrasybulus with Thrasyllus on a few occasions does not add to one's confidence in his accuracy.

129 Cartledge 1987, 77–89.

130 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.1; Diod. 13.70.1–2.

131 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.3–7; Krentz 1989b, 135–137. If, as Thucydides says, 8.6.1, it cost a talent a month to keep a trireme in action, then each sailor received a drachma a day, and the Persians were willing to pay half-shares for an unlimited number of Peloponnesian vessels at thirty minas a month. But in 8.45.2 he has Alcibiades saying that the Athenians at the time, in 412, were only paying three obols, half a drachma, a day, as they had for a long time. The increase of an obol a day that Lysander wanted would make the pay better than the Athenian, but if the total available funds were 500 talents, the length of time before exhaustion would be appreciably shortened. For the vexed problem of pay rates see Pritchett 1971–85, 1:3–29, Gomme et al. 1945–81, 5:97–99. Krentz 1989b, 125.

132 Xen. *Hell.* 1.4.1–7. Kagan 1987, 294–297; Krentz 1989b, 124f.

133 Plut. *Lys.* 4.4 claims that there were serious desertions from the Athenian fleet. 'Most of their seamen came over to those offering higher pay, and those remaining were discouraged and mutinous and every day gave their generals a hard time.' Kagan 1987, 311, points out that the desertions, if not on Plutarch's scale, were still a factor to be considered.

134 Diod. 13.69.4 at least explains why there was such a delay in proceeding against Ephesus.

135 Plut. *Alc.* 36.2, from a speech by the other Thrasybulus, son of Thrason, of Collytus.

operations. Alcibiades was under tremendous pressure, political, financial, military, to win a big victory over the Spartans, and fast. The Spartan fleet under Lysander was growing stronger, with ninety ships and stable and secure finances. Any Athenian delay would only work to Sparta's advantage. Alcibiades took the Athenian fleet of eighty ships to Notium, the port of Colophon, in late 407, and stayed there for a month or so.[136] Lysander stayed in harbour, apparently adding more ships.

At the end of 407 or early in 406[137] Alcibiades left the fleet at Notium, placing one Antiochus, his κυβερνήτης, helmsman,[138] in charge of it, with strict instructions not to get involved in any action. Antiochus was not a general or even a trierarch, and the reason for the appointment is unknown. It has provoked much criticism. Perhaps it was to ensure that Aristocrates or Adeimantus would not seize the opportunity to fight Lysander. The sources differ on where Alcibiades went and why. Xenophon (1.5.11) says he went to Phocaea to confer with Thrasybulus. 'Alcibiades, having heard that Thrasybulus had come out of the Hellespont to fortify Phocaea, sailed across to him.'[139] Diodorus (13.71.1) says he sailed to Clazomenae, still an Athenian ally, to relieve a siege by some oligarchic exiles, taking some troop-transports with him. Plutarch (*Alc.* 35.8) says he went to Caria to get money. This last is obviously referring to Alcibiades' earlier financial forays and may be safely ignored. Diodorus, however, is here clearly based on P, since one of the fragments mentions Clazomenae.[140]

Therefore there are two strong but different traditions about Alcibiades' leaving the fleet, though the Diodoran version based on P may be much mangled, mostly by Ephorus.[141] Xenophon by his phrasing indicates that the arrival of Thrasybulus to fortify Phocaea was unexpected, at least at the time it happened, and that a conference was required. Diodorus' version, with troop-ships being escorted to relieve a siege of a loyal ally, is reasonable, too. Clearly neither tradition was particularly interested in the reasons why Alcibi-

136 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.12 implies the move to Notium, specified by Diod. 13.71.1. For date see Kagan 1987, 312, n. 82 for references.

137 Kagan, loc. cit. n. 136 supra, points out that the date can be set anywhere between late December 407 and April 406; he prefers a date in late December 407 or early January 406, because of the pressures on Alcibiades. I should prefer a somewhat later date because of the appearance of Thrasybulus and the vigour of the Spartan reaction, unlikely in the depths of winter.

138 'Helmsman' is the usual translation for the experienced seaman who navigated the ship, the sailor who sailed it while the trierarch fought it. Perhaps he is analogous to the old man-of-war Master, for which see *OED s.v.h.* I.2.b. See also Amit 1975, 9f.

139 Ἀλκιβιάδης δὲ ἀκούσας Θρασύβουλον ἔξω Ἑλλησπόντου ἥκοντα τειχίζειν Φώκαιαν διέπλευσε πρὸς αὐτόν...

140 *Hell. Oxy.* 7 Chambers = 3 Bartoletti, and Bruce 1967, 33f. in commentary ad loc.

141 Gray 1987, 83.

ades was absent – provided they were legitimate – only in his absence. This gave Antiochus the opportunity to commit his act of disobedience and folly, thereby bringing down Alcibiades. The moral lesson was the thing of interest, and the circumstances of Alcibiades' absence – an absence that was in itself an error – were extraneous.[142]

Perhaps, as Busolt suggested long ago, Alcibiades did both.[143] He escorted some troop-transports as far as the mouth of the Hermaean Gulf and turned off to Phocaea while the transports sailed on to Clazomenae. They are not very far apart.

There is no ancient evidence about why Thrasybulus was at Phocaea. *A priori*, one would suppose that Thrasybulus would not be operating in this area unless by earlier arrangement, and presumably his arrival was expected, but not as early as he appeared. Phocaea, between the main Athenian bases at Samos and Lampsacus, would be a good spot for operating along the northern part of the Asia Minor coast and for keeping an eyes on Lesbos and Chios. Attacks on the coast were clearly envisaged when Alcibiades was voted hoplites and cavalry. Kagan, following Busolt, has suggested that the deployment of Thrasybulus in this area was part of Alcibiades' planned campaign to reduce at least the northern part of Ionia. In this way Lysander would be forced out to fight and risk losing another Peloponnesian fleet, or much of the coast would be returned tribute-paying status, with disastrous repercussions on the reputation of Sparta.[144] All this sounds very reasonable, but it is far beyond the evidence, as Bloedow intimates.[145]

Diodorus' account of Notium has been shown by Gray[146] to have diverged considerably from the account given by P, probably at the hands of Ephorus for rhetorical reasons. It need not be considered. We are left with Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.5.10–15) and P (*Hell. Oxy.* 8.1–4 Chambers = 4.1–4 Bartoletti). The other sources seem principally to follow one or the other, or both combined.

Both main sources agree that Alcibiades' helmsman, Antiochus, precipitated the sea-fight by sailing very close off Ephesus, accompanied by one other trireme. They do not explain why he did it. Among the conjectures are: a reconnaissance in force gone wrong;[147] a limited operation to counter a feeling of frustration in the Athenian fleet;[148] a prideful attempt to grab some

142 Tuplin 1986, 49f.
143 Busolt 1893–1904, 3.2:1574f.
144 Kagan 1987, 312f.; and n. 86; for the significance of Phocaea Krentz 1989b, 139.
145 Bloedow 1971, 75, n. 447.
146 Gray 1987, 77f.
147 Russell 1994, 35–37.
148 Andrewes 1982, 18f.

credit;[149] enticement by Lysander to catch the fleet wrong-footed;[150] an attempt to re-enact the battle of Cyzicus.[151] P also says that the two ships were covered by a small crack squadron of ten Athenian triremes, though Xenophon makes no mention of this. Both Xenophon and P say that Lysander launched a few ships (three in *Hell. Oxy.* 8.2 Chambers = 4.2 Bartoletti) and that there was a fight into which the other ships were drawn. P seems to say that Antiochus was sunk and killed at the outset, and that the Athenians became disorganized. Then there was in both sources an encounter battle between the Peloponnesians in formation and the Athenians coming up in dribs and drabs. The Athenians were defeated and according to P (8.3) withdrew to Notium. Xenophon says they lost fifteen ships, while P says twenty-two.

It took a day or so to get word to Alcibiades in Phocaea (or perhaps by then in Clazomenae), and in three days , according to P, he got back to Notium, accompanied by Thrasybulus and his thirty ships. In this way he would still have enough ships to outnumber Lysander. The combined fleet went to Samos, and then it challenged Lysander by appearing in battle formation off Ephesus. Wisely he refused to fight, being outnumbered. The Athenian fleet returned to Samos.[152]

The Spartans then moved north to take Delphinion, an Athenian strongpoint on Chios and Teos.[153] Diodorus (13.73.3–5) describes a botched Athenian raid on Cyme, one that ended with Athenians pillaging the territory and suffering a minor defeat on land. Cyme was, however, an allied city.[154] It may be that this was connected with the evacuation of forces from Clazomenae, not mentioned by any source, but which must have happened about this time.

The defeat at Notium was materially not very serious. There was, however, a severe collapse in morale in the fleet,[155] and the strategy started to unravel. Phocaea was abandoned,[156] and along with it any plans to work through northern Ionia. This was not too serious, since many other options lay open, but the extravagant expectations of the Athenians in the miracle-working skills of Alcibiades, that he would clear the islands, including Chios, and all the Ionian coast, and re-establish the Empire, were finally dashed.[157]

149 Plut. *Alc.* 35.5.
150 Paus. 9.32.6.
151 Hatzfeld 1951, 312.
152 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.15.
153 With the emendation of Eion to Teos. See Krentz 1989b, 141.
154 See Kagan 1987, 320, n. 110.
155 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.20.
156 It was the main spot for the Peloponnesians to get to after their defeat at Arginusae, Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.33.
157 For the kind of expectations see Plut. *Alc.* 35.2–3.

Alcibiades' opponents went to work, notably Thrasybulus, son of Thrason of Collytus, the other Thrasybulus. According to Plutarch he sailed to Athens and denounced Alcibiades in the terms quoted above, for graft and corruption, handing over command to drunken louts, and cruising around picking up money.[158] Other sailors from the fleet joined in, as well as his political enemies; he was accused of plundering Cyme; of failing to get support from the Persians; of consorting with the Persians. His popularity with the fleet evaporated. Plutarch in one place (*Lys.* 5.3) and Nepos (*Alc.* 7.3) speak of an actual deposition from office, while Diodorus (13.74.1) and Plutarch in another place (*Alc.* 36.3) talk as if he were simply not re-elected. Alcibiades was probably dismissed, since the general who replaced Conon, who was sent to Samos to take over from him,[159] was not a general among the new slate of ten for 406/5.[160] Alcibiades sailed off to his castle in the Chersonese without going back to Athens.

Thrasybulus, if not dismissed on the spot like Alcibiades, which is probably what happened, was not re-elected for the coming year. Theramenes, too, seems to have been involved in the débacle, since he, too, was not re-elected in 406, but Thrasyllus was. It is unclear whether this indicates a shift in factional alliances,[161] or that Thrasyllus was in another area and so not to be held responsible. Guilt by association is a not a rare political phenomenon, and the dismissal of Thrasybulus and Theramenes resembles what happened to Leon and Diomedon. Presumably Thrasybulus returned to Athens at the end of his generalship, whenever it ceased. The idea, first suggested by Beloch,[162] that the later rivalry between Conon and Thrasybulus had its genesis at this time, has gained considerable popularity, in spite of the fact that there is no evidence to support it. It is, however, not an unlikely conjecture.[163] Clearly, by 393 Conon and Thrasybulus were not on good terms with one another, though simple rivalry and jealousy at the time might explain it.

158 Plut. *Alc.* 36.1–2.

159 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.17–18.

160 Phanosthenes Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.18f., Fornara 1971, 69f.; Roberts 1982, 224, n. 62; Kagan 1987, 322, n. 120.

161 So Kagan 1987, 324, 326; Ostwald 1986, 430f. However, Krentz 1989b, 142f. points out that not too much should be read into the failure of Theramenes and Thrasybulus to be re-elected, since several of the generals elected had close ties to Alcibiades.

162 Beloch 1884, 118f.

163 Strauss 1984, 42f. and nn. 21, 22.

THRASYBULUS' CHARACTER

Thrasybulus was a man trusted and respected by most Athenians. He must have been a politician already known as a man of great integrity and ability to have attained the position he had in 411 and to have kept it. He lost his generalship and his *auctoritas* temporarily in 406 by guilt through association, being too close to that brilliant rascal Alcibiades in the events leading up to the battle of Notium. He had also been a general operating with Alcibiades for years, working well with him. This close professional association implies little about mutual liking or dislike, however.

Thrasybulus was a man of consistent principles, a type all too rare in the last fevered years of the Peloponnesian War. He was steadfast in his belief in and loyalty to democracy and steadfastly opposed to oligarchy. He was intelligent, and a brilliant general in the Hellespont. He had enough diplomatic and military skill to repair some of the damage in the Thracian region and recover much of it for the Empire. He let credit be awarded to others and lacked that unscrupulousness that seems to have been a useful quality in the latter half of the Peloponnesian War. He emerges as a rather attractive figure, holding purposefully to his love of democracy, a nice man who was apt to finish last. There is nothing in the record to support the view that Thrasybulus was a political 'moderate,' sharing the same general view of democracy as Theramenes, though the two seem to have been of the same rather high social class.[164]

164 See McCoy 1971, *passim*; Strauss 1986, 94.

CHAPTER 3

ARGINUSAE AND THE THIRTY
407–403 B.C.

Thrasybulus was not a member of the new board of generals elected for 406/5. He was only a private citizen, presumably in Athens, when the Athenians under the command of Conon were defeated off Lesbos, and the forty survivors of their main fleet were trapped at Mytilene.[1]

Conon, the commander who replaced Alcibiades, arrived with his twenty ships from Andros in early 406.[2] He found the fleet demoralized and shorthanded. He was forced to regroup by putting his crews into seventy ships, where there had previously been over a hundred.[3] He promptly set out with these to collect funds by landing at various places and plundering enemy territory.

In the spring of 406 a new Spartan commander, Callicratidas, arrived to replace Lysander, whose term had expired. There was some discontent at the new policy of annual rotation of navarchs, but Callicratidas proceeded to gather a fleet of 140 ships at Ephesus.[4] He thus outnumbered Conon by two to one, and he had considerable Persian financial support.

Callicratidas then proceeded to practice the converse of the strategy that Alcibiades had been about to try; he moved on the various Athenian holdings off the northern Ionian coast, attacking and eventually capturing Methymna in Lesbos.[5] Conon in the meantime was forced to come to the aid of Lesbos. What happened next at the so-called battle of Mitylene is a matter of dispute, but how Conon escaped unscathed from the Athenian courts afterwards remains a mystery.

1 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.15–18. The elaborate story told in Diodorus 13.77.2–79.7 seems to be incredible to most. Gray 1987, 84f., following Busolt, shows that it is not based on P, but on the rhetoric of Ephorus.

2 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.18. It is significant of Athenian financial problems that the squadron that replaced his was of only four ships.

3 Xen. *Hell.* 1.5.20. Krentz 1989, 144f., suggests that the others were being repaired. It seems to me more likely that the higher pay on the Peloponnesian side may have been causing repercussions and crew shortages. Note that Conon's first action was to collect funds.

4 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.1–4. Sealey 1976, 347.

5 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.12–15; Diod. 13. 76.5.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.6.15–23) gives a fairly cursory account, its clarity not helped by a textual problem (1.6.17). Diodorus (13.77.1–79.7) gives a much fuller story, which, as Krentz has demonstrated,[6] does not contradict Xenophon, but fills the holes in his account. Unfortunately much of the filling seems to be afflicted with Ephoran rhetoric.[7]

Conon, even though outnumbered, put out to sea to attempt to bring help to Methymna.[8] On learning that it was captured, he stopped for the night at the Hecatonisi Islands, northeast of Lesbos, at the mouth of the Adramyttenic Gulf, halfway between Mytilene and Methymna.[9] At dawn Conon put out to sea, and the enemy came streaming out from Methymna in pursuit, so as to cut him off from Samos.[10] There was some sort of a fight near Mytilene. According to Diodorus the Athenians hoped the pursuing fleet would become strung out and could be attacked in detail. It did become scattered, and the Athenians turned and routed their opponents, as Polyaenus also reports.[11] Unfortunately, the Athenians pursued too far and got caught by the rest of the enemy fleet, losing thirty ships, the crews escaping. Xenophon reports that there was a fight 'near the harbour,' where Conon lost the thirty ships, the men escaping to the land.[12] The upshot was that the forty remaining Athenian ships were trapped in the inner harbour, with 170 Peloponnesian ships blockading them.

Conon managed to slip two ships through the blockade, and one made it to Athens with the bad news, its arrival dated about the middle of June.[13] Diomedon, another general, also brought the tidings to Athens with the last two ships of his squadron of twelve, which had also been caught by the Spartans.[14] 'When the Athenians learned what had happened and about the blockade, they voted to rescue Conon with 110 ships, embarking all those of military age, both slaves and freemen. Within thirty days they manned the 110 ships and sent them off. Even many of the cavalry class were aboard.'[15] To pay for the repair of ships, for the new crews and for all the equipment, the state was compelled to melt down the golden statues of Nike and other valuables on the Acropolis, thereby realizing 200 talents.[16] Diodorus

6 Krentz 1988, 128–130.
7 Gray 1987, 85.
8 Diod. 13.77.1. Xenophon gives no reason for Conon's foray, and at least this makes sense.
9 Diod. 13.77.2.
10 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.15 and Diod. 13.77.2.
11 Polyaenus 1.48.2.
12 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.17.
13 Kagan 1987, 338 and n. 42.
14 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.22–23.
15 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.24.
16 Kagan 1987, 338, and Krentz 1989, 151, citing Hellanicus, *FGrH* 323a F 26, and Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 141. The figure of 204 talents is from Thompson 1970, 1–6.

(13.97.1) gives a very different version, with sixty ships being sent to Samos, where they 'came up with the other generals who had gathered eighty ships from the other islands.' What other generals? Diodorus' eighty ships seems a very large number to be raised from the islands[17] and is generally rejected. Xenophon is generally preferred for the narrative of the battle, since Diodorus' account, derived from Ephorus, is generally thought to be a rhetorical muddle, with perhaps nuggets of truth buried here and there.[18]

One of the 110 ships was captained by Thrasybulus, another by Theramenes. Though most of the crews were unskilled and inexperienced, there may have been some experienced sailors, like Theramenes and Thrasybulus, who had been left at home, as Diodorus seems to hint (13.99.2). Still, the fleet was not trained as a unit, and it had mostly raw, scratch crews, even if it contained some of the cream of Athenian society, and there was little time for it to have much drill and practice in tactics. Several of the eight generals in charge are thought to have been political rivals of Thrasybulus, but the evidence for this is thin. One of them, Thrasyllus, was an old colleague from the time of the Four Hundred, and Diomedon and Aristocrates served with Thrasybulus and Theramenes in the north Aegean. Aristocrates was Theramenes' partner in his actions in overthrowing the Four Hundred.

ARGINUSAE

The fleet sailed out and picked up from Samos another ten or so ships, Samian vessels, and another thirty-odd from various other allies, for a total of 150 to the Peloponnesians' 170.[19] In some over-confidence Callicratidas, the Peloponnesian commander, left fifty ships under Eteonicus to keep Conon blockaded and came out with 120. Xenophon alleges that he attempted a night attack on the Athenian fleet at Arginusae, one frustrated by a storm. This is in contrast to Alcibiades, who used the shelter of a storm to his advantage at Cyzicus.[20]

The facts that all the skilled Athenian crews were blockaded in Mytilene, and that the fleet was raw and untrained in evolutions governed the tactics

Krentz suggests on the basis of *IG* 1^3 117, as restored by Meritt, that Alcibiades had arranged in the summer of 407 for the construction of new triremes in Macedonia, and that these were ready and the melting of the Nikai was to pay for them. This would explain how they could produce so many triremes so rapidly.

17 So Kagan 1987, 338 and n. 44, following Busolt 1893–1904, 3.1590, n. 1.

18 See Gray 1987, 84–86; Kagan 1987, 340f., with notes. Krentz 1989b, 151, tries to give Diodorus some credit for his version of the battle, and for his version of the trial.

19 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.25.

20 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.28.

followed by the Athenian generals.[21] In recognition of the low level of skill in their fleet they stationed their ships two deep on the wings and in single file in the centre, where they concentrated the most skillful crews. That is, four squadrons of fifteen ships each, totalling sixty ships, on each wing, deployed in two files, with three squadrons of ten ships each in single file linking them, giving a frontage of ninety ships. Aristocrates had the left wing with Diomedon next to him, and Pericles behind Aristocrates and Erasinides behind Diomedon. On the right wing was Protomachus with Thrasyllus to his left, and Lysias behind Protomachus and Aristogenes behind Thrasyllus. Of the centre squadrons the left one of ten ships was the Samian unit commanded by Hippieus of Samos, the centre one of ten ships under the ten taxiarchs, and the right one of about ten to fifteen other allied ships under the three navarchs. 'By sheer bulk they hoped to counter the superior seamanship of the opposing Spartans and prevent diekplous.'[22] That is, they hoped to prevent any breakthrough.

The Spartan fleet was drawn up in a single line of 120 ships, Callicratidas on the right, 'with a view to making a break-through and an outflanking movement [διέκπλους and περίπλους], since the Spartan ships were faster.'[23] Presumably the squadrons of Pericles and Erasinides on the left and Lysias and Aristogenes on the right could move out in echelon to their right or left to counter such attempts. At any rate, the helmsman of Callicratidas pointed out the fact that the Spartans were outnumbered and suggested withdrawal, but Callicratidas refused.[24] Whether it was from personal pride, as Xenophon implies, or from some fatalism, as Diodorus suggests,[25] is unknown. Probably he decided that a withdrawal at this time, with a fleet of such a high quality, would have unacceptable repercussions. Whether the Athenians included the Arginusae Islands in their battle-order, as Diodorus states, or whether their inclusion is a rhetorical device by Ephorus to amplify the battle, is unclear,[26] but such an inclusion would not be unreasonable, even if not mentioned by Xenophon. Diodorus, with some hyperbole, associates Thrasybulus and Theramenes with the right wing and specifically with the squadron of Thrasyllus.[27] It is reasonable, for what that is worth.

21 Gray 1987, 86; Tuplin 1986, 58.
22 Gray 1987 86.
23 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.31.
24 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.32.
25 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.31f.; Diod. 13.97.5.
26 Diod. 13.98.3. The inclusion of the Islands is accepted by Grote and Kagan 1987, 345 and n. 69. Gray 1987, 85f., observes how Diodorus has used the islands to create *four* opposing fleets out of two, and how his text makes that doubling the point.
27 Diod. 13.97.6, 98.3.

It was a long drawn-out, hard-fought battle, gradually spreading out as time went on.[28] Callicratidas was drowned, the Spartan left wing was broken by the Athenian right, and the Spartans fled to Chios and Phocaea.[29] Both Xenophon and Diodorus report that the Athenians lost twenty-five ships;[30] the Spartans lost very heavily, nine of ten Laconian ships and more than sixty allied ships.[31] We can be sure that Thrasybulus handled his ship bravely and skillfully because of the responsibilities given him after the battle.

We should remember that the little wooden triremes, unlike modern metal craft, very seldom sank immediately after being holed. They became waterlogged and unmanoeuvreable; they wallowed for a considerable period before they broke up. Sailors could cling to the wreckage for some time. This fact has a bearing on the examination of what happened subsequently.

THE AFTERMATH: THE SHIPWRECKED SAILORS AND THE TRIAL OF THE GENERALS

The aftermath of the battle of Arginusae, where the victorious generals ended up being executed for something they did not do, is one of the most notorious episodes in all of ancient history. From a number of viewpoints it has engendered bitter controversy ever since it happened, and it still does. Xenophon's narrative still makes a profound impression and has attracted much attention, scholarly and non-scholarly.[32] Henry claims that 'the development of this whole scene [in Xenophon] was obviously contrived with no other object in view than to set off the adamant refusal of the great philosopher [Socrates] in the face of overwhelming constraint.'[33] Perhaps. The individual standing up for the right against the mob makes a compelling picture, but the episode has also been taken as a lesson pointing out the instability of democracies and the vagaries of mob rule, and as exemplifying what can and does happen to an

28 For an excellent description of the battle, with maps and studies of spacing between ships, see Kagan 1987, 341–353. He is too kind to Diodorus, and accepts some of the Ephoran rhetoric.

29 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.33. Like Tuplin 1986, 58, I do not believe Diodorus, who has Callicratidas dying in combat.

30 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.34; Diod. 13.100.3. In 1.7.30 one of the speakers says only twelve were lost, for which see below.

31 Xen. *Hell.* 1.6.14; in 1.7.30 a speaker says seventy. Diod. 13.100.3 says seventy-seven.

32 Gray 1989, 83f.

33 Henry 1967, 197. Due 1983, 33–35, points out that this makes Euryptolemus' long speech an anomaly; he and his sophistic defence give a picture of contemporary Athenian life as bleak and brutal (id. 39–44).

otherwise responsible body under great stress.[34] The launching of the fleet was just about the Athenians' last throw of the dice, and the strains must have been enormous.[35] But Xenophon's purpose was not so much historical as moral; by implication he paints a devastating picture of Athens in the late fifth century. Whatever purpose Diodorus apparently had is also moral, presumably highlighting the spiritual and social decay of democracy in the last stages of the Peloponnesian War.[36] Neither Diodorus nor Xenophon was particularly interested in history *per se*, or in the place of Thrasybulus in it, or even Theramenes, except as possible agents of villainy or political rectitude. The picture that is given is consequently somewhat blurred and distorted.

In Xenophon (1.6–1.7), the generals are sailing around after the battle, then suddenly in the next chapter being deposed and put on trial in Athens. There is no explanation for what happened, except by implication from what they later say in their own defence. Diodorus does provide one, somewhat confusedly, with a liberal covering of whitewash for Theramenes. Part of the sequence of events, the story of the attempted rescue of the sailors and the subsequent trial of the generals (13.100–103.2) is thought by some to be from a more reliable source than the battle itself. Andrewes has made a strong case that at least a part of it, in particular 13.100–101, is ultimately derived from P, the Oxyrhynchus Historian.[37] But these chapters, too, have curious inconsistencies, probably stemming from Ephorus.

Because the versions of the sequel to the Battle of Arginusae given in Xenophon and Diodorus are so different, and Xenophon has such a curiously mixed-up way of describing the sequence of events, it is worth examining both of these sources together, closely and critically.

First, after the battle: in Xenophon, but reported later (1.7.29), there was an argument after the victory among the generals about exactly what to do about the shipwrecked sailors still clinging to the half-sunken hulks, especially since immediate action to trap the Peloponnesian squadron blockading Conon would ensure Athenian mastery of the sea. The Athenians had sailed a few miles back to the Arginusae Islands (1.6.33). After some discussion, Thrasyllus' suggestion (1.7.30) was adopted, and a detachment was organized to send to the rescue: three ships from each of the eight generals, plus the ships of the ten taxiarchs, plus the ships of the three navarchs, plus the ten Samian

34 Cf. Ostwald, 1986, 434–445, for a discussion of the clash of popular sovereignty with the rule of law.

35 They were virtually out of *any* funds, and short of manpower. A minor mystery to me has been how Conon managed to escape from any blame for his defeat at Lesbos, or for his part in this incident, or at Aegospotami, or even from the imputation of any blame for most of his career.

36 Sacks 1990, 42f., 48f.

37 Andrewes 1974, 112–122, esp. 120f.

ships, for a total of forty-seven ships. Presumably these were the most experienced and the best in the fleet. Elsewhere (1.6.35) Xenophon confirms the number and notes that the force was placed under the command of Theramenes and Thrasybulus, two of the most experienced officers. In Diodorus (13.100.1) the argument among the generals is briefly reported, but it was about the recovery of the dead, not of the living. One may begin to have suspicions about Diodorus' (or Ephorus') veracity and accuracy, although I suppose one could argue for dramatic anachronism, with the living still clinging to the hulks already considered as dead.[38]

Second, both Xenophon and Diodorus agree that the storm arose *after* the decision had been made to send out the rescue squadron, and that the storm was so severe that the force was unable to carry out its task. Diodorus (13.100.2) adds that the crews refused the rescue duty 'on account of battle damage and the size of the waves.' *Perhaps* this is a nugget ultimately from P, but one cannot be sure. The whole fleet, the rescue detachment as well as the main section, sheltered after the storm among the Arginusae islands and did not move until it abated (Xen. 1.6.35; Diod. 13.100.3).

Third, both sources say that when it calmed down, the main fleet sailed off to Mitylene to try to catch the Peloponnesian squadron blockading Conon. The fifty Peloponnesian ships, however, had previously been informed by a picket boat of the defeat and managed to escape, presumably before the storm. Conon and his forty ships came out to join the Athenian fleet. They sailed together to Mitylene, Chios and Samos (Xen. 1.6.36, Diod. 13.100.6, omitting Chios), not back to help the forty-seven ships of the rescue squadron under Thrasybulus and Theramenes.

Fourth, no source says anything about the actions of the rescue squadron. Presumably, after the storm abated, Theramenes and Thrasybulus sailed out as soon as possible to pick up what they could. By the time they arrived in the battle area, there were still some left alive floating here and there. A few, including one general, had survived by lucky chance (Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.32).[39]

38 Krentz 1989b, 157f., takes a different tack. He argues that 'Xenophon's silence about the corpses suits his overall attempt to show the generals as innocent victims.... His story defends the generals against the possible charge that they should have tried to save their sailors sooner.' That still does not explain the Diodoran emphasis on corpses rather than living sailors clinging to wrecked hulks, waiting to be rescued, or why he does not point out the delay that killed them.

39 Krentz 1989b, 168, doubts this, since it is part of Euryptolemus' speech, and he may be lying. It is a speech on the side of the generals and of virtue, and it had to be, as Due 1983, 41, points out, made in terms that would carry weight and credibility at the time. I doubt that Euryptolemus could get away with having one of the six generals saved from his sunken ship unless it actually was the case. Diodorus (13.99.3) does have some general sunk, but the text is defective, giving the name as Nausias (corrected to Lysias by Palmer).

Theramenes and Thrasybulus no doubt recovered some of the dead; it takes a few days for bodies to start floating, and so there were probably not many corpses visible by the time that the rescue squadron arrived, shortly after the storm passed. If they were looking for bodies, they may have stayed in the area for a few days, and eventually it transpired that enough to crew about a dozen ships were gone; they had disappeared, or their bodies had drifted on to a hostile shore. A circumstance like this could account for the statement that Xenophon has Euryptolemus make, that really only twelve ships were lost (Xen. 1.7.30 [τῶν ἀπολωλυιῶν δώδεκα οὐσῶν]). Only twelve ships' worth of crew was unaccounted for, some 2,400 bodies.

Fifth, something else must have happened, something that we can infer from the aftermath. When the rescue squadron rejoined the fleet, presumably at Samos, and informed the generals of what was recovered, we may be sure that there were great excitement and some recriminations. The loss of some 5,000 Athenians, or even 2,500 unaccounted for, was not to be taken lightly. The former figure was comparable to the losses of Athenians at Syracuse, and the latter was bad enough.

Sixth, apparently a preliminary report went to Athens announcing the victory. This is specifically mentioned by Diodorus (13.101.1), but not in Xenophon, except by implication (1.7.4 and 1.7.17). Diodorus goes on to say that the Athenians voted thanks to the generals, but were deeply disturbed 'that they permitted the dead from the victory to be unburied.' Either Diodorus is telescoping Ephorus' narrative here, or there is another inconsistency. How did they know about the Athenians not being buried at this point? Clearly the crew of the despatch boat could report that losses were heavy, and, if it set out after the storm, that there was a failure to rescue many of the living. But not burying the dead? That would be difficult to ascertain unless they left after the rescue squadron rejoined the main fleet. It seems more likely that the original despatch boat announcing the victory was followed by another sent after the rescue squadron returned to Samos.

Seventh, according to Xenophon the generals sent a letter to the assembly, perhaps by the second despatch boat. They had originally intended to fasten the responsibility for the failure of the rescue attempt on Theramenes and Thrasybulus, but had decided against it (1.7.17). The letter blamed the weather for the loss of life (1.7.4 and 1.7.17). Diodorus (13.101.2), however, says that the generals' letter made it clear 'that the generals had given instructions to recover the dead,' i.e., they did fasten the responsibility on the two ex-generals. These two versions are different, and one is wrong. To be sure, one can argue that the two are not *exactly* contradictory, and that the letter may have indicated that the two in command were prevented by inclement weather from carrying out their assigned task, but that is not what Diodorus says. He makes it perfectly clear that the generals were putting the blame on Therame-

nes and Thrasybulus, and that they were to be the ones to receive any reprobation for not recovering the dead. Note that there was nothing about the living, just the dead. Again an inconsistency in Diodorus.

Eighth, at some point Thrasybulus and Theramenes arrived in Athens. Xenophon has Theramenes speak out against the generals at an Assembly, when the latter were already back and being tried, and read from their letter (1.7.4), while Diodorus gives a picture with a complicated chronology (13.101.2–4), one clearly different from Xenophon's. According to Diodorus, Theramenes and Thrasybulus arrived in Athens even before the generals' letter got there (101.2); they then rapidly organized an opposition to the generals, presumably even before the generals got back. Inconsistently, Diodorus blames all the generals' troubles on the generals' letter, ignoring the arrival and actions of Theramenes even before the generals' letter arrived. Theramenes (Thrasybulus seems to drop out of sight) rallied his friends, and various people from the fleet. One gets the impression of a carefully orchestrated campaign against the generals. Doubtless there *was* a carefully orchestrated campaign against the generals, conducted by Theramenes, but exactly *when* is the question. Xenophon (1.7.8) has it at the time of the Apaturia, with mourners and public grief being furnished by the followers of Theramenes. Diodorus has it much earlier. I believe Xenophon, and I would place the return of Thrasybulus and Theramenes with some elements of the fleet at about the time of the return of the generals or slightly subsequent to it.

Ninth, in Xenophon (1.7.1–2) and Diodorus (13.101.5) the generals are dismissed while still at Samos. Two of them decided to go into exile. The rest were ordered to come home after handing command over to Conon, who was still free from blame. The list of names differs between Xenophon and Diodorus,[40] but, as Diodorus says, the generals returned with most of the fleet, 'hoping that many of those in the ships would be on their side in the trial.' Possibly one general has dropped out of Diodorus' list, but the discrepancies do not promote confidence in Diodorus' veracity.

Tenth, in Xenophon (1.7.1–3) the six, already dismissed, returned home to be arrested and imprisoned. The first to be prosecuted was Erasinides, but the indictment of the rest soon followed. Diodorus (13.101.6–102.5) has a broadly similar picture, but with Diomedon, who is not mentioned by Diodorus in his list, making a speech.[41]

40 Diodorus (13.101.5) has only five names, including one Calliades, but not mentioning Diomedon and Erasinides. Xenophon (1.7.1–2) has Lysias and no mention of two previously mentioned (1.5.16) generals, Leon and Archestratus. McCoy 1975, 193, suggested that Leon was captured on the one ship caught escaping from Mytilene, and Archestratus was killed in the battle of Mytilene. Lysias replaced Archestratus.

41 Perhaps 102 is from a different source than 101, Andrewes 1974, 120. Or perhaps it is the usual Diodoran sloppiness.

What, then, do we have? Xenophon is anxious to exculpate the generals from all wrong-doing,[42] while Diodorus, following Ephorus and perhaps P, is busily engaged in whitewashing Theramenes. In spite of Andrewes' arguments to the contrary, Diodorus here does not seem reliable or consistent, and he is certainly inaccurate, while Xenophon is obviously guilty of *suppressio veri*. But his chronology and what he says both seem more nearly accurate and precise than what Diodorus gives us, and it is certainly more self-consistent. If this is so, then the order of events in Xenophon should be followed, and Diodorus should be ignored. Ephorus did too much damage to P for anything useful to emerge.

The generals returned to the Arginusae Islands after the battle, leaving behind the wrecks, including one with a general aboard, probably Lysias.[43] The fleet and its commanders were anxious to move as quickly as possible to catch the last undefeated Peloponnesian squadron, the fifty ships blockading Conon. Perhaps also they desired to rest a little after such a hard-fought battle.

They appointed a rescue squadron under the command of Thrasybulus and Theramenes – and others – with the job of recovering the Athenian sailors clinging to their wrecks. The storm prevented them from carrying out their task, even though they contained the best ships of the fleet.

When the storm abated the main force went off to deal with the Peloponnesians blockading Conon, while the rescue squadron sailed out to see what could be done. They found mostly corpses.

A despatch boat brought the news of the victory to Athens, but I suspect also some wild reports of the losses incurred, because many sailors had not been rescued in time. Hence there was some sort of mixed reaction.

When the rescue squadron rejoined the main fleet at Samos, there must have been considerable mutual recrimination and many reproaches. The generals realized that this was a serious problem, and that they were doubtless in trouble, since up to 5,000 Athenian lives had been lost.

A second despatch boat was sent to Athens with a letter about Thrasybulus and Theramenes. It indicated that they had been appointed to command the rescue unit, but it put the blame for the inability to carry out any rescue attempts not on Thrasybulus and Theramenes but squarely on the fact of the storm. It may have been ambiguously phrased or was simply badly written. It did not seem to help much, since up to 5,000 lives were lost.[44]

The Assembly did not accept their explanation, and they dismissed the generals, except for Conon. As a consequence two generals (Protomachus and

42 Krentz 1989b, 158–170; Due 1983, 33–44.

43 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.32; if it was Lysias, he was one of those tried and condemned.

44 McCoy 1991, 319, prefers a reconstruction that has the first letter making no mention of the assignment of rescue operations to Thrasybulus and Theramenes. This does not explain why the two trierarchs hurried to arrive at Athens so early.

Aristogenes) went into exile, six of the generals (Pericles, Diomedon, Lysias, Aristocrates, Thrasyllus, and Erasinides) and their respective units returned to Athens. Along with them, or shortly afterwards, came Theramenes and Thrasybulus.

Theramenes spoke out against the generals at the Assembly, putting the blame on them while minimizing his own responsibility, as one of the officers in charge of the rescue mission, for any losses. His primary aim was to save his own skin. He was probably joined in the initial stages of his campaign by Thrasybulus, but the evidence is unclear about how long Thrasybulus stayed with him. Theramenes, without Thrasybulus, helped to orchestrate the campaign that eventually had the six generals executed. Factional politics may have played a part in discrediting the generals after their great victory, with the oligarchs somehow involved, but just how is unclear. Theramenes and his faction played the major role, primarily to clear him of any taint of wrong-doing and prevent any prosecution.

Even in Diodorus (or P) Theramenes and his partisans are the ones responsible for the destruction of the generals, no matter how it is explained away, just as they are in Xenophon. The excuse in Diodorus for Theramenes' behaviour, that it was a defensive reaction to slanders from the generals, looks more like a party document picked up by Diodorus' source, be it P or another. The truth is that Theramenes took a good opportunity to throw the responsibility on the generals to ensure that he would be absolutely clear from any blame for the losses, since passions were high. He was very successful in escaping. When he was exculpated by the generals from any wrong-doing, he and his followers still continued their attack, as both Xenophon and Diodorus emphasize, and Theramenes' faction, if it did not instigate, at least strongly supported the efforts that got the generals condemned to death.[45] The reason is not far to seek. Theramenes, since the generals of Arginusae were eliminated, stood a good chance of being elected general again, of being vindicated, and of becoming a leader in the state. (He actually was elected, but rejected at his audit.) The hand of Alcibiades has been seen here by some, since Archidemus, a leading prosecutor, was alleged to be an intimate of his.[46] But this seems far-fetched, even for Athenian politics.

Thrasybulus is not mentioned by any source as attacking the generals, except possibly in an ambiguous passage in Xenophon (*Hell.* 1.7.5–6). '[The generals] assigned the duty of recovering those shipwrecked to men among

45 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.5–8; Critias makes it clear that, in his eyes, Theramenes was responsible for the execution of the generals. 2.3.32. Gray 1989, 90f., shows how Xenophon is not concerned with Theramenes' motives, but with his lack of *philanthropia*.

46 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.2 for Archidemus as prosecutor; Lys. 14.25 for links with Alcibiades through his son. Cf. Strauss 1984, 42, n. 22.

the trierarchs who were capable and had been generals in the past, Theramenes and Thrasybulus, and others like them. If there was need to blame any over the recovery, there was no one else to blame except those to whom the task had been assigned. "And because they are accusing us," they said, "we will not lie and say that they were guilty, but state that it was the enormous storm that prevented any recovery." ' There is nothing here against the idea that Thrasybulus stopped attacking, when the generals cleared him of any blame.[47] Theramenes continued to be the vigorous and vicious prosecutor, strongly supported by his friends.

In fairness to the Athenians and to defend them from the charge of being easy dupes, it must be remembered that the crews of the fleet were drawn from all walks of Athenian life, not just from foreign mercenary oarsmen and working-class types from the Piraeus. Twenty-five ships meant 5,000 young Athenians, the loss falling on all classes, particularly those from Athens itself, a grievous loss for a town the size of Athens, one that could well warp judgement. The number of Athenians lost at Syracuse was little larger.[48] But the Athenians soon realized their error and punished those directly responsible for inducing the assembly to kill the generals.[49] Neither Theramenes nor Thrasybulus was punished, as apparently they were not directly involved in the actions that brought about the executions. Perhaps there was a split between Theramenes and Thrasybulus at this point,[50] if not earlier. Certainly they never worked together again after Arginusae.

THE PEACE AND THE THIRTY

After the execution of the generals Thrasybulus drops out of sight for a few years. He did not get elected as general or, as far as we know, take any part in the campaigns leading up to the disastrous defeat at Aegospotami in 405 B.C. Theramenes is said by Lysias to have been elected general for 405, but to have been rejected on his δοκιμασία, examination before the Boule, because he was not considered εὔνους, favourably inclined, by the democracy,[51] but there is no mention of Thrasybulus at all. He was not a trierarch at Aegospo-

47 That Thrasybulus was not a party to the condemnation of the generals has been generally accepted. Cf. Schwahn 1936, 570; McCoy 1991, 321–323.

48 Canadians may remember the bitter controversy over the casualties from the Canadian assault in 1942 on Dieppe, about the same number from a much larger population. The result was that the British generals concerned were severely blamed, and the Canadian generals lost their commands.

49 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.35. Krentz 1989b, 169f.

50 So Ostwald 1986, 475.

51 Lysias 13.10. Cf. Adeleye 1977, 94–99.

tami, but Conon was one of the generals there and so was at least in part responsible for what happened. The generals made no attempt to shift their anchorage to Sestos, as Alcibiades advised, but stayed in an exposed position. Conon managed to escape with about half of his command and make his way to Cyprus and Evagoras. As usual, he came out largely unscathed. But the fleet was gone, and with it Athens' last hope.[52]

Thrasybulus, however, seems to have been at Athens during the last desperate days of the Athenian democracy, when the capitulation to Sparta was being arranged by his old colleague Theramenes with his usual adroit duplicity.[53] We have no record of any of Thrasybulus' activities in these times.[54]

Shortly after the peace was signed, Lysander made a triumphal entry into the Piraeus. Plutarch (*Lys.* 15.1) says it was on 16 Munychion, in the middle of the spring.[55] The careful study by Hignett[56] shows that there was a delay between the ratification of the Peace and the demolition of the Long Walls, and that, as Xenophon says (2.3.11), right after the demolition the Thirty were installed. Hignett dates this to July, 404, as does Rhodes, though others set it as late as September.[57]

Under Spartan pressure, skillfully applied by Lysander, and, I suspect, because of their disillusionment with democracy, the Athenians gave way and installed an oligarchy by the psephism of Dracontides,[58] that of the infamous Thirty Tyrants. Dracontides himself was named one of the Thirty. These nominally were a committee charged with drawing up a constitution in accordance with ancestral practice in the state (πάτριος πολιτεία), and with go-

52 Xen. *Hell.* 2.1.25–2.2.3. Xenophon and Diodorus 13.106.1–6 as usual disagree, but the result was the same, the annihilation of the Athenian fleet, with the exception of nine or ten ships with Conon.

53 Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.16–21; Lysias 12.68–70, 13.9–14; *P. Mich.* 5982, the so-called Theramenes Papyrus, for which see Pesely 1989, 29–35, Breitenbach 1989, 121–135, with text and translation, and Engels 1993, 125–155, who makes it part of the 'Theramenes Myth.' Xenophon says there were two trips by Theramenes, but Lysias seems to have only one. Krentz 1989b, 185f.; Green 1991, 8–10. Both Xenophon and Lysias take a negative view of Theramenes' activities.

54 Ostwald 1986, 474, suggests that he might have been out of the country at the time peace was made. There is nothing to support this idea except silence.

55 Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.23. Krentz 1989b, 188f., discusses the date with references, preferring to put it near the end of March. Rhodes 1981, 436f., says the end of 405/4 or early 404/3.

56 Hignett 1952, Appendix XIII, 378–383.

57 Krentz 1982, 147–152; Green 1991, 10–16.

58 Lysias 12.71–76; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 34.3; Diod. 14.3.5–7. An excellent treatment of the Thirty in Krentz 1982.

verning Athens, at least for the interim.[59] After some negotiations it was agreed that Theramenes and his faction would appoint ten, Critias and the hard-line oligarchs ten, and the Assembly ten.[60] Apparently an assembly of limited rights, composed of the most well-to-do, called the 'Three Thousand' was envisaged.[61] All the names of the Thirty are known, and several have been identified, as many as is possible on present evidence.[62] About half were active politicians; none of the best-known members of Theramenes' faction are on the list; and several were members of the Four Hundred, at least seven, perhaps all, if Lysias is right.[63]

Xenophon is careful to portray the Thirty as having all the characteristics of tyrants, but there is nothing from the other sources to contradict his picture. They *were* tyrannical and imposed a reign of terror.

The Thirty started to work, but their function of drafting a constitution and laws went slowly, as they were more concerned with consolidating and extending their power.[64]

There were at first friendly relations and close co-operation between the two emerging leaders of the Thirty, Critias and Theramenes.[65] They worked ruthlessly and effectively together. They organized a body of 300 police, (μαστιγοφόροι, 'whip-bearers') for order, a new Council of 500, a new Eleven, to run the prisons, execute malefactors, and to see to confiscations, and a newly inaugurated committee of Ten to control the Piraeus. All these gave them full control of the apparatus of the state,[66] but they did not consider themselves secure.

59 Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 35.1–2; Krentz 1982, 50 and n. 23, and 1989b, 190f., argues that the texts do not support the usual belief that the Thirty were a legislative commission that usurped power, but that they were appointed to govern the city according to the ancestral laws, which they were to publish. But cf. Rhodes 1981, 434f. and Ostwald 1986, 476–478.

60 Lysias 12.75–76. Krentz 1989b, 191, doubts Lysias' trustworthiness in this regard. The idea that Theramenes defended Athenian liberties against Lysander (Diod. 14.3.6) is incredible.

61 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.18. For the Three Thousand Krentz 1995, 127; Ostwald 1986, 485–487.

62 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.2. Krentz 1982, 52–56.

63 Krentz 1982, 55f.; Lysias 12.74.

64 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.11. Krentz 1995, 123f. for other references, all saying the same.

65 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.15–16.

66 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.11–14; Krentz 1995, 123–126. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 35.1; Rhodes 1981, 436–439.

THE PURGES

One of the first things that the Thirty did was to execute several democratic leaders, including the generals Strombichides and Dionysodorus, and some other generals and taxiarchs. These had been arrested after they had expressed their dislike of the peace terms to Theramenes, before the treaty was ratified. They may also have been planning something more violent than loud disapproval, since one of them, a metic named Agoratus, turned informer and got them all put into jail before the meeting of the assembly that approved the peace terms.[67] Theramenes did not denounce them himself, but it was Agoratus who got them arrested. Lysias alleges that he was persuaded to become informer by Theramenes. Whatever the truth, it does show Theramenes in not too favourable a light, somehow responsible for executing those who trusted him, much as he did to the six generals of Arginusae. This incident is not mentioned by Aristotle, Diodorus, or expressly by Xenophon. I suspect that it was about this time that Thrasybulus began making plans to go into exile and to organize resistance, when the democratic leadership was being effectively eliminated.

Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.3.12) and Lysias (12.5) both indicate that there was a considerable number of other executions, mostly of 'undesirables,' such as informers (συκοφάνται, 'sycophants') and blackmailers. No doubt the repeal of various old laws aided the Thirty in their purge of the state.[68] At some point they requested the Spartans to send a garrison to support them until they 'got rid of the criminals'.[69] The garrison was to be paid for by Athens. Critias, as represented by Xenophon, claims Theramenes took an enthusiastic lead in prosecutions, and there is no good reason to disbelieve him.[70]

The purge was apparently widened to include other active democrats and anyone reasonably suspected of disaffection for the regime.[71] Krentz makes a strong case that the primary motive for this further purging was not so much greed and fear, as Xenophon and Aristotle suggest, but rather the suppression of overt political opposition coupled with an attempt at the Laconization of the state, that is, reconstructing Athens to copy as closely as possible the

67 Lysias 13.13–28; 30.14. Lysias' chronology seems telescoped to many, but it is possible. Krentz 1982, 60.

68 Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 35.2 for the repeal of laws and the effect of some of them on such matters as inheritance. Krentz 1995, 124f.

69 A typical tyrannical act, getting in foreign troops, Krentz 1995, 125. Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.13–14; Diod. 14.4.3–4; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 37.2. The *Ath. Pol.* does not follow Xenophon's chronology, as everyone else does. *Pace* Krentz, the discrepancy does not require serious treatment.

70 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.28.

71 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.14; Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 35.4; Lysias 12.5, 6.

Spartan model, with Spartiates, perioeci, helots, ephors, etc.[72] The victims included a certain Antiphon,[73] the general Leon of Salamis,[74] Niceratus, son of the great Nicias,[75] and Lycurgus, a prominent member of the important clan of the Eteoboutadae.[76] Apparently the Thirty thought it necessary to arrest numerous metics *en masse,* with each of the Thirty charged to arrest one metic.[77] It seems Theramenes neglected to arrest his.[78] There are indications that the metics as a group were against the Thirty, and later many of them actively supported Thrasybulus. Several metics opposed to the Thirty were executed, among them Lysias' brother. Lysias himself was arrested, but escaped from custody into exile.

THRASYBULUS IN EXILE

At some point before the execution of Theramenes, i.e., between July 404 and very early in 403, probably late in 404,[79] Thrasybulus fled into exile. It seems that a decree of exile and confiscation of real property *ex post facto* was promulgated soon after he had gone.[80] As a staunch, vocal, and well-to-do democrat and a famous ex-general he had been a marked man from the inception of the purges. If his family had any wealth, as apparently it did, he would be a ready source of escheated funds and doubly desirable to eliminate.

72 Krentz 1982, 64–67, 78–82.; 1995, 127f. Ostwald 1986, 484–487, suggests that the purges were a part of the restructuring of the state on the Spartan pattern.

73 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.40; Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F120. Davies 1971, 327.

74 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.39; Xen. *Mem.* 4.4.3; Plato. *Apol.* 32 c–d; Andoc. 1.94; Edwards 1995, 180.

75 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.39; Diod. 14.5.5; Lysias 18.6, 19.47.

76 Plut. *Mor.* 841–843.

77 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.21–22. Xenophon says thirty, one per Tyrant, but the other sources have different numbers. Cf. Ostwald 1986, 487 and n. 108. Krentz 1982, 80f., says it was a total of ten, but that the total is erroneous; Krentz 1995, 129 denies the whole incident.

78 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.41.

79 The chronology of the reign of the Thirty Tyrants is a matter of debate, since the sources differ widely in their sequences of events. See Krentz 1982, esp. Fig. 2, 132f.; 1995, 10f.; and Rhodes 1981, 416–420. One of the principal disputes is whether Theramenes was executed *before* Thrasybulus seized Phyle, as in Xenophon, or *after*, as in the *Ath. Pol.* Most modern authorities agree that the *Ath. Pol.* and Diodorus both wish to clear Theramenes from blame, and so they alter chronology. Cf. Rhodes 1981, 422, 450. Krentz 1982, 133–143, argues that the *Ath. Pol.* here depends on P, and so should supersede Xenophon, an argument not widely accepted. See Ostwald 1986, 481–484 for a good summary of the problem; he also supports the chronology based on the *Ath. Pol.* The arguments for Xenophon of Hignett 1952, 387–389, and Rhodes loc. cit., seem to be more persuasive.

80 Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.42; Krentz 1982, 70; McCoy 1971, 184, and n. 71.

Probably he went one jump ahead of the authorities, about the time of the arrests of Leon, Niceratus and Lycurgus. Thrasybulus sought sanctuary and assistance from the Boeotians. The Thirty seized his estates.

The Boeotians had been reasonably loyal allies of Sparta and bitter and uncompromising enemies of the Athenians. They had advocated the destruction of Athens at a meeting of the Spartan allies before the end of the War.[81] They had, however, been distancing themselves from the Spartans for some time, particularly after the peace was signed, and they had begun to drop their hostility to Athens. In fact, they are said to have become 'upset' (ἀγανακτούντων, Diod. 14.32.1) at the behaviour of the Thirty, and full of sympathy for any exiles. Consequently many of them, particularly a certain Ismenias, together with some of his followers, received Thrasybulus and other exiles hospitably.[82] Ismenias himself supported some of them, in particular, Thrasybulus, from his private means,[83] and members of Ismenias' faction helped others. An unnamed Athenian in a fragment of Lysias[84] says that he himself was the *xenos*, guest-friend, of one Cephisodotos, a colleague of Ismenias, 'when we fled there [to Thebes].' He remembers fondly the kind Theban treatment of their guests.

At the behest of the Thirty the Spartans had promulgated a decree that no state should receive fugitive Athenians, under penalty of Spartan displeasure and a heavy fine.[85] The decree was largely a dead letter, ignored by most states, including Megara, Chalcis, Argos, and Boeotia.[86] In fact the Boeotians are said to have expressly rejected this Spartan initiative and to have gone so far as to pass decrees 'that every house and town in Boeotia should be open to such Athenians as needed assistance; and whoever did not assist an exile being arrested [*sc.* by Spartan or Athenian authorities] should be fined a talent; and that if anyone should bring weapons through Boeotia against the tyrants in Athens, no Theban was to see or hear anything.'[87] It is true that traditions of hospitality, *xenia*, usually would not permit too much of a serious nature to happen to a guest-friend, a *xenos*, but, given the enthusiastic Boeotian support and the warm hospitality still remembered among the Athenians

81 Buck 1994, 25, with references.

82 For Ismenias as faction leader, Buck 1994, 24.

83 Justin 5.9.8, *Ismenias, Thebanorum princeps, etsi publicis non poterat, privatis tamen viribus adiuvabat*; cf. *Hell. Oxy.* 20.1 Chambers = 17.1 Bartoletti. Cloché 1918, 334; 1952, 97f. Cook 1988, 57–85.

84 Lysias, fr. 24.1 Gernet-Bizos = fr. 78 Thalheim.

85 Diod. 14.6.1; Plut. *Lys.* 27.2; Demosth. 15.22. There is no reason to doubt the veracity of this tradition, though it is omitted by Xenophon.

86 Megara: Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.1; Chalcis: Lysias 24.25; Argos: Diod. 14.6.2, Demosth. 15.22; Boeotia: see above nn. 81, 82.

87 Plut. *Lys.* 27.3; cf. Lysias 12.95; Plut. *Pelop.* 6.4. Buck 1994, 26 and n. 81.

many years later,[88] it seems likely that Ismenias and his faction had a preponderant influence in Boeotian politics at this time.

The hospitality and kindness of the Boeotians make it likely that Thrasybulus' choice of Boeotia was arranged beforehand, while he was still in Athens but considering where to go, and that negotiations made it preferable to go there rather than, say, to Megara. Quite possibly there were connections of consanguinity or guest-friendship between Ismenias and Thrasybulus.[89] Considerations in addition to the purely military, such as safety, comfort and friendship, governed the choice of Thebes by Thrasybulus and his friends.

Political considerations governed the Boeotians in deciding to receive the exiles. The Boeotians had been for most of the Peloponnesian War, and even earlier, allies of the Spartans and supporters of oligarchy. When on two occasions some of their leaders tried to wean them from Sparta in the period after the Peace of Nicias, their advice was rejected by the Boeotian Federal Council with the comment that Boeotia was an oligarchy, and the Council preferred their League to stay with oligarchic Sparta.[90] Clearly the Council, and presumably its hoplite electors, had strong views about oligarchies and oligarchic solidarity. This makes the Boeotian change to an anti-Spartan stance even more striking, even though the prospect of a Spartan client state as a neighbour must have been disturbing.

The general view is that the change in the Boeotian attitude is somehow to be associated with the rise of a new faction in Boeotian politics, that of Ismenias.[91] There is, however, no agreement as to how it is connected. Did a change of attitude in Boeotia give a chance for a new faction to get support and start anti-Spartan activities? Or did a new, well-financed, anti-Spartan faction somehow bring the Boeotian voters to an anti-Spartan stance?

Boeotia had for long been dominated by a faction headed by Leontiades, Asias, and Coeratadas. It was strongly pro-Spartan. Leontiades was a son of Eurymachus, the Theban leader who headed the abortive invasion of Plataea that set off the Peloponnesian War.[92] Eurymachus, in turn, was a son of another Leontiades, the leader of the Theban forces that fought and capitulated at Thermopylae.[93] The Leontiades of the late fifth century was clearly a member of a leading noble Theban family. Of the other two leaders, Asias is virtually unknown, but Coeratadas was an important and very courageous

88 Lysias, fr. 24.1,2 Gernet-Bizos = fr. 78, 79 Thalheim.
89 Singh 1971, 92f., 108f.
90 Thuc. 5.31.6; cf. 5.38.2–3.
91 See Cook 1988, *passim*; Buck 1994, 24–26; Krentz 1982, 17, 69f.; Cloché 1952, 96–100; Cartledge 1987, 282f., 291; Bruce 1967, 113.
92 Buck 1979, 161f.; Bruce 1967, 111.
93 Ibid. 132.

general in the Peloponnesian War, who had made a sensational escape from Athens as a prisoner of war.[94]

The new faction, the anti-Spartan one, was led by Ismenias, Antitheus, and Androclides.[95] Ismenias[96] was of a prominent Theban family[97] and the possessor of great wealth.[98] Antitheus is little more than a name; Androclides is remembered chiefly as the leader of the Theban exiles after the execution of Ismenias in 382. He was assassinated at Athens, leaving an estate that became the subject of an Athenian lawsuit.[99] Why Ismenias chose to raise a faction is unknown, but the fact that elements of the Boeotian leadership had made previous attempts to lead Boeotia away from its Spartan alliance indicates that there was some discontent with ideological solidarity, Spartan leadership, and the policies of Leontiades' faction long before the Decelean War. Perhaps the faction of Ismenias stems from some of the authors of these attempts.

The Oxyrhynchus Historian (20.2 Chambers = 17.2 Bartoletti) seems to say that the faction of Ismenias did not obtain power until much later than the end of the Peloponnesian War, between 400 and 396. But the key passage is defective and ambiguous. Thus there is room for much disagreement about what went on in Boeotia at the end of the Peloponnesian War and in the immediate post-war period. M.L. Cook, for example, does not think that Ismenias' faction gained a predominance in the Federal Council until 396 or so; but that in the late fifth century it somehow persuaded the Councillors to a change of view on the treatment of the Athenians.[100] Others, such as Cloché,[101] argue that the hospitable reception of Thrasybulus was a product of the cooling of relations between Thebes and Sparta; that factional politics had little to do with it; and that Leontiades' faction remained in charge. Still others, such as Morrison, are convinced that the change of Boeotian attitude at the end of the Decelean War means a change of government.[102]

Though Ismenias' faction had its genesis during the Decelean War and apparently was anti-Spartan *ab initio*, the faction of Leontiades had remained dominant during most, if not all, of the Decelean War. The Boeotians had been

94 Xen. *Hell.* 1.3. 15–22. He had been captured at the siege of Byzantium.

95 *Hell. Oxy.* 20.1 Chambers = 17.1 Bartoletti. Bruce 1967, 110f. Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.1 talks of Androclides, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus, not Antitheus. Krentz 1995, 195.

96 His name in the Boiotian dialect is Hismenias, to judge by the evidence of numismatics, but the Attic literary form will be used here.

97 Arr. *Anab.* 2.15.4.

98 Plat. *Menex.* 90A; *Rep.* 1.9; Plut. *praec. g. r.* 31; *de tranq. an.* 13. See Swoboda 1916, 2136–2139.

99 Lysias, fr. 24.1, 2 Gernet-Bizos = fr. 78, 79 Thalheim.

100 Cook 1988, 62–68.

101 Cloché 1952, 96–98.

102 Morrison 1942, 57–78, esp. 76. Bruce 1967, 113, says Ismenias gained ascendancy shortly after 404.

enriched by much loot from the pillaging of Attica while this faction was in control.[103] With wealth pouring in, it would be reasonable to expect that this faction and its policies would remain popular and predominant in Boeotian politics. But the faction and its policies did not. There are indications that Theban relations with the Spartans were deteriorating during the Decelean War, especially near its end. This should well have caused a decline in the position of Leontiades' faction along with a rise in anti-Spartan feeling and of support for Ismenias' faction. Several reasons can be adduced for these important changes.

BOEOTIA COOLS TO SPARTA

First, the Spartans seem to have been interfering with the lucrative forays, which the Boeotians were making into Attica during the Decelean War, by seizing some of the booty for themselves. The Spartans were bringing home all the spoils of war they could, from all theatres of war. Since victory had been gained by the efforts of all the allies together, not by Sparta alone, the rewards should have been shared equitably among all of them, and not have been hogged by Sparta. Thebans, Corinthians, Megareans and other allies requested their rightful shares of the total booty and were scornfully rejected, principally by Lysander and Agis.[104] This sort of greedy Spartan behaviour provides an economical explanation for the Boeotians' sudden unpleasant demand that a tithe of *all* the booty seized from Attica be paid to Apollo Ptoios, that is, from the Spartans and their king Agis as well as from the Boeotians.[105] Apollo Ptoios was an oracular god with considerable status in the Boeotian League.[106] Whether the tithe was paid or not is uncertain, but Agis was much insulted, and even ten years later the Spartans were still angry about it. Quarrels over money, then as now, can embitter the closest relations.

Second, the Spartans, earlier than the tithe incident, had royally snubbed the Boeotian delegate at the conference that discussed what was to be done with Athens. The Boeotian, Erianthes, was probably a prominent member of the faction of Leontiades.[107] He suggested the destruction of Athens and the enslavement of its people and was backed by other allies. The Spartans rejected this with a comment about the great services to Greece done by the

103 *Hell. Oxy.* 20.3, 4 Chambers = 17.3, 4 Bartoletti. Cf. Isok. 14.31. Bruce 1967, 114f.

104 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5, 12; Justin 6.10; Plut. *Lys.* 27 mentions only the Thebans. For the gold, the 470 talents and the prows brought to Sparta by Lysander, Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.8. Krentz 1995, 197; Bruce 1967, 116f.

105 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.5. For the enormity of the insult to the Spartans, Underhill 1900, xxviii.

106 Schachter 1981, 1:69f.

107 For Erianthes see Buck 1994, 23, n. 65, 25.

Athenians, especially during the Persian Wars, with the snide implication that nothing of the kind was done by the Boeotians.[108] This was true but undiplomatic. Though the Boeotian government later disavowed Erianthes,[109] the damage was done. The Spartan behaviour, and that of Erianthes, was doubtless exploited by Ismenias and his followers, so that the Federal Councillors, who had the κῦρος, the supreme authority, in the Boeotian League, became suspicious of Sparta, if they had not been so already.

A third factor in the cooling of relations was the obvious fact that the Boeotians were afraid of being hemmed in by Spartan clients. Sparta already had Phocis on the west as a loyal ally. Athens on the east would complete the encirclement.

Fourth, the Spartans often had a regrettable tendency to treat allies as if they were helots. Such behaviour during the campaigns of the Decelean War may have prepared the way for a split, too. There is no direct evidence on this point, but Spartan arrogance in the field as a contributing factor to the cooling of relations with Boeotia seems likely. Spartan brutality after Mycale played a significant part in the disaffection of the Ionians and the formation of the Delian League. There is no evidence that the Spartans were less brutal in 409 than they were in 479.

With sources of discord like these, the rise of Ismenias and his faction to a position of major influence at the end of the Peloponnesian War seems a reasonable thing to have happened. Justin (5.4) in referring to the end of the Decelean War terms Ismenias *Thebanorum princeps*. His source had the view that Ismenias had the leadership of the state at the time. At any rate it is reasonable to conclude that Boeotian suspicions of Sparta were exploited by Ismenias for his own ends, and that he and his faction were prevailing over Leontiades and his faction by the end of the Decelean War. If this is so, then the στασιασμός mentioned by P (19.1 Chambers = 16.1 Bartoletti) as occurring a few years before the Corinthian War was the result of efforts by the faction of Leontiades to regain power at that point, rather unsuccessfully.

BOEOTIA AND ATHENS

P says that the Ismenian faction, though accused of Atticizing, was not particularly concerned for Athenians (οὐ μὴν ἐφρόντιζον τῶν Ἀθηναίων, *Hell. Oxy.* 20.1 Chambers = 17.1 Bartoletti). If this was the case, then the hospitality shown to Thrasybulus and his followers, whatever the relations that may have existed between him and Ismenias, should be regarded as a facet of its

108 Xen. *Hell.* 2.2.19; Hamilton 1979, 146–150.
109 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.8.

anti-Spartan activities. Ismenias' faction took care to give as much publicity as possible to incidents that would exacerbate ill-feeling between Boeotia and Sparta. The Boeotian Federal Council had been elected before Erianthes had made his suggestion about destroying Athens. But in the next few months the Council changed its anti-Athenian, pro-Spartan attitude. It permitted the reception of exiles, or at least it did not stop Ismenias. Then, after the Spartan decree came down, the Council rejected it, prohibiting any interference with the exiles by any Boeotians or anyone else on Boeotian soil.[110] Clearly Ismenias' faction had enough prestige and authority by this time to have its anti-Spartan policies supported and implemented by the Federal Council. If Ismenias and his friends could do this reasonably consistently, then they would be the dominant faction. Eight months after Erianthes advocated the destruction of Athens, Ismenias and his faction were dominant. They could not have elected a majority of councillors, but between the time of the election and the reception of the exiles they influenced enough Councillors to reverse Boeotian policies and give the new faction the *auctoritas* to direct the state.

The Boeotian assistance to Thrasybulus, though it was at least in part the product of factional politics as well as of guest-friendship, followed a familiar Boeotian pattern: help for Athenian opponents of any regime in power at Athens. The Boeotians had assisted the Alcmaeonids in their attempts against the Peisistratids before 510 B.C.[111] They had apparently given aid to the oligarchs several times in the heyday of the democracy.[112] Anything that would distract and weaken their Athenian neighbour was good to do. Adherence to this pattern, I suspect, helped to swing many Councillors over to the Ismenian side and to support the initiatives in favour of the exiles.

Another Boeotian pattern emerges as well: a Boeotian faction was endeavouring to profit from and to exploit a cooling of relations with an ally and to make the most of its opponents' errors; in this case the faction of Ismenias succeeded brilliantly and ultimately eliminated its opponents, the faction of Leontiades, from power until the end of the Corinthian War in 387, in spite of the latter's struggles to regain influence. One might argue that Thrasybulus and his friends were pawns in a Boeotian power struggle, one centering about relations with the paramount Greek power, Sparta.

Thrasybulus was permitted, early in 403, perhaps in March, after the death of Theramenes, to organize a raid from Boeotian territory into Attica, and the Thebans gave all the active support they could, this side of engaging in actual hostilities. With no further direct help from the Boeotians they succeeded in overthrowing the Thirty, and they were able to repay the favours granted by the Boeotians and Ismenias later, in the Corinthian War.

110 Plut. *Lys.* 27.3; *Pelop.* 6.4; Lysias 12.95; Cloché 1952, 96.
111 Hdt. 5.62.2; Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 19; Buck 1979, 112.
112 Buck 1981.

CHAPTER 4

THE OVERTHROW OF THE THIRTY AND THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY 403–396 B.C.

PHYLE

The exiles in Boeotia, as the situation worsened in Athens, finally made the decision to attack. How many Athenians there were in Boeotia is not known, but the number that took part in the first invasion of Athenian territory was very small indeed. Thrasybulus led a force of about seventy men[1] from Thebes across the frontier into Attica, where they occupied Phyle, a defensible location (χωρίον ἰσχυρόν) on the border. It was early in 403, 'the weather being very fine,' perhaps as early as January or February, but even as late as early March, since a snowstorm was regarded as divine intervention.[2] Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.2) puts it shortly after the death of Theramenes.

Phyle is a high, steep crag in a commanding location. It is now crowned by a fortress built in the fourth century. On the west and south the slopes fall sharply into a deep ravine. These sides have not been walled. The top of the crag is flat, about ninety m in diameter, suitable for holding as a strong point. It had been used in this way before, by some opponents of the Pisistratids.[3] Apparently this spot was unoccupied and at that time unfortified, but it controlled the most direct, if not the easiest, route between Athens and Thebes. It has been suggested that Thrasybulus' success in defending the spot may have encouraged the later construction of the fort on the site.[4]

An inscription containing a decree honouring Thrasybulus' first band of attackers has been recovered, and locations for fifty-eight names in a space for

1 The number is variously given: around thirty, Nepos *Thrasyb.* 2.1; fifty, Aristot. *Rhet. ad Alex.* 8, Aristides, 1.254; sixty, Paus. 1.29.3; seventy, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2. Krentz 1995, 140, suggests that thirty started from Thebes and were augmented by volunteers. Xenophon and Pausanias are the most likely.

2 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.14.

3 On the site see Ober 1985; Krentz 1982, 72, n. 5. For the opponents of the Pisistratids Plut. *Mor.* 189.

4 Krentz 1982, 71f.

perhaps seventy have been established.[5] Only one of the fifty-eight can be identified with some degree of certainty as anyone prominent: Archinus of Coele, a leading politician and mover of the decree, as well as being one of the band of attackers. He is alleged by Aristotle in *Athenaion Politeia* (34.3) to be a follower of Theramenes, but he seems to have been a strong democrat, not a moderate.[6] Two others have been restored with some confidence, Thrasybulus and Theocles, and one with some reserve, Cephisophon. The seventy who first occupied Phyle may have been primarily an assault group, since about five or six of those listed in the inscription were from the deme of Phyle, and at least three others were from Eleutherae, a nearby Boeotian town with close links to Athens.[7] These were the sort of men who had intimate knowledge of the area and would have been an asset in a force facing such an operation. Other leading figures may have been in the seventy or, more probably, have come up to Phyle later: Anytus, son of Anthemion of Euonymon, a former general, remembered for losing Pylos and later prosecuting Socrates, also alleged in the *Athenaion Politeia* to be a follower of Theramenes and later a leader in Thrasybulus' faction;[8] Thrasybulus of Collytus, a namesake, a former trierarch, an enemy of Alcibiades, and a later political rival of Thrasybulus of Steiria;[9] Aesimus, later a leader in our Thrasybulus' faction;[10] and Ergocles, later another member of Thrasybulus' faction, prosecuted many years later for malfeasance.[11] The decree apparently contains an epigram, cited in Aeschines (3.190), which speaks of the greatness of the deed, and makes links to past heroes and great battles.

Τούσδ' ἀρετῆς ἕνεκα στεφάνοις ἐγέραιρε παλαίχθων
δῆμος Ἀθηναίων, οἵ ποτε τοὺς ἀδίκοις
θεσμοῖς ἄρξαντας πόλιος πρῶτοι καταπαύειν
ἦρξαν, κίνδυνον σώμασιν ἀράμενοι.

'The people of Athens, long in their land, honoured
With crowns these men because of their courage,
Who first led them to stop those once ruling the city
With unjust laws, at the peril of life and of limb.'

5 Raubitschek 1941, 284–295. Aeschines 3.187 records the essential facts about the decree. Translated in Harding 1985, No. 7, pp. 11–13.

6 Demosth. 24.135 says he was, after the gods, most responsible for the restoration of democracy. Demosthenes presumably was talking about constitutional changes, not the fighting. Cratippus *FGrH* 64 T 2; Aeschines 3.187, 195; Aristides 34.

7 *Pace* Raubitschek, Eleutherae was probably not Athenian at this time, Buck 1994, 28.

8 Lysias 13.78; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.42; Plut. *Mor.* 345D–E.

9 Demosth. 24.134.

10 Lys. 13.80–82.

11 Lys. 28.12.

LOGISTICS

The seventy were soon reinforced, apparently in fairly small but frequent drafts. A month or so later there were still only 700 at Phyle. Any force must have weapons. It is reasonable to suppose that few if any Athenians of the hoplite class brought their helmets, corselets, shields and spears with them when they fled from Athens or were exiled. This means that the refugees had to be provided with, at the least, shields and spears; these had to be procured, and fast. Foreign volunteers and mercenaries might or might not supply their own equipment.[12] I suspect that the acquisition of equipment was the limiting factor on the size of Thrasybulus' force. Even after their victory at Munychia, supporters in the Piraeus were still making shields, so as to arm more hoplites.[13] Then, too, by the end of the Peloponnesian War military science had made considerable advances, and professional skills were becoming necessary. This meant that citizen soldiers in exile and away from their usual formations would need much training, or an appreciable number of mercenaries to support them.[14] Thrasybulus needed both weapons and mercenaries, and the funds to obtain them. All this means that he had to set up promptly a considerable organization to engage in various financial and supply activities: in gathering funds; in procuring arms; in contracting mercenaries; in channeling volunteers from exiles and sympathizers all over Greece; in creating good will for the resistance to the Thirty in various states; and finally in sending food supplies and reinforcements to Phyle. Thrasybulus must have started forming such an organization just after he got to Thebes, since it is seen in action sending in reinforcements as soon as Phyle was occupied and getting funds and support even earlier. Its establishment, rapid expansion, and success speaks well for Thrasybulus' organizational and administrative abilities.

Among the most active in Thrasybulus' organization was Lysias, or so he claims. Lysias was of a prosperous Syracusan family long settled at Athens, a metic, and a wealthy one. He became later a famous orator and a ghost writer for a variety of litigants in the Athenian courts. He had fled to Megara after escaping from arrest, about the time of the purge of metics, just before the execution of Theramenes.[15] Lysias' brother was not so fortunate and was imprisoned and killed. Lysias somehow got in touch with Thrasybulus, or was

12 Pritchett 1971–85, 2:121f., 228f.

13 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.25.

14 Though not as many as Krentz 1995, 141, indicates. See below.

15 Lys. 12.17; for his arrest and escape,12.6–17; Fr. 1 Gernet-Bizos, 155–164; Plut. *Mor.* 835E–F. The source for this part of [Plutarch's] *Lives of the Ten Orators* seems to be the speech preserved in Fr. 1.

put in touch with him. Thrasybulus, according to Plutarch, used him as one of his key envoys and organizers.[16] He managed to supply various useful items, 'funds of 2000 drachmas and 200 shields, and while being sent on a mission with Hermas, he paid for 300 mercenaries and persuaded Thrasydaeus of Elis to contribute two talents, since he was his guest-friend [his *xenos*] (*Mor.* 835F).'[17] It is possible that the purge of metics organized by the Thirty was carried out because of their disaffection, and that Lysias and his family were in touch with Thrasybulus long before Lysias' escape to Megara.[18] There were quite a few others in the supply organization, such as Hermas, but their deeds and efforts have not been recorded. Clearly they helped enormously in the success of the democratic counter-revolt.

FIRST SKIRMISHES

The efforts of those supplying Thrasybulus enabled him to overcome the first difficulties. Phyle was occupied by the seventy, and they were quickly reinforced to withstand an assault. When the Thirty learnt of the occupation of Phyle, they responded by bringing out the Three Thousand and the cavalry. 'Some of the young men, full of over-confidence, immediately attacked the place, but they got nowhere, except to receive some wounds before they withdrew.'[19] The next effort, to besiege Phyle, was thwarted by what was believed to be divine intervention in the form of a sudden and violent snowfall, and the army of the Thirty retreated to Athens, losing some equipment-carriers (σκευοφόροι) to the attacks of the men of Phyle.[20] Thrasybulus then apparently stayed quiet for about a month, reinforcing and organizing.

BATTLE OF ACHARNAE

The Thirty then sent out a force to contain Thrasybulus in the hills and to protect the farmland, so that he and his men could not live off the country but

16 Plut. *Mor.* 835F, Ἐπιθεμένων δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ Φυλῆς τῇ καθοδῳ, ἐπεὶ χρησιμώτατος ἁπάντων ὤφθη [sc. Lysias]... .

17 There are other numbers in the various sources: Justin 5.9.9 has 500 mercenaries; so does Orosius 2.17.9; Schol. Aristoph. *Plut.* 1146 has 800 shields; Schol. Aeschin. 3.195 has 300 mercenaries and 500 shields. If [Plutarch] used Lysias, his numbers are more likely to be correct.

18 Lateiner 1971, 25f., doubts this idea and thinks that Lysias was fairly quiet under the Thirty until his arrest.

19 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.2; Diod. 14.32.2 (in the wrong year).

20 For the importance of equipment-carriers, Hanson 1989, 61–63.

would have to get all their food and other materials from Boeotia, at great inconvenience and expense. Thrasybulus' supply lines could eventually be cut, when the weather improved, if he just sat there in Phyle. The Thirty sent out the whole Spartan garrison and two tribes of cavalry. Xenophon says they were posted about fifteen stades (a couple of miles, about three km) from Phyle, in the outlying areas (presumably of the deme Acharnae), and they camped in a bushy spot.[21] By this time Thrasybulus had 700 men under command, as reinforcements were equipped and sent in.[22] At some unspecified time, probably in April, Thrasybulus decided to attack the enemy, and with his 700 moved at night to a point about three or four stades (less than half a mile, three-quarters of a km) from the enemy camp.[23]

> 'When it was getting towards daylight, and the enemy were already getting up to go where each had to go, away from their quarters, and the grooms, as they were currying the horses, were making considerable noise, at that moment Thrasybulus' troops rose up and ran to the attack. They cut down some of the enemy and routed the rest, pursuing them for some six or seven stades. They killed more than 120 of the hoplites and from the cavalry Nicostratus the Handsome and two others, catching them still in their cots' (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.6).

One hundred and twenty dead from a force of fewer than 700 Laconian hoplites was a major defeat.[24] Thrasybulus' force returned to Phyle, and the relief force from the city picked up the dead under truce and retired. This is the battle of Acharnae, an important victory, with great consequences. Five days later Thrasybulus was fighting in the Piraeus.

MASSACRE AT ELEUSIS

It is at this point, just after the battle of Acharnae, that Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.8–10) puts the massacre of the Eleusinians, while Diodorus (14.32.4) places it earlier than the battle. Most authorities prefer Xenophon,[25] but a few follow

21 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.4. Diod. 14.32.6–33.1 is somewhat discrepant, and should be ignored as from Ephorus, not P.

22 Krentz 1982, 83f. and n. 54, and 1995, 141, argues that only 100 were Athenians, 300 were mercenaries, and 300 were foreigners. He relies too much on some loose remark of Aeschines 3.187–190 about those besieged at Phyle.

23 Xenophon probably sets this battle too early in the year, or telescopes chronology. Krentz 1995, 141, puts the battle about three or four months after the capture of Phyle, far too late. A month or so is all that is needed. Ostwald 1986, 487f., follows a chronology derived from Diodorus. He argues that the attempts at the Laconization of Athens pressured Thrasybulus into attacking.

24 Krentz 1995, 141.

25 E.g., Rhodes 1981, 418–422; Hignett 1952, 291.

Diodorus,[26] probably because Xenophon's chronology allows such a very short span of time, four days, during which the massacre had to happen. Diodorus (14.32.5) also alleges that at some point the Thirty offered Thrasybulus the position in the oligarchy once held by Theramenes, and he flatly refused. Diodorus also has the inhabitants of Salamis massacred as well as those of Eleusis, and a passage from Lysias has been interpreted to agree with him.[27] Diodorus' version probably stems from rhetoric that associated some executions of Salaminians with the massacre of Eleusis, as is done by Lysias, and it should be rejected. The offer to Thrasybulus of a seat in the Thirty is barely possible on Diodorus' chronology, but unless it was made well before the battle of Acharnae, impossible on Xenophon's. It sounds like a slander made later by a political rival, one that was credulously picked up by Ephorus. It is unbelievable that such a man as Thrasybulus, so well known as a staunch democrat, would even have been approached. Surely the Thirty would not have bothered to waste their time.

Xenophon makes it clear that after the Battle of Acharnae events moved extremely rapidly. The town of Eleusis may have been as disaffected as the metics were (it is perhaps significant that the herald of the Eleusinian Mysteries, Cleocritus, was one of Thrasybulus' men),[28] and the Thirty acted swiftly. According to Xenophon they considered they were no longer safe and immediately decided to prepare a place of refuge. They went with the cavalry to Eleusis, where they arrested all the male inhabitants and imprisoned them in Athens. The next day they called a meeting of the 'hoplites and cavalry whose names were on the list' (2.4.9). By making them vote publicly in the presence of the Spartan garrison the Thirty forced them to condemn the Eleusinians (the tone here has made some wonder whether Xenophon was one of the voters).[29] Within two days the male inhabitants whom they had arrested were put to death by the Eleven. A potential danger spot was eliminated and a port of refuge was opened, just in time, too. Within another two days Thrasybulus was in the Piraeus.

26 Krentz 1982, 85f.; Ostwald 1986, 486–488.

27 Lysias 12.52 talks of killings done to the Salaminians and the Eleusinians but refers only to the massacre of 300 Eleusinians 'by a single vote.' In 13.44 he says that some Salaminians were slain by the Thirty, but in the vaguest terms. Any atrocity done on Salamis would gain emotional voltage by being associated with the massacre of the Eleusinians. Lysias is certainly evidence for killings on Salamis, but not for the elimination of the adult males on the scale of Eleusis.

28 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.20.

29 Krentz 1995, 142, argues for the execution of about 300 of over 450 Eleusinian males. For the cavalry Bugh 1988, 125.

BATTLE OF MUNYCHIA

Right after the massacre of the Eleusinians (ἐκ τούτου), probably at the beginning of May, Thrasybulus made a night march to the Piraeus with 1,000 men, leaving 200 to hold Phyle.[30] He and his men were warmly welcomed by the inhabitants of the Piraeus, and numerous light-armed troops were recruited from these to join them. Some peltasts and javelin men also arrived, presumably some of the mercenaries hired by Lysias and his colleagues of the resistance supply organization. The Piraeus was the home of the democratic opposition, and its possession gave Thrasybulus a firm base and the fervent support of many people. It would also cut Athens off from the sea and from the importation of sea-borne supplies and so put some pressure on the Thirty.

The Thirty immediately sent out the Spartan garrison, the cavalry, and the hoplites to the Piraeus by the main road. At first Thrasybulus tried to stop them from coming up, but when he realized that the large circuit of the walls required a large garrison, and he did not have that many in his force, he concentrated everything on the Munychia hill. This lies at the northeast corner of the town, above the smaller harbours of Zea and Munychia. The enemy rendezvoused at the agora of Hippodamus, which is thought to lie north of Zea and west of the hill, in the low area between the intersection of Athena Street and Leoforos Mounychias and the Plateia Korais.[31] They drew themselves up in a formation

> 'that filled the road that goes to the sanctuary of Munychian Artemis and the shrine of Bendis. They were no less than fifty shields deep. In this formation they marched up the hill. The men from Phyle also filled the road, but they were no more than ten hoplites deep. But behind them were stationed the peltasts, the javelin men, and especially the slingers, and of these there were many, since they came from around there' (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.12).[32]

30 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.10 says 1,000 men, while Diodorus 14.33.1 says 1,200, but makes the point that a guard was left at Phyle. Cf. Krentz 1982, 91, n. 3.

31 Paus. 1.1.3; the site has not been excavated. Judeich 1932, 451, gives a reasonable description.

32 Xenophon's calculations are rough. If all the Thirty's troops were deployed, with the cavalry dismounted, there would be about 5,000. This gives, with a formation 50 ranks deep, 100 files. One hundred files ten deep gives 1,000 hoplites for Thrasybulus' force, just as Xenophon said. A hundred files means a road of considerable width, Frazer, 1898, 2:28f. Judeich 1932, 431 and n. 5, and 452, n. 8, following Wachsmuth's calculations, estimates a width of thirty to forty m. This must be based on a formation with interlocked shields. Pritchett 1971–85, 1:44–54, points out that a file in open order needs some eighty to one hundred cm space, but if Delbrück and Lammert are correct that fighting was done in close order, about half of that. Thus the width of the road might be anywhere from thirty to eighty m, but Judeich's estimate of thirty to

There was a little time before the enemy hoplites were in range, and Xenophon has Thrasybulus deliver the usual pre-battle speech. Whether this in reality reflects anything of Thrasybulus and his ideas, or it is what Xenophon thought appropriate for the occasion, is unknown.[33] But it gives the impression of being a sensible talk by an able and rather pious general. The Spartans, whom he had defeated, are noted on the right wing (Thrasybulus' right, that is) and the Thirty on his left wing, in the place of honour and command, the extreme right wing of their own side.[34] A calm assessment is made of the problems in attacking uphill, of the certainty of divine help, and of the righteousness of their cause. Strict instructions are given not to move until he gives the signal by raising the paean. As Lengauer points out, here is the model of the soldier-citizen, fighting for ethical reasons in the interest of his city. Lengauer also notes the resemblances in vocabulary and ideals to Pericles' funeral speech.[35] No doubt Xenophon was skilled enough to imitate the characteristics of Thrasybulus' oratorical style. Xenophon does not present a corresponding speech from the other side, from Critias or any other leader. He had revealed their sentiments, brutal and pragmatic, in the speech he had Critias give a couple of days earlier, to the Three Thousand at the time of the massacre of the Eleusinians (2.4.9).

Xenophon (2.4.19) gives no details of the battle, except to say that at a crucial moment, as the troops of the Thirty toiled uphill, the democrats, inspired by the suicidal attack of their *mantis*, their seer, charged down on them and broke their line, pursuing the Thirty as far as level ground; among the seventy slain were two of the Thirty, Critias and Hippomachus, and one of the Ten governing the Piraeus, Charmides, a kinsman of Plato. Diodorus (14.33.2–3) says that there was a long hard fight on the hill, with numbers matched against position. Finally, Critias fell, his forces retreated to more level ground in something of a panic, but the exiles did not venture to pursue them. Then, when the latter received reinforcements, including some desert-

forty m is the most reasonable. Krentz 1995, 143, suggests that the Thirty's force was drawn up in formation in the agora, but then what about Thrasybulus' force? Xenophon says 'filling the road (ἐμπλῆσαι τὴν ὁδόν, 1.4.11),' not the agora.

33 See Hansen 1993, 161–180, for a full discussion of the historicity of pre-battle speeches in general, and of this speech in particular, 161, 169f. He concludes that such speeches are unhistorical; they are literary compositions reflecting what the historian thought was rhetorically appropriate. They embody the historical convention of rhetorical address. At best what was actually given was a scattering of a few apophthegms. A line deployed a kilometre long is acoustically not a good audience, though a tight-packed formation with a front of less than 100m has possibilities. It should also be remembered that Thrasybulus had a remarkably loud voice (Plut. *Alc.* 26.6). For Xenophon's purpose in having the speech, Gray 1989, 99–101.

34 This deployment is often misinterpreted and reversed.

35 Lengauer 1979, 73.

ers from the Thirty, they attacked and cleared the Piraeus. There may have been a double battle, but it is doubtful. A trademark of Ephorus is double battles, and this, as he reports it, seems to be one of his doubles.[36] Hanson[37] has wondered why Thrasybulus' men charged downhill rather than stand; 'superior morale, favorable terrain, shields grounded, troops both stationary and massed in unusual depth to absorb an enemy already on a difficult uphill advance.' Surely it was not simply the urge to advance that sent them forward; the suicidal act of the *mantis* is emphasized by Xenophon as the cause of the charge. This certainly ensured that the formation of the Thirty broke and was unequivocally defeated.

Xenophon (2.4.20–22) reports at this point, at the end of the battle, the speech by Cleocritus, the herald of the Mysteries, one of Thrasybulus' supporters, a speech which he alleges had a powerful effect on the auditors. Cleocritus pointed out how both sides had been companions and friends, and asked why they were fighting. He begged them in the name of their common families and associations to leave the Thirty and live in peace.[38] It seems, however, to have had little influence on subsequent developments.

THE TEN

The military defeat, however, did have a traumatic effect on the enemy. It was a disaster, and evidently everyone blamed the Thirty. The next day they were promptly deposed by the Three Thousand, who allowed any of them who desired to go to Eleusis.[39] In their stead the Three Thousand elected a board of Ten, one from each tribe, like the old board of generals, or like the oligarchic decarchies that Lysander was establishing all over the Aegean in place of democracies. One of the Ten, Pheidon, was an ex-member of the Thirty.[40] Of the Thirty only he and a certain Eratosthenes (later prosecuted by Lysias) remained in the city.[41] The Ten, to judge by their actions, seemed to be desirous of continuing in much the same manner as the Thirty, keeping the same policies, using the same administration, holding on to such officials as the hipparch Lysimachus, a hard-bitten, ruthless brute.[42] They also kept a tight

36 Cloché 1915, 54–57, also rejects Diodorus, but on different grounds.
37 Hanson 1989, 137f.
38 Gray 1989, 101–103, terms this speech 'a minor masterpiece.' She points out the juxtaposition and contrasting sentiments of this with Thrasybulus' address.
39 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.23–24; Krentz 1995, 147.
40 Lys. 12.55, 58.
41 Lys. 12.54. This oration, against Eratosthenes, was delivered by Lysias himself, according to its title.
42 For Lysimachus, Bugh 1988, 123, 127, and 226 no. 29.

control over the city and their own people, with cavalry patrols watching for deserters, as well as for raids from the Piraeus. There was also the occasional execution for encouragement of the rest, like that of Demaretus, a prominent and presumably recalcitrant citizen.[43] They continued the fight against Thrasybulus and the democrats for the next few months.

There was considerable skirmishing between the forces in the city and in the Piraeus, with the initiative normally in Thrasybulus' capable hands.[44] He had all sorts of volunteers, including metics and foreigners, to whom he promised *isoteleia* (equality in payment of taxes, including capitation, access to the courts, and the elimination of the requirement for a patron to plead one's case),[45] but the serious problem still seems to have been a shortage of equipment. Xenophon (2.4.25) tells how the inhabitants of Piraeus were making and painting great numbers of shields, presumably for all these volunteers. Within ten days Thrasybulus' troops, with a cavalry component of seventy (no doubt many were deserters from the enemy), had control of the area around Athens.[46] The cavalry from the city occasionally made attacks on foraging parties and harassed the main body, when it marched out, but generally the troops of the Ten seem not to have been too effective. Under Lysimachus the Hipparch they committed another atrocity. They massacred some people from Aexone who were going to their farms to get food. In revenge the troops of Thrasybulus executed a cavalryman prisoner. The supporters of Thrasybulus were also preparing and bringing forward siege engines for breaching the walls of Athens. The democrats in the Piraeus clearly had the initiative.

SPARTAN INTERVENTION: LYSANDER AND PAUSANIAS

Meanwhile ambassadors from the Thirty and the Ten had gone to Sparta, and both complained that the Piraeus group, which was in their view really a bunch of Boiotian puppets,[47] was violating the Peace Treaty. Lysander supported these complaints and allegations, and as a result the Ten were given a

43 Cavalry patrols, Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.24; Demaretus, *Ath. Pol.* 38.2.

44 Diod. 14.33.5 and *Ath. Pol.* 38.1 say that the Ten were chosen to stop the fighting, but their subsequent actions do not agree with this coat of whitewash. Lys. 12.54 says in his prosecution of one of the Thirty, Eratosthenes, that they were elected for their hostility to the Thirty and their friendship for those in the Piraeus, but that they turned out hostile to both. He seems here to have been trying to get in an extra taunt at Eratosthenes, who had been a supporter of the Ten as well as one of the Thirty.

45 Krentz 1995, 147f.

46 Xen. *Mem.* 2.7.2.

47 Lys. 12.58. Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 38.1–3, talks of a second board of Ten being named, but

loan of 100 talents, and Lysander was despatched as harmost to Athens, while his brother was made navarch, with command over a fleet of forty ships. Lysander 'then came to Eleusis and began to assemble a large force of Peloponnesian hoplites; meanwhile the navarch instituted a blockade, so that no supplies could come in by sea to [the Athenians].'[48] The blockade does not seem to have been in place long, although, as Xenophon said, it began to get Thrasybulus and his followers into difficulties, and Thrasybulus had to rely on foraging for foodstuffs.

Things might have become unpleasant for Thrasybulus, if Lysander had been able to get his land forces organized, but before that happened, the Spartan kings intervened, sometime in the summer. Xenophon (2.4.29) claimed that Pausanias (moving with the agreement of the other king, Agis)[49] was jealous of Lysander, but some authorities argue that it was policy, not jealousy, that led the Spartans to reverse themselves on Lysander's appointment.[50] Pausanias, with the backing of three of the five ephors, got the task of going to Athens. He also brought with him contingents from all the allies, except the Boeotians and the Corinthians. These suspected the Spartans were contemplating evil designs on Athens and would not send anyone to further them. Pausanias arrived outside Athens at Halipedum, north of the main harbour of Piraeus by the Kophos Limen.[51]

Pausanias commanded Thrasybulus to disband his forces forthwith (Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31), but the latter paid no attention. Pausanias prepared to attack. In spite of what Xenophon suggests, there is no sign, at this time, of Pausanias' being εὐμενής, well disposed, to the men from the Piraeus.[52] On the next day he moved his men near the Kophos Limen on a reconnaissance for lines of circumvallation, and Thrasybulus' light-armed troops caught Pausanias' force off guard. Pausanias' hoplites and cavalry rallied and drove the light-armed back, into an encounter battle with Thrasybulus' hoplite force in the built-up area of the Piraeus, near the theatre below the Munychian Hill.[53] Here the Spartan force was roughly handled and took considerable casualties,

this is well-nigh universally rejected, Rhodes 1981, 459f., though Krentz 1995, 149, sees some merit in the story.

48 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.28–29.

49 Plut. *Lys.* 21.3–4.

50 Cartledge 1987, 134f., 351. Krentz 1995, 149f., points to the tradition in Lysias and Diodorus that makes Pausanias aware of such factors as the growing unpopularity of the Spartans.

51 For Halipedum see Judeich 1932, 425.

52 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.31–35. Cf. Cawkwell 1976, 62–84, esp. 74f. and the notes in 1979, 132, and Krentz 1995, 150.

53 For the location of the theatre Krentz 1995, 151, and literature there, and Judeich 1932, 451, who emphasizes that it is not the new theatre west of Zea, 442.

including two polemarchs. It fell back to a more open area, where it received reinforcements. Thrasybulus was unable to break off the fight when it spread to open country, but instead he was constrained to continue into a set-piece hoplite battle. It seems likely that his men had their blood up and persisted in fighting, even when a reinforced Peloponnesian phalanx came down on them. Finally, some of Thrasybulus' men were forced into the marsh of Halae, and others gave way. Thrasybulus then retreated after having 150 killed. The Spartans did not follow, but retired after putting up a trophy.[54]

Clearly Thrasybulus' force was trained, equipped, and formidable, and Pausanias had to think again. The casualties in his force are nowhere recorded, but the loss of two polemarchs and other prominent leaders indicates they were not light. The cemetery in the Ceramicus where the Spartiates are buried was excavated by the German School some years ago.[55] At least thirteen Spartiates lie here, some with arrowheads still embedded in their remains and one with a spearhead between his ribs. The dead from the Lacedaemonian and allied contingents will have exceeded this number considerably.

Though Thrasybulus' force was tough and ready for action, the same could not be said for the troops under the Ten or the Thirty. There was clearly a problem with morale and fighting qualities, since the cavalry had to patrol the circuit around Athens, to prevent desertions, as well as to warn of enemy raids. According to Lysias (18.9–10) prominent and powerful men like Diognetus were making emotional appeals to the Spartans against the oligarchy of the Ten. Then, too, it seems likely that Pausanias was faced with some discontent in the contingents from the Peloponnesian League. Though Corinth and Boeotia had not sent their quotas of troops, in their disapproval of Sparta's policies, others, almost as disapproving, had done so, probably unhappily and reluctantly.[56] Lysander's idea of blindly supporting the Athenian oligarchs was obviously not going to work. Pausanias decided to try another way of establishing stability in Athens and keeping a counterpoise to Boeotia.

THE RECONCILIATION (SEPTEMBER, 403)

Xenophon (2.4.35–43) gives a reasonably complete and, as far as can be judged, accurate account of the steps by which Pausanias settled the differences between the Ten and Thrasybulus' men and brought peace to Athens. Pausanias got Thrasybulus' and his followers to send an embassy to him and the ephors, and hinted to them and to the men in Athens that they should

54 Xen. *Hell.* 2.4.33–35.
55 Willemsen 1977, 117–157.
56 Cf. Krentz 1982, 100.

indicate their willingness to make peace with one another and be allies of Sparta. After some balking by some of the men in Athens and the sending of several embassies to Sparta, the Spartans sent a commission to sit with Pausanias and to make what seemed to them the best settlement. They did their task and came up with a report. It said that the Three Thousand and the men of Phyle should live together under an amnesty, and that the Thirty and their followers should settle at Eleusis in a virtually independent state. Aristotle in the *Athenaion Politeia* 39 gives a more detailed version of the settlement, but with no variations on the broad outline of Xenophon.[57] In September, 403, representatives of the groups swore a set of solemn oaths supporting democracy and an amnesty, a procedure very similar to that in Samos in 411, when Thrasybulus had all swearing oaths to support the democratic government. In effect, Athenian democracy was restored (with some safeguards added against hasty and arbitrary actions). Thrasybulus had won his war and utterly defeated the oligarchy. The smoothness and skill he showed in gaining all of his objectives without further bloodshed are clear indications of his abilities as a negotiator as well as a fighter; and of the effectiveness of the team he had assembled.

Pausanias disbanded his army, and Thrasybulus and his men went up into Athens and to the Acropolis and sacrificed to Athena. Afterwards an assembly was convened, and Thrasybulus made a speech. As reported by Xenophon (2.4.40–42) it is a victory speech, an unrestrained attack on his former enemies. Given Thrasybulus' diplomatic skills, one may doubt its accuracy. He rebukes the Three Thousand for their conceit, their greed, and their unfairness. Then he points out that in the fighting they had been thoroughly defeated by their humble opponents, and that they had been double-crossed by the Spartans. More fools they. He then urges his own men to restrain themselves and preserve the peace. Finally he assures all that the pledges would be honoured forever. It is an unsatisfactory speech, reflecting Xenophon's views on his colleagues in the Three Thousand and his not unfavourable view of the leader of the reformed Athenian democracy, but hardly what a competent politician would deliver in a time for reconciliation.[58] Though Thrasybulus was by many accounts not a charismatic orator, but rather stiff and formal,[59] he was not one to offend what would be in the future the main strength of the Athenian hoplite force, many members of which would be the backbone of the new democracy, and who would be needed to support his policies.

57 For full discussion see Loening 1987.

58 For Xenophon's purpose in writing the speech in this way, Gray 1989, 103f. She argues that Xenophon was showing the democrats' great ethical achievement in forgiving the harm suffered. It marks the end of civil discord in Athens.

59 Saur 1978, 276–288.

RENEWED DEMOCRACY: ARCHINUS

After describing the reconciliation and the reunion of Eleusis to Athens (see below), Xenophon turns his attention to other matters, especially activities in Persia, and he does not return to affairs at Athens for some time, until the outbreak of the Corinthian War. For the interim we are left with Diodorus, the *Athenaion Politeia*, the orators, and, fortunately, with some inscriptional evidence. From all these it is clear that most of the Athenian democratic leaders, Thrasybulus' colleagues from the Piraeus, joined with leaders from the Three Thousand in working hard to preserve the reconciliation, and they handled any attempts to violate it swiftly and firmly. Archinus is said to have persuaded the Boule to execute without trial some individual who had violated the amnesty.[60] He also promulgated a law (νόμος) that prevented any prosecution if it violated the 'oaths' (ὅρκοι), i.e., the reconciliation agreement.[61] The 'oaths' themselves were apparently never embodied in a law, though Thrasybulus is alleged by Nepos (3.2) to have seen to its enactment. Most authorities consider Nepos mistaken.[62]

There was certainly a program of laws enacted by the assembly. It was carefully balanced and was mostly concerned with finances and real estate. The war debts incurred by the exiles in Boeotia were paid off from public funds, as were those of the Three Thousand and any monies owed to Sparta by the Thirty.[63] The recovery of chattels (χρήματα) sold by the Thirty was only permitted under severe restrictions, and Thrasybulus and Anytus are commended for their restraint and generosity in not attempting to recover their possessions, which had been seized under the Thirty. It was felt that if they had done so they could have imperiled the reconciliation.[64] Thrasybulus, it may be inferred, was wealthy as well as magnanimous.

The Athenians pressed on with re-establishing the democratic state. Archinus moved the decree mentioned earlier in this chapter honouring the men of Phyle. Although Thrasybulus was still a leading figure he seems at this time to have overestimated his support and to have been outstripped by Archinus.[65] According to various scraps of information Thrasybulus was somewhat arbitrary, stubborn, and impatient in trying to push things through the assembly.[66] Furthermore, some of the courses of action he was advocating

60 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 40.2.
61 Isoc. 18.2.3; for the sequence Loening 1987, 57.
62 Loening 1987, 26–28.
63 Loening 1987, 85–97.
64 Isoc. 18.23–24. Loening 1987, 94f., 126.
65 Hignett 1952, 295f.
66 Arbitrary and stubborn: Strattis fr. 17 Kock, αὐθάδης; impatient: schol. ad Aristoph. *Eccl.* 202–203.

were too radical for most of the citizenry, who found the cautious conservatism of Archinus more to their liking. Among other things it is alleged that he promised to extend full citizenship, not simply *isoteleia,* to the metics and foreigners who had supported the overthrow of the Thirty, a total of about 1,000.[67] It is claimed that he got one of the meetings of the assembly to pass a psephism to that effect.[68] Unfortunately, Thrasybulus had done an unconstitutional act by having the Assembly pass a measure without a *probouleuma*, a decree indicating a previous examination and recommendation by the Boule. There was no Boule elected at the time, but that was beside the point.[69] His measure was disallowed through the efforts of Archinus. The Assembly did, however, eventually pass measures to reward all those who had died fighting the Thirty, including foreigners, with a pubic funeral and the posthumous honours of citizens.[70] *Isoteleia* and posthumous citizenship were as far as the Athenians would go.

Thrasybulus also desired to strengthen the powers of the ordinary people by funding public participation in the business of the state, as had been done in the palmy days of the full democracy after it was introduced by Pericles. Pay on this scale, however, amounted to a considerable sum, and it easily absorbed nearly all the revenues of the state. This meant that there was little left over to pay for a fleet, or for fortifications; there was no money for defence. To pay for public participation and have a moderate surplus to build up the reserves of the state and provide for defence could, however, be accomplished in one simple way: by reviving the Empire.

Archinus, however, was not in favour of reviving the radical democracy with full pay at this time, but during 403/2 he managed to reconcile many of the Three Thousand to the newly revived and revised democracy. On the one hand he opposed the motion of Phormisius to limit the franchise solely to property-holders, and on the other hand he saw to the disallowance of Thrasybulus' psephism, which would have extended citizenship to hundreds of metics and foreigners.[71] He tried to follow a middle path of reconciliation, between Thrasybulus and his followers on one side, and the Three Thousand on the other, until he died, probably in 402 B.C.[72] At some time between 403

67 Krentz 1982, 110, says 1,200, while Osborne 1981–1983, 2:30, n. 77, gives a figure of about 800.

68 Aristot. *Ath. Pol.* 40.2 and Plut. *Mor.* 835F–836A, talk of citizenship for Lysias, probably referring to this same proposal by Thrasybulus.

69 Plut. *Mor.* 835F–836A; Rhodes 1981 474f.

70 Lys. 2.66.

71 Phormisius: Lys. 34, proem.; psephism of Thrasybulus: *Ath. Pol.* 40.2, Aeschin. 3.195, *Mor.* 835F. See also Hignett 1952, 296f., Strauss 1986, 97; Cartledge 1987, 286.

72 Strauss 1986, 97.

and 401 the Athenians, apparently at the behest of Thrasybulus,[73] passed a psephism, recorded on a much-mutilated inscription, granting *isoteleia* to the thousand or so non-citizens who had aided the democrats, and perhaps citizenship to some.[74] Thrasybulus was clearly in a position of pre-eminence, but he had competition.

FACTIONS AT ATHENS

Thrasybulus kept his links with Thebes and the Boeotians. About the time of the passage of this psephism he and some of his former fellow-exiles dedicated a colossal relief statue of Pentelic marble of Athena and Heracles, the work of Alcamenes, in the Heraclium at Thebes. This was clearly in gratitude, as a thank-offering for Boeotian help in time of need. The monument is lost, but there are several vase paintings from the turn of the century that appear to reflect its appearance, in particular, one from the Agora.[75] Relations continued to be close and friendly between Athens and the Boeotian League.

The split between Thrasybulus and Archinus over the grant of citizenship for metic members of the Piraeus veterans indicates that divisions, and with divisions factions, were manifesting themselves among the men of Phyle, as well as among other Athenians, soon after the settlement. Presumably the various factions represented major groups among the Three Thousand and the men of Phyle. For the end of the fifth century and the early fourth Strauss has identified at least seven that were important in Athenian politics: a faction centred on Thrasybulus, another around Archinus, a third headed by Phormisius, and a fourth led by Andocides, a fifth, more demagogic, led by Agyr-

73 Isocrates 18.23 describes Thrasybulus and Anytus as the most powerful men in Athens at a time approximating 402. Sealey 1956, 181.

74 *IG* 2^2. 10. Translated in Harding 1985, 3, pp. 8–10. M.J. Osborne 1981–1983, 1:D6; 2:26–43 where he argues for 70–90 citizens. Whitehead 1984, 8–10, argues that all were granted full citizenship. Krentz 1986, 201–204, argues that all got *isoteleia* and none citizenship. Harding shares the same view. The inscription indicates three categories of non-citizens to be rewarded: (1)'those who came down together from Phyle or [materially aided] those who did'; (2) 'those who fought together in the battle of Munychia'; (3) 'those who stayed loyal to the People when the Reconciliation occurred.' Osborne thinks that just the first group, some 70 to 90, got full citizenship. See Ostwald 1986, 508f. and nn. 40, 41. Since Lysias, who surely belonged to the first group, did not get citizenship, Krentz's argument, that none got citizenship but all got *isoteleia*, seems more likely. The date, given variously as 404/3 to 401/0, depends on one's restoration of the text in terms of one's historical interpretation of the sequence of events.

75 Paus. 9.11.6; Pemberton 1981, 317–321; the Agora vase is P10673, illustrated in Pl. 54(c) and 55(a); Schachter 1981–95, 2:23.

rhius, another of similar views under Epicrates and Cephalus that emerged by the early 390s, and a small faction led by Thrasybulus of Collytus. Many of these factions were of smallish size, but two or three of them were on the scale of Boeotian ones. Certainly the faction of Thrasybulus was.[76]

There seem to be a few differences in the policies advocated by these various factions, but not many. All favoured the recovery of the Empire; all were strongly democratic; all were prepared to side with Persia against Sparta; none were pro-Spartan. *Pace* Cloché there is no real evidence for any faction fronting for this or that socio-economic class.[77] The real divisions were on personalities, tactics, and timing: about who was to lead the state, and when he might make things happen and just what he might make happen. There was little controversy about where the state was to go. It was primarily a series of battles over personal differences among individuals and when things should be done, rather than over policies.

DOMINANCE OF THRASYBULUS

It was probably under Thrasybulus' guidance that the town of Eleusis was reabsorbed. Xenophon (*Hell.* 2.4.43) gives a brief report.

> 'Later on, when they heard that those in Eleusis were hiring mercenaries, [the Athenians] marched out against them in full force. They killed the [Eleusinian] generals when they came to a conference, but to the others they sent in their friends and kinfolk and persuaded them to come to terms. And oaths were sworn not to remember past grievances, and to this day they live together and the people hold to their oaths.'

The fact that the Athenians came πανδημεί, in full force, shows that the hoplite class of the Three Thousand was now reconciled to the new regime and actively supporting it. Archinus and Thrasybulus had succeeded. The only other source to report much on the incident is Justin, and he seems to be based on Xenophon and is even sketchier.[78] Lysias (25.9) talks vaguely about the Athenians besieging Eleusis, but nothing more specific. Aristotle (*Ath. Pol.* 40.4) merely dates the reunion of Eleusis to 401/0. Whether the allegation that the Thirty were recruiting mercenaries had anything to it or was merely a rumour used as a pretext, is uncertain. It is clear, however, that the

76 Strauss 1986, 89–104; Hamilton 1991, 160f., identifies as the major factions those of Cephalus and Epicrates, Thrasybulus, and Agyrrhius (with Callistratus of Aphidna). Agyrrhius was in eclipse around 400, Sealey 1956, 181f.

77 Cloché 1934, 9–14; Bruce 1966, 280f.; Beloch 1884, 122. *Contra*, Perlman 1968, 258.

78 Justin 5.10.8–11; cf. Krentz 1982, 120f.

united Athenians, under several of the generals, went on the offensive and killed the generals of the Thirty by treachery. After that it was a mopping-up operation. The treacherous act of slaying someone at a conference does not sound like something that the honourable Thrasybulus would have done. It is, however, unlikely that any democrat would have been moved by scruples in regard to anything to do with the Thirty, and the demise of the generals settled the matter effectively. Eleusis was once again part of the Athenian state. The well-to-do classes not only acquiesced but vigorously supported the restored democracy.

Andocides apparently headed his own small faction, but was a dependent of Thrasybulus' colleague Anytus, who supported him at his trial in late 400.[79] Andocides had been involved in the notorious incident of the mutilation of the Herms, just before the expedition for Sicily had set out. To save his own life he turned informer, becoming very unpopular with the families and friends of those whom he denounced. He became so hated and despised that had to withdraw into exile. He had tried to return twice before, ending up being rejected both times. It is evidence of the dominance of Thrasybulus' faction that Andocides was acquitted and allowed back into Athens – this time. Andocides was a particularly slippery type, even for an Athenian of aristocratic lineage.

RELATIONS WITH SPARTA

Athens was weak and in no condition to do much against any foreign power by herself. She needed allies, land powers with armies. Oropus, previously a dependency of Athens but independent for some time, joined (or rejoined) the Boeotian League in 402/1.[80] Athens did not intervene. Perhaps Thrasybulus, by ensuring Athenian inactivity, was repaying favours to the Ismenian faction in Thebes; or perhaps Athens was simply too weak to fight the Boeotian army; or perhaps Athens was too preoccupied with Eleusis. Thrasybulus, while Athens was alone and weak, saw to it that she took no offensive action beyond her borders (except at Eleusis), but stayed submissive in her role as a loyal ally of Sparta. As such in 401/400 she sent hoplites to aid Sparta in the war against Elis, where Sparta settled old scores and tried to gain control of a troublesome neighbour.[81]

79 For date see Edwards 1995, 14, MacDowell 1962, 204f., Sealey 1956, 182. For Andocides' anti-democratic, pro-oligarchic attitude, Missiou 1992, 27–29, 42f., 72, 180–182.

80 Buck 1994, App. 1, 123–126.

81 Xen. *Hell.* 3.2.25. Krentz 1995, 174, points out how Xenophon emphasizes that even Athens was loyal at the time. For the date see Falkner 1996, 17, n. 1.

Tissaphernes after the death of Cyrus had attempted to bring the Ionian cities back under Persian rule. The cities, which had largely supported Cyrus and feared retaliation, appealed to Sparta. The Spartans sent Thibron to Ionia as harmost and an expeditionary force including 5,000 hoplites. Thibron also asked for and received 300 Athenian cavalry. The Athenians 'sent some of those who had served in the *hippeis* under the Thirty, deeming it profit to the people if they went overseas and were killed there.'[82] Thus in 399 B.C. Athens despatched a cavalry unit for the Persian expeditionary force. Thrasybulus and his faction clearly pursued a pro-Spartan policy until the Boeotians and Corinthians openly split with Sparta and were ready to go to war. Thrasybulus had to see sufficient military strength hostile to Sparta ready to be deployed before he could or would move. Until then he was opposed to any anti-Spartan adventures, unlike some of his political rivals.

A case in point might be the fate of an Athenian embassy to the Persian King, probably in 398/7. Pharax, the Spartan navarch, intercepted it and sent its members, [—]crates, Hagnias, and Telesegorus, to Sparta for judgement, and there they were executed. No protest was made by the Athenians.[83] Another example is Thrasybulus' reaction to the expedition of Demaenetus. The latter was of an aristocratic family, a general later, in 388/7 and 387/6,[84] and was obviously a prominent politician. As P reports it

> '(1) About the same time [in 397/6] a trireme sailed out from Athens without the consent of the people. Demaenetus was in command of it, and he had, it is said, been in secret agreement with the Boule about the matter, since some of the citizens supported him. With some of them he went down to the Piraeus, launched a ship from the ship sheds, put to sea and sailed off to Conon. (2) After this there was a great outcry, with the better sort of Athenians being upset and saying that this would destroy the city by bringing on a war with the Spartans. The members of the Boule were frightened by the outcry and convoked the assembly. They claimed that they had nothing to do with the matter. When the assembly met, the faction of Thrasybulus, Anytus and Aesimus got up and explained that they [the members of the Boule] were running a great risk, unless they freed the city from responsibility. (3) The respectable Athenians and the property holders were content with the present circumstances, but the common people

82 Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.3–4; Krentz 1995, 156; Bugh 1988, 130. There is no further mention of the 300 cavalry, who disappear from history.

83 *Hell. Oxy.* 10.1 Chambers = 7.1 Bartoletti; cf. Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 8, Isaeus 6.8. Perlman 1967, 259.

84 Xen. *Hell.* 5.1.26; Aeschin. 2.78; see also Sealey 1956, 178–203, esp. 179f.; Perlman 1968, 259.

> and the lower classes, now thoroughly frightened took their advice and sent word to Milon, the harmost of Aegina, telling him that he could punish Demaenetus, since he had not acted with the state's approval. Previously they (the common people) during nearly all the time had stirred up matters and had engaged in many anti-Spartan activities' (*Hell. Oxy.* 9.1–3 Chambers = 6.1–3 Bartoletti).

In other words Thrasybulus saw to it that the Spartans were supported against Conon and the Persians as late as 397/6. Demaenetus, incidentally, escaped from an ambush by Milon and completed his mission.

The phrase 'were content with the present circumstances' (ἔστεργον τὰ παρόντα) is ambiguous. The 'present circumstances' could be 'the usual pro-Spartan stance of the state,' or they could be 'the despatching of Demaenetus and other aid and comfort to Conon.' The usual interpretation favours the former, but the contrast set up by P between those tolerating the present circumstances and the thoroughly frightened common people and the better sort who raised an outcry might indicate a split in the propertied classes between those desiring a firmer stand against Sparta and those not.

At any rate, there were factions pushing for an active anti-Spartan policy at that particular time. Chief among them was the faction of Epicrates and Cephalus.[85] It was at the instigation of these two that the people had sent arms and seamen to Conon and the embassy to the Persian King, of [—]crates, Hagnias, and Telesegorus, which was arrested by the Spartans and executed.[86] Thrasybulus and his group had to struggle against various other factions and did not have things all their way. Thrasybulus, the staunch democrat and leader of the fight against the Thirty, was now enmeshed in the web of Athenian politics, endeavouring to make compromises, trying to persuade the voters to see things his way, trying to circumvent his rivals for the leadership of the state.

SOCRATES

In 399, in the same year that the three hundred cavalry oligarchs were sent off to fight and die for Sparta, Anytus and others saw to the elimination of that prominent and prickly intellectual, Socrates. Much controversy swirls round this act, and it is unknown whether Anytus did this with the support of his

85 *Hell. Oxy.* 10.2 Chambers = 7.2 Bartoletti. Cawkwell 1976b, 275, sees this as arising from a split in policy between Conon and Thrasybulus. In one sense it is, since Conon's group wanted the Persians and their fleet to liberate Athens, while Thrasybulus wanted the Greeks to do it, with Persian funding.

86 *Hell. Oxy.* 10.1 Chambers = 7.1 Bartoletti. See above.

factional colleagues like Thrasybulus or not. In fact, 'it is an almost impossible task to disentangle from the later literary debate the various strands which were relevant to Socrates' trial and death.... That the associations of Alcibiades and Critias with Socrates were in some way relevant seems certain.'[87] The fact that Thrasybulus was an associate of Alcibiades for several years and was instrumental in getting him back on the Athenian side means little about his personal attitude towards him – or to Socrates. Socrates was, in spite of his defence as reported in Plato and Xenophon, smeared with the brush of association with members of the Thirty Tyrants – as well as with Alcibiades. Many of the Thirty and their supporters, including Critias and Charmides, had been his pupils, as had Alcibiades. His actions at the trial of the generals after the battle of Arginusae, where he refused to put the motion for their trial in the assembly, were brave, but ineffective, if Xenophon is correct.[88] Though Socrates had not supported the Thirty, he had not actively opposed them; his views on democracy as reported to us by Plato and Xenophon are not of such a nature as to endear him to the men of Phyle. Perhaps it might be well to regard his trial and condemnation as an incident when a few exceptions slipped past the barrier of the 'oaths' in a final settling of accounts.[89] Eratosthenes and several other oligarchical figures were being tried about this time, too, in spite of the amnesty.

THRASYBULUS THE MODERATE

There is much confusion in the use of the English term 'moderate' by modern scholars, especially when they apply it to Athenian politicians. The word 'moderate' is sometimes used to translate ἐπιεικής, which seems rather to mean 'decent,' as in 'decent people,' with very little moral connotation, or with no more significance than 'respectable.' It does not usually translate as 'conservative democrat,' with a political connotation. 'Moderate' is sometimes used for anyone who advocates a hoplite oligarchy on the Boiotian pattern.[90] This restricted the franchise to those who had enough wealth to supply themselves with hoplite armour, or ride in the cavalry, that is, to the reasonably prosperous. By that criterion the Boiotian League with its rotating councils elected by a hoplite franchise should be 'moderate.' For others it refers to someone who strives to mediate between the oligarchs and the common people, but is really somewhat democratic; that is, it refers to one

87 Lewis 1994, 39f.

88 Xen. *Hell.* 1.7.15; Krentz 1995, 163f.

89 For a lively and informative retelling of the trial, Stone 1988, criticized and corrected by Hansen 1995. See especially Hansen 1995, 26–28, 30f.

90 Harding 1974, 104f.

who advocates something like the constitution of Cleisthenes before the reforms of Ephialtes, doubtless with office-holding unpaid and moderately limited.[91] A confusion in terminology here is not helpful. But in any of these definitions Thrasybulus is not a 'moderate;' he was a democrat. I suspect that he admired the democracy as it operated under the leadership exercised by Pericles (Thuc. 2.65.8–9) and the ideals of democracy outlined in the Funeral Speech (Thuc. 2.35–46). Thrasybulus was also, like Pericles, an imperialist, taking for granted the merits for Athens of the Empire.[92]

It is often inferred that Thrasybulus and his faction were 'moderates,' that is, part of οἱ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς οὐσίας ἔχοντες, 'the decent folk and men of property,'[93] but no text supports this idea. Thrasybulus opposed and stopped the attempt of Demaenetus to form an alliance with the King, and so performed an act pleasing to some, but not all, of the 'moderates'. Thrasybulus found himself in this instance on the same side as 'the better sort of Athenians' (οἱ γνώριμοι καὶ χαρίεντες) literally 'the well-born and cultivated.'[94] The better sort were very upset with Demaenetus. So were Thrasybulus and his faction, and his main constituency, the common people. But this does not mean that he and his faction were part of 'the better sort of Athenians.' Much of his support came from 'the majority of the common people' (οἱ πολλοὶ καὶ δημοτικοί) – P seems to enjoy hendiadys – not just from the hoplites or the wealthy. It is clear that Thrasybulus was not as glib or persuasive a speaker as some of the other party leaders. Thrasybulus' skills in organization and administration, however, were teamed with the fast-talking abilities of his friend Anytus, an impressive orator and a very adroit politician, so skillful that he was acquitted after losing Pylos and so smooth that he persuaded the courts to execute Socrates. The faction of Thrasybulus with men like Anytus as leading figures must have been formidable in debates of the assembly.

PERSIA AND SPARTA

With the invasion of Persian territory in 399 by Thibron and his replacement Dercyllidas, Spartan relations with the Persian Empire became hostile. Thibron (sent home because of his brutality to the allies) and his successor Dercyllidas (much more popular) carried desultory warfare against both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus for some years with considerable success. Their efforts and Spartan attempts to come to an arrangement with Egypt led the

91 E.g., Krentz 1982, 47.
92 Cf. Seager 1967, 95–115; Perlman 1968, 257–267; Cawkwell 1976b, 270–277.
93 Strauss 1986, 90.
94 *Hell. Oxy.* 9.1–10.1 Chambers = 6.1–7.1 Bartoletti. McKechnie and Kern 1988, 132f.

Persian King to begin rearmament by, among other things, mobilizing a large fleet under the former Athenian general Conon. This was ready by 397.[95] The Spartans were informed by one Herodas of Syracuse,

> 'who happened to be in Phoenicia with a ship-master and saw Phoenician triremes, some sailing in from elsewhere, others there all fitted out, still others still being equipped. He heard as well that there were going to be 300 of them. He boarded the first merchant ship proceeding to Greece, and he reported to the Spartans that the King and Tissaphernes were preparing this fleet.'[96]

As a result of this in 396 a further Spartan expeditionary force was sent to Asia Minor under the new king Agesilaus.

In Greece Spartan relations with some of its former allies, like Boeotia, were very sour. Before setting out for Asia Minor Agesilaus wanted to sacrifice at Aulis, the harbour from which Agamemnon's expedition against Troy had set out, as 'Agamemnon had sacrificed before going to Troy'(Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.4). The Boeotians, in whose territory Aulis lay would not permit such a Spartan claim to any Homeric-style pre-eminence. They pointed out that he was not using the official *mantis* at the sacrifices, and they sent out very junior officials to forbid him to do any sacrificing.[97]

Though nominally Athens was still a loyal Spartan ally, clearly by 397, if not earlier, a split was developing among its politicians about Sparta. It was over not what to do, since all factions were anxious to have another round with Sparta eventually, but it was clearly over when to do it.[98] There does not seem to have been any faction representing any particular class against other classes, though certainly many of Thrasybulus' supporters were drawn from the common people. Most factions seem to cut across class lines. Some factions were pushing for immediate hostilities against Sparta, with, it was hoped, help from the King. Other factions, like that of Thrasybulus, wanted to wait until more Greek land support was available. Then came Timocrates of Rhodes as a kind of *deus ex machina*.

95 Hornblower 1994, 66f. for background and date.
96 Xen. *Hell.* 3.4.1. It is interesting that the Spartans learned of this in such a casual way.
97 For the incident see Buck 1994, 29f.
98 Strauss 1986, 91.

CHAPTER 5

THE FIRST TWO YEARS OF THE CORINTHIAN WAR: THRASYBULUS AND CONON 395–394 B.C.

TIMOCRATES OF RHODES

At some point before the outbreak of hostilities in Greece, probably in mid- to late 396, a little later than the time of the dispute over Demaenetus, Timocrates of Rhodes arrived in Central Greece on a mission for the Persian King.[1] His task was to buy a war on the Greek mainland to distract Spartan efforts and so encourage the Spartans to withdraw their forces from Persian territory. He brought with him 'fifty silver talents worth of money.' His efforts were backed by the appearance of the Persian fleet under the command of Conon.[2] Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.1–2) and Pausanias (3.9.8) say Timocrates visited Thebes, Corinth, and Argos, where he bribed various faction leaders, such as Ismenias and his colleagues at Thebes, 'on the understanding that they would make war on Sparta.' He did not, according to Xenophon, need to bribe any Athenians, since they were eager enough for war in any case; but Pausanias says that he actually did bribe the Athenian faction leaders Epicrates and Cephalus. No one mentions Thrasybulus, who had been elected general this year.[3]

Xenophon's allegations of bribery throughout Greece, except at Athens, stem from the usual fourth-century rhetorical accusations of one politician against another, and from his own prejudices. The Boeotian leaders, who were anxious for a war with Sparta, needed no bribery,[4] and neither did any Athenians,[5] Corinthians or Argives.[6] What Timocrates probably did was give all parties assurances of Persian funding for military operations, with the Persian 'archers,' the Persian silver coins with an archer on the reverse, as earnest money. Most of the fifty talents went as down payments for war materials,

1 Seager 1967, 95, n. 2. and 1994, 98; Cartledge 1987, 290. For the controversy over the date, Cook 1981, 122–127, 556–570.
2 Lendon 1989, 311 and n. 56.
3 Paus. 3.5.4.
4 Buck 1994, 34f.
5 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.2. Seager 1967, 95f. and 1994, 98f.
6 *Hell. Oxy.* 10.5 Chambers = 7.5 Bartoletti.

including mercenaries. Agesilaus' quip, that the King was expelling him from Asia with 10,000 archers, does not necessarily imply bribery in spite of Plutarch's editorializing.[7] It could mean that funding was now available for Greek powers to embark on a war against Sparta, with a promise of future Persian subventions. If Xenophon's word-order means anything, the Boeotians were approached first. It seems very likely that Timocrates also acted as an intermediary among Boeotians, Corinthians, Argives, and Athenians, so that there was a sufficient understanding among all parties well before the start of the Boeotian War.

THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

With Persian funds committed, and with informal arrangements established among the major powers, the Boeotians, guided by Ismenias, engineered a fight with a Spartan ally, Phocis, a fight in which Sparta found herself cast in the role of aggressor. There had been a long-simmering dispute between Phocis and a Boeotian ally, Locris. The Locrians, encouraged by the Boeotians, in late 396 seized some territory that they considered wrongfully occupied by Phocis. The Phocians countered with an invasion of Locris; the Locrians appealed to their ally Boeotia; Boeotia promptly invaded Phocis in what is called the Boeotian War. This in turn led to an appeal by Phocis to Sparta and the sending of a Spartan ultimatum, followed in early 395 by an invasion of Boeotia by Spartan-led troops.[8]

In this way the Boeotian leadership under Ismenias and his faction had cast Sparta in the role of invader and so neatly stymied the pro-Spartan faction of Leontiades, who perforce had to support the government against the Spartan aggressors. In fact, the heaviest casualties at the battle of Haliartus fell on supporters of Leontiades, who were trying to prove their loyalty to the Boeotian cause.[9]

THE ATHENIAN ALLIANCE

In early 395 the Spartan forces were poised to invade Boeotia from two directions, under Lysander from Phocis and king Pausanias from the Peloponnese. The Boeotians then sent envoys to Athens seeking a formal alliance; and Xenophon has them address the assembly (*Hell.* 3.5.7–15). Their speech

7 Plut. *Ages.* 15.6.

8 For the steps leading up to the invasion by the Spartans, Buck 1994, 30–36.

9 Buck 1994, 39.

covers topics suitable for the occasion, and it presents appropriate sentiments, even if it is Xenophon's invention. The Boeotians pointed out the services they had rendered Athens previously at the time of the Thirty Tyrants, especially to the democrats, i.e., to Thrasybulus and his partisans; they urged a general anti-Spartan alliance; they mentioned the hatred of all against the Spartan harmosts; and they hinted strongly at Boeotian support for a revival of the Athenian Empire in all its glory. Their speech, says Xenophon, went over well, and it was supported by Athenian speaker after speaker. The vote in favour of an alliance with Boeotia was unanimous.[10]

Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.16) has Thrasybulus deliver a copy of the psephism embodying the alliance to the Boeotians, and then make a speech to them. A rather strange one it is. Xenophon makes Thrasybulus sound rather surly, in a manner most *mal à propos* for one who was so kindly treated by the Boeotians. He is made to say that though the Piraeus was not fortified, the Athenians would run the risk of paying back a greater favour than they had received. 'Whereas you did not march against us with them [the Spartans], we shall fight them at your side.' This speech, I think, is more Xenophon than Thrasybulus, with its back-handed swipe at the Boeotians.[11] To be sure, many of Thucydides' speeches are equally blunt, but neither he nor Xenophon were giving verbatim transcriptions. The sentiments that Xenophon has Thrasybulus deliver give the former the opportunity to editorialize. No doubt Thrasybulus did deliver the official Athenian reply, concluding the alliance, but surely in much more diplomatic terms. An alliance was also made by the Athenians with Locris, probably at the same time, and the texts of both the Boeotian and Locrian treaties are partially preserved.[12]

Any hints about the revival of the Athenian Empire would have been particularly well received, because its restoration was the goal of many Athenians, including Thrasybulus, the architect of the Boeotian alliance. It was simply taken for granted among many, if not all, that the Empire would be restored. Thrasybulus clearly regarded the old alliances of the Delian League as still valid, and that the various states would be regained for the League when the opportunity offered. He had been doing something similar in the last decade of the Peloponnesian War in Thrace. Clearly his guiding principle was

10 Paus. 3.9.6 says that the Athenians sent an embassy to Sparta to ask them not to act aggressively against the Boeotians, but to go to arbitration. All this seems improbable and is generally rejected. Pausanias' source is unknown.

11 Gray 1989, 108f., makes the point that the Thebans are, in Xenophon's view, asking for a lot more than they should expect. In this context Thrasybulus' reply is highly relevant.

12 *IG* 2^2. 14 and 15; Tod 1946, nos. 101 and 102. Translated in Harding 1985, no. 14 for Boeotia and no. 16 for Locris.

to continue the Periclean policy of paid democracy and of funding the democracy through theEmpire.[13]

Such a policy entailed the restoration of the navy, so as to fulfill Athenian obligations and to bring recalcitrants into line. This in turn meant rebuilding the walls of the Piraeus and the Long Walls to Athens, to protect Athens against Sparta.

THE BATTLE OF HALIARTUS

In early 395 Lysander invaded western Boeotia with a force of Phocians, Oetaeans, Heracleots, Malians, and Aenianians, the northern allies. Orchomenus, which had long been disaffected, promptly seceded from the Boeotian League.[14] Lysander advanced eastward as far as the neighbourhood of Haliartus, while King Pausanias, with the main Peloponnesian army, slowly came out of the Peloponnese and crossed Cithaeron into eastern Boeotia. Haliartus was a strategic spot on Lake Copaïs, on the route along the south shore between eastern and western Boeotia. Lysander and Pausanias had arranged to meet there on an agreed day, but their timing was off. It is quite likely that Lysander got there early and was anxious to win a victory before Pausanias arrived. There was no love lost between the two Spartans.[15] Pausanias was moving westward through Cithaeron and on to Plataea, when a messenger between Lysander and Pausanias was intercepted by the Thebans. As a result the latter were able to arrange quite effective counter-measures.[16]

Xenophon (*Hell.* 3.5.18–20) and Plutarch (*Lys.* 28.2–6) both describe the battle in much the same way, with Plutarch's version being slightly more detailed. When the message was intercepted, Lysander was approaching Haliartus quite rapidly. Meanwhile an Athenian force, commanded by Thrasybulus,[17] arrived in Thebes. Their presence rendered Thebes secure and enabled the Thebans to leave the city and make a hasty night march to Haliartus. They arrived a little ahead of Lysander. They reinforced the garri-

13 Cawkwell 1976b, 270–277; Perlman 1968, 261.

14 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.6; Buck 1994, 36, 37, 39f.

15 Proietti 1987, 104. The question of whether Lysander was early or Pausanias was late cannot be answered on present evidence. Cf. Cartledge 1987, 359.

16 The story of the intercepted message is in Plut. *Lys.* 28.2. It is sometimes rejected, as by Accame 1957, 39, for no sound reason. Messages do get intercepted fairly often, usually with unhappy results for the senders, as the military history of the twentieth century makes clear. The German interception of Russian wireless signals before Tannenberg in 1914, or the British interception of numerous German Enigma signals between 1940 and 1945 are cases in point.

17 Plut. *Lys.* 29.1.

son of Haliartus, and their main force waited in a spot somewhere convenient for an attack on the enemy from the rear. The Thebans and Haliartans defeated the troops under Lysander quite handily, killing him and over a thousand others. They themselves lost about 300. The Spartans had been handed a sharp defeat.

By the morning of the following day Lysander's forces had withdrawn westward in full retreat into Phocis, but later in the same day Pausanias and his Peloponnesians appeared near Haliartus, deployed for battle, causing, according to Xenophon, some alarm and despondency among the Thebans.[18] The Spartans, however, did not advance. On the day after that, since the Spartans had clearly committed themselves and were deployed near Haliartus, Thrasybulus led up his Athenians from Thebes and formed line of battle beside the Thebans.[19] He also brought up a cavalry contingent under Orthobulus.[20] Pausanias did not move against this now large and confident force, since *his* army was now having problems of morale. He arranged a truce, to recover the Lacedaemonian dead, especially the corpse of Lysander, and then withdrew westward into Phocis.[21] The Athenian forces played a very important strategic role in this campaign, though they did not have to fight, and Thrasybulus must have received much credit in both Thebes and Athens for his inexpensive but crucial help and his expert sense of timing. A victory of this magnitude, achieved so inexpensively, must have raised his prestige to new heights and given him a dominant position in Athenian politics. Unfortunately, it also marked him as an expert commander of infantry, a reputation that eventually got him involved in two nasty defeats that were probably not his fault, but which must have been politically damaging.

It was probably after the battle of Haliartus that the rebuilding of the defences of the Piraeus and of the Long Walls was commenced,[22] though the earliest inscriptional evidence comes from the end of 395/4.[23] It is likely that Thrasybulus initiated this project.[24] The crediting of this to Conon seems another example of Thrasybulus being pushed out of the limelight, much as he was after Cyzicus.

18 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21.

19 Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.22. Paus. 3.5.3–4 gives the Athenians an exaggerated role, putting some of them into Haliartus and having Thrasybulus with the main force preparing to take Pausanias' force from the rear. Xenophon makes more tactical sense and does not divide the army in the face of a tough enemy.

20 Lysias 16.13. The speaker alleges that the force was full of draft-dodgers from the infantry, since they believed it was safer in the cavalry than on foot in the phalanx. Of the Athenian forces only the cavalry did any fighting in this campaign.

21 Plut. *Lys.* 29.1–3; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.21–25.

22 Seager 1994, 101, after Perlman 1968, 261.

23 *IG* 2^2. 1656; Harding 1985, p. 31 no. 17. This is still well before the return of Conon.

24 Sealey 1956, 183.

The younger Alcibiades, the son of the famous Alcibiades, the colleague of Thrasybulus in the strategia until 406, was prosecuted after the Athenians returned home on the grounds of desertion, as he switched, at the time of this campaign, from the infantry to the cavalry without any authorization by the State. His behaviour has been taken by some to indicate a certain amount of draft-dodging by the well-to-do.[25] But Alcibiades actually campaigned in the cavalry in Boeotia, and, while serving in their ranks, did get involved in some combat with Spartan cavalry patrols. The infantry did not get into any fighting at all. Alcibiades' offence was technical, since what he had done was alleged to have been without proper authorization and hence illegal. The Athenian cavalry for a variety of reasons was not esteemed by many Athenians, particularly by the thetes,[26] who remembered that the cavalry class had been enthusiastic in its support for the Thirty. Cavalry, to be sure, never has been popular with the infantry in most armies throughout history.

Thrasybulus was now in a position to pay back favours owed to the Boeotians and to start the long process of recovering Athenian predominance in Greek affairs. As a dominating figure and as a general he was one of the political figures responsible for bringing Athens into a Grand Alliance of powers against Sparta, along with Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos. Clearly he did not operate alone, and there must have been a wide measure of support in Athens for the idea of re-opening the fight against Sparta once again at this time, with allies from across Greece.

THE CONGRESS AND ALLIANCE

In the winter of 395 a Congress was summoned to meet at Corinth, consisting in the first instance of deputies from the original four allies, Boeotia, Athens, Corinth, and Argos. [27] Envoys were sent to many other states asking them to join against Sparta. Several Spartan allies did so: all of Euboea, Leucas, Acarnania, Ambracia, and much of the Chalcidice. None of the Peloponnesian states did, however, beyond the ones already members. There is no mention of whether Thrasybulus was one of the Athenian deputies, but he was certainly in a leading position in Athens, and if he was not a deputy, the Athenian delegation must have had members who reflected his views and opinions.

25 Lys. 16, *in Alcibiadem*. Strauss 1986, 121f. Cf. Andoc. 3.25.

26 Mantitheus, a cavalryman who found it expedient to serve in the infantry and to fund two other hoplites, had links with the Thirty to live down, and service as an aristocratic *hippeus*, horseman, would not suffice. See Bugh 1988, 133–135, 140f.

27 Diod. 14.82.1–4. Seager 1994, 100f.

The agreed strategy seems to have been to fight in the Peloponnese as close to Sparta as possible and as soon as possible. Timolaus of Corinth likened it to smoking out wasps.[28] In addition, for protection against Agesilaus and any Spartan resurgence in the area, the northern parts of Greece, such as Thessaly, needed to be made as secure as possible by eliminating any Spartan garrisons or allies. This meant helping Medius of Larissa, the Alliance's Thessalian partner, in his efforts to secure hegemony in Thessaly, and for the Alliance to capture Heraclia, restoring it to its original Trachinian population.[29] In addition the Boeotian leader Ismenias persuaded the Aenianes and Athamanes to revolt from Sparta and provide troops. Reinforced by these he invaded Phocis and defeated the Phocians in battle. The northern operations were undertaken in late 395, and they were reasonably successful. The Athenians and Thrasybulus, as far as we know, played no part in them.

THE BATTLE OF NEMEA

The forces on both sides concentrated in the spring of 394 for the campaign in the Peloponnese.[30] The Athenian contingent of the hoplites of the ten tribes was under the command of Thrasybulus.[31] The Allies attempted to implement their strategy of fighting as close to Sparta as possible, but the Spartans did not co-operate. The Allies moved south from Argos along the eastern part of the Peloponnese towards Laconia, somewhat late, while the Spartans moved north through the central Arcadia towards Corinth a trifle earlier. Each was aiming to strike at the other's main base. The Spartans concentrated more quickly and moved faster, and the Allies had to withdraw hurriedly from the area of Nemea, so as to cover Corinth from an attack from Sicyon. They took up a position in a rough, bushy area west of the city, while the Spartans moved east from Sicyon. Each side probably deployed about 23,000 to 24,000 hoplites, in what was perhaps the greatest hoplite battle ever fought.[32]

Apparently the Allies had a rotating command, and this meant the commanding nation held the right wing, the dispositions changing every day or so.[33] On the day of the battle the Boeotians held the right wing, while the

28 Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.12.

29 Diod. 14.82.5–10.

30 For the course of the battle Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.15–23.

31 Lys. 16.15.

32 Tuplin 1986, 51f., points out the difficulties over numbers of combatants. Anderson 1970, 141–150 and Pritchett 1965–, 2:73–84 give the estimates of the size of the two armies mentioned in the text. Lazenby 1991, 88, comments on the magnitude of the battle.

33 Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18 comments snidely on this, imputing cowardice to all and sundry.

Athenians were on the left, where six of their tribal battalions, those on their extreme left, faced the Spartans and four on the Athenian right were opposite the Tegeans. The Spartans had a new drill to outflank and roll up the opposing force.[34] They extended their right beyond the enemy line, then had the outflanking files wheel inward to take the enemy's left wing in the flank and rear. This manoeuvre was aided here by the Thebans who also inclined to *their* right, in order to do the same thing to their section of the Peloponnesian line. This, however, dragged the Athenians to the right, too.[35] The Spartans successfully outflanked the six Athenian tribes opposite them, but the other four broke the Tegeans opposite them and were out of the way when the Spartans swept past their rear. The rest of the Allied army had defeated the Peloponnesian hoplites opposite them, except for the Thespians who were fighting the Pelleneans, and both sides 'fought and fell in their places' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.20), but they were returning when the Spartans hit them on their open right sides and put them to flight with heavy casualties, some 2,800 according to Diodorus.[36] Thrasybulus, as the commanding general, was somewhere on the right flank of the Athenians with the four victorious tribes.[37] He seems to have fought well and bravely himself. He was one of the last Athenians to quit the battlefield. He was, however, extremely angry at the six defeated tribes. He accused them in vigorous language of cowardice. Some members of the defeated six tribes never forgave him for his insults.[38] These must have been searingly memorable and no doubt delivered very loudly.

The battle was a victory for the Spartans, but not decisive. The defeated Allies fled to Corinth, where at first the gates were closed against them. Unlike the Battle of Mantinea in 418, it did not lead to the breakup of the alliance against Sparta; but it is clear that no other Peloponnesian states cared to join it. The Peloponnesian campaign was not successful. The overall defeat, the casualties, and the anger of members of the beaten six tribes probably did Thrasybulus considerable harm politically, though it did not as yet cost him his job. The next battle, Coronea, further weakened confidence in his leader-

34 Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.19, 20.

35 Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.18.

36 Diod. 14.83.2, 84.2. Schol. Demosth. 20.52, translated in Harding 1985, no. 18.

37 The position of a general in a hoplite battle at this time was normally somewhere on the right wing, but where he could direct his troops in battle. Wheeler 1991, 145, 147; Hanson 1989, 110–115; Lazenby 1991, 92. The general was not normally in the rightmost position, but where he could exercise some tactical control over the action.

38 Lys. 16.15. Mantitheus, the speaker of this defence, claims he quit the field even after 'that pompous ass from Steiria, who had accused everybody of cowardice' (ὕστερος ἀνεχώρησα τοῦ σεμνοῦ Στειριῶς τοῦ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις δειλίαν ὠνειδικότος). For the Athenian casualties here and at Coronea, *IG* 2^2. 5221, 5222, 6217, all translated in Harding 1985, no. 19.

ship. The general of a defeated army is usually held in less esteem afterwards, if not punished, fined, or executed.[39]

THE BATTLE OF CORONEA

Agesilaus had been recalled from Asia by the Spartan government and had made his way fairly rapidly along the old invasion route taken by Xerxes in the Persian Wars.[40] He had reached Amphipolis by the time he learnt about the battle of Nemea, and continued quickly on into Thessaly. He defeated the Thessalian allies in a cavalry battle, and consequently they were unable to stop him, or even to slow him down very much.[41] Just before he crossed from Phocis into Boeotia there was an eclipse of the sun. This can be dated to August 14, 394 B.C., and it is one of the few secure dates for this part of Greek history.

At about the same time Agesilaus learnt of the Spartan naval defeat off Cnidus, at the hands of Conon in his capacity as a Persian admiral.[42] Peisander, the Spartan admiral though outnumbered by eighty-five to 170, fought and was overwhelmed,

> 'his allies on the left wing immediately fled and he himself, after fighting with the enemy, was driven ashore with his trireme damaged by their rams; the others who were driven ashore abandoned their ships and saved themselves as best they could, and got to Cnidus. But Peisander died fighting on his ship' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.12).

The defeat changed the strategic picture in the Aegean. Sparta lost control of the sea,[43] and the victorious fleet went along the Asia Minor coast and through the islands, expelling Spartan harmosts and proclaiming freedom. Eventually by 393 it had even established a garrison off the coast of Laconia on Cythera.[44] Agesilaus lied to his troops about Cnidus, claiming that Peisander had been killed in the moment of victory, 'since his men were the kind of people who were glad enough to share in good fortune, but whom he did not consider the sort to share any difficulties with.'[45]

39 For the treatment of defeated generals, Wheeler 1991, 151.

40 Xen. *Hell.* 4.2.8. Krentz 1995, 210, notes the difference of emphasis between this passage and the parallel one in *Agesilaus* 2.1, where the contrast in time, one month to one year, tones down the comparison with Xerxes.

41 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.5–8.

42 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.10.

43 Diod. 14.8 4.4.

44 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–8; Seager 1994, 103–105.

45 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.13; Plut. *Ages.* 17.3. Cf. Powell 1989.

The Allies were apparently caught by surprise by the speed of Agesilaus' advance through northern Greece and were slow to respond and move their forces into central Greece.[46] This may explain why they did not try to meet him in Phocis or near Heraclia, but instead near Coronea in western Boeotia. Both sides were about equal in numbers, about 20,000 to 24,000 each.[47] The Allies were drawn up with the Boeotians (who were again in command) on the right, the Argives on the left, and the Athenians and the others in the centre; on the Spartan side the Orchomenians were facing the Boeotians. Various highly skilled mercenary and north Greek forces faced the Athenians in the centre, and the Spartans were deployed against the Argives. Thrasybulus was apparently still in command of the Athenian forces.[48] As at Nemea, the Spartans fairly easily overcame their opponents, while the Boeotians, with their new deployment in a deep phalanx, broke the Orchomenians.

> 'As they were advancing toward one another there was dead silence in both armies for a while. When they were about a stadium apart [200 m, 220 yards], the Thebans yelled their war-cry and charged together in a run. When the armies were still separated by about three plethra [100 yards, 100 m], the troops whom Herippidas commanded [i.e., the mercenaries] and the Ionians, Aeolians, and Hellespontines ran out together from the line of Agesilaus, and all these attacking together and getting into spear-thrust range put their opponents to flight. The Argives did not even wait for the attack of Agesilaus' force, but turned and fled to Mount Helicon' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.17).

Xenophon implies that the Athenians fled from the charge of the well-trained professional mercenaries, and both they and the Argives broke and ran to the slopes of Helicon, where an attack against them would have to be made uphill. The Athenian contribution was inglorious, and the Athenians knew it.

The Boeotians carved their way through the Orchomenians and continued on to the baggage train. The Spartans wheeled their phalanx to attack them, while they in turn formed in their tight Theban phalanx to meet the Laconian, yelling as they did so. The two phalanxes crashed into one another, hand to hand, front to front. The Boeotians broke through, taking some casualties but inflicting severe losses on the Spartans, including the wounding of Agesilaus right through his armour. The Allies had fairly light casualties, about six hundred men, if Diodorus is right, most being Boeotians.[49] Thrasybulus was,

46 Cary 1922, 98f.

47 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.15–23; for the battle see also Pritchett 1971–85, 2:85–95; Anderson 1970, 150–153; Tuplin 1986, 52f.

48 Seager 1967, 99, n. 33.

49 Diod. 14.84.1–2. For the Boeotian attack, Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.19–20; Hanson 1989, 144f., 164.

of course, going to be blamed for the Athenian part in this defeat, and it was deemed a defeat, since the Allies had to ask for their dead under truce.

Tactically it was a Spartan victory, but strategically it was a stand-off. The allied army on Helicon was in a good position and still fit to fight; the Spartans were unable to force their way through Boeotia, and it soon emerged that they even lacked the strength to hold down western Locris.[50] Politically, however, the battles of Nemea and Coronea were not good for Thrasybulus, especially when they were contrasted by the Athenian voters with Conon's victory at Cnidus and his other successes in the Aegean. Thrasybulus was clearly not giving the Athenians a string of victories as a general, whatever he had done while commanding a fleet. By this time he had pretty well used up his political capital from the time of Haliartus. Two defeats in a row on land were hard for the Athenian people to accept, and Thrasybulus went into eclipse for a few years. He was not re-elected general in the elections of 394, or to any other office, and Aristophanes even makes a jest over his lack of employment.[51] Presumably he became a private citizen again, while Conon's faction and its allies gained in power and prestige. If Thrasybulus was not in disgrace, he certainly was not in demand.[52]

The Athenians were unfair to Thrasybulus. He actually did a good job of leading the amateur Athenian hoplites. It was his bad luck twice to find his forces facing Spartans, or skilled Spartan-trained mercenaries. The Athenian hoplites in discipline and training were no match for such trained professionals of the Spartan army, though perfectly adequate against ordinary Peloponnesian troops. But the Athenian assembly seldom accepted such excuses. Note that one of the first things that Conon did on his arrival at Athens was form a picked band of mercenaries, peltasts, a force that later gained notable successes under Iphicrates.

Meanwhile Conon and the Persian satrap Pharnabazus had sailed from island to island and to cities on the coast of Asia Minor, during the fall of 394, expelling the Spartan harmosts and being received joyfully as liberators.[53] Cos, Nisyrus, Teos, Chios, Erythrae, Ephesus, Mitylene, and Samos all became 'independent.'[54] The winter was spent in operations in the Hellespont.

Conon's prestige was increasing while that of Thrasybulus was waning. Their policies seem to have been largely the same: support for a democratic regime and obtaining funds by something resembling the revival of the Empire. But they differed on how to do it, and when. It has been argued that a personal antipathy divided them and prevented effective co-operation, a dis-

50 Xen. *Hell.* 4.3.22–23; Buck 1994, 47.
51 Aristoph. *Eccl.* 202–203. Cf. Strauss 1986, 108.
52 Seager 1967, 98f.
53 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.1–2.
54 Diod. 14.84 for the other locations and 14.97 for Samos.

like going back as far as the time of the battle of Notium, if not earlier.[55] There may have been a personal dislike, perhaps originating in their respective relations with Alcibiades, or perhaps even in Thrasybulus' contempt for Conon's skillful dodging of any blame. Conon was elected with the friends of Alcibiades in 407, with the opponents of Alcibiades after Notium in 406; after Arginusae and his own defeat at Mitylene he avoided any punishment and was elected in 405 in time for Aegospotami.[56] He survived even that disaster as a respected soldier of fortune in Cyprus and became commander of the Persian fleet and the saviour of Athens! It seems an unnecessary hypothesis, given these facts and Conon's ability to steal credit and kudos, to posit more than mutual contempt; both were ambitious men and with different factions supporting them, advocating different methods and timings, and each must have regarded the other as the main competitor. Cawkwell has argued that they were also split on their views on Persian assistance. Conon and his supporters wanted to use the Persian navy to fight Athens' wars of liberation, while Thrasybulus and his followers preferred that the Greeks do their own fighting and not be controlled by Persia.[57] It seems clear that neither Thrasybulus nor Conon had the charismatic charm of an Alcibiades to win the other over. And Conon was slippery and adaptable even beyond most of the other Athenian politicians. The success of one and the failure of the other might well have caused a certain bitterness to arise in Thrasybulus and a certain mocking arrogance in Conon. To judge by the remarks they made about one another (see below), they certainly did not like one another by 393. The neat way that in later history the rebuilding of the walls of Athens is credited to Conon is surely a reflection of some deliberate attempt to ignore the fact that Thrasybulus started refortifying Athens.[58]

55 Strauss 1984, 37–48.
56 Sealey 1956, 183.
57 Cawkwell 1976b, 274–276.
58 Diod. 14.85.2–3. Nepos, *Conon* 4, 5.

CHAPTER 6

THE CORINTHIAN WAR: THRASYBULUS AND THE NEW ATHENIAN EMPIRE 393–389 B.C.

CONON TRIUMPHANT

Conon went on from success to success. In the spring of 393 he and Pharnabazus sailed to Melos, and, using it as a base, ravaged areas of the Peloponnese and captured Cythera. Sparta was in danger of being defeated, and the alliance between Persia and the Greek powers had just about accomplished what Persia desired: the deliverance of Persian territory from Spartan threats. The two Persian commanders then proceeded to the Isthmus of Corinth and met the delegates of the Allies.[1] Pharnabazus encouraged them with speeches and, more to the point, with funds. He then authorized Conon to go to Athens with the fleet and finish rebuilding the Long Walls, and he gave him money to do so.[2]

> 'Conon, when he arrived in late spring, erected a great part of the fortifications, using his own crews for the work, hiring carpenters and masons and meeting all other necessary expenses. There were other parts of the walls, however, which had been rebuilt by the Athenians themselves with the help of volunteers from Boeotia and other states' (Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.10, Warner's translation).

The Boeotian volunteers were some of the results of the Boeotian-Athenian alliance and of the friendship that had arisen from the efforts of Thrasybulus during and after his sojourn in Thebes. But it was Conon who finished the walls and got the glory.

Conon gained great credit politically, completely eclipsing Thrasybulus. After his completion of the walls gave renewed security to the state, Conon dedicated a gold wreath on the Acropolis,[3] he is supposed to have erected a temple to Cnidian Aphrodite in the Piraeus,[4] and he gave a public banquet. In

1 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.7–8

2 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.8–10; Diod. 14.85.

3 Demosth. 22.72; Perlman 1968, 262.

4 Paus. 1.3.3; Frazer 1898, 2:29–31. There was a sanctuary before Conon arrived: cf. *IG* 2^2. 1657, translated in Harding 1985, no. 17b, which seems to imply work near the sanctuary before Conon's arrival at Athens. Is this more stealing of credit by Conon?

return the Athenians passed laudatory decrees, gave him immunity from taxation and erected two statues.[5] He seems to have had his principal support from the faction of Agyrrhius;[6] Agyrrhius and Conon dominated Athens for the next year, mid-393 to mid-392 B.C.

Thrasybulus as one of Conon's main rivals was swiftly disposed of. Conon as a winner overshadowed him as a loser, a defeated general, and Thrasybulus in the next year, 393/2, was again not elected to any office, much less to that of general. We may suspect that Thrasybulus was driven to advocate bold courses of action in speeches in the assembly, bolder than those preferred by Conon. It was probably during this time that Conon accused Thrasybulus of rashness. He made a pun on his name, one he repeated apparently all too often: Κόνων Θρασύβουλον θρασύβουλον ἐκάλει, 'Conon used to call Thrasybulus [which literally means 'Bold Counsel'] a man of reckless counsel.'[7] Not too good, but no doubt it was serviceable in the scrimmage of debates in the Assembly.

Conon proceeded to organize a corps of highly trained mercenaries, peltasts, for service in the area of Corinth, one later taken over by Iphicrates with great success.[8] He also saw to the despatch of an Athenian embassy to Dionysius of Syracuse to detach him from his Spartan alliance[9] and probably to the passage of a decree in his honour that is still extant.[10] In spite of the intervention of Evagoras of Salamis and the prospect of a possible dynastic marriage alliance, these negotiations came to naught.[11] A serious problem for Athens was to follow. Evagoras was in the process of raising a rebellion against the Persian King, and the Athenians, led by the factions supporting Conon, backed Evagoras. Such loyalty to Evagoras would certainly entail losing the Persian contribution to the financing of the war. The Athenian position may be considered a triumph of principle over expediency, but it was expensive.

As far as is known, Thrasybulus remained out of office. What impression he made in the debates in the Assembly, and whatever bold actions he advocated, produced no results for him. He remained on the fringes, unused, and he apparently tried to get back into centre stage, rather unsuccessfully, if Aristophanes' unkind remark can be believed:

5 Demosth. 20.68–71; Athenaeus 1.3d; Davies 1971, 509.
6 Sealey 1956, 183.
7 Aristot. *Rhet.* 1400 b 20. Strauss 1984, 41f.
8 Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F 48; Dem. 4.24. Seager 1994, 105.
9 Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 150, translated in Harding 1985, no. 22.
10 *IG* 2^2. 18; translated in Harding 1985, no. 20, with bibliography.
11 Lysias 19.19–21.

σωτηρία παρέκυψεν, ἀλλ' ὡράζεται
Θρασύβουλος αὐτὸς οὐχὶ παρακαλούμενος.
Γυ^{α} ὡς ξυνετὸς ἀνήρ.
'A hope of safety peeped out, but Thrasybulus
Displayed his oratorical gifts, although not called upon.
Parl. What a keen type he is.'[12]

THE DOWNFALL OF CONON

By the spring of 392 the Spartans were at a severe disadvantage. The Athenian-Persian co-operation, the losses in the Aegean, and the occupation of Cythera pushed the Spartans to make overtures for peace with Persia. They sent a mission headed by Antalcidas to the satrap Tiribazus, who had recently replaced Tithraustes, the successor of Tissaphernes. Tiribazus had been satrap of Armenia when the Ten Thousand had passed through his area. He, in contrast to his predecessor and to his neighbouring satrap Pharnabazus, had no particular enmity toward the Spartans. The purpose of Antalcidas' mission was to bring about a bilateral peace between Sparta and Persia. The lever for accomplishing this, according to Xenophon,[13] was the denunciation of Conon's activities in strengthening Athens and rebuilding the Athenian Empire, activities that rendered her once again a threat to all. The Athenians somehow heard of this mission[14] and decided to send one as well, probably an unofficial one.[15] Conon was, perhaps unwisely, despatched as one of the Athenian envoys.[16] They invited the other allies to send missions as well, and the Argives, Boeotians, and Corinthians did so. They all arrived at Sardis, and there was, according to Xenophon,[17] a full-scale debate.

The negotiations fell through. Athens was offered nothing much except the three islands of Scyros, Lemnos, and Imbros, and was given no chance of recovering her Empire. The Boeotian League would have to be dissolved, and the association between Argos and Corinth would have to be abolished. Not

12 Aristoph. *Ecc.* 202–204, with ὡράζεται for the ms. ὁρίζεται.

13 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.12–13. Plut. *Ages.* 23.1 combines this with the later mission of Antalcidas, the one that resulted in the King's Peace of 387/6. See Urban 1991, 59–78.

14 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13. How did the Athenians learn of the mission? Could a supporter of Agesilaus have passed a message in order to defeat Antalcidas, Agesilaus' bitter enemy? Cf. Plut. *Ages.* 23.1. But Cartledge 1987, 195, doubts that there was much enmity between them.

15 Urban 1991, 62, n. 206.

16 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.13. Conon was not recalled by the Persians, and Cawkwell 1976b, 271, is in error here.

17 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.14f.; Diod. 14.85.4 says nothing about such a debate.

surprisingly the Allies rejected the terms. Tiribazus then did two things that complicated matters considerably. He provided funds for the Spartans, and he arrested and imprisoned Conon on the pretext that he was acting contrary to the interests of the Persian King.[18] Both of these actions were unwise, and eventually the King sent out Struthas to replace Tiribazus. Struthas was apparently a trouble-shooter sent to problem areas; he was also pro-Athenian, because of the damage that Agesilaus had done to the King's territories.[19] Ultimately this led to a complex situation: the Spartans in 391 sent a punitive force to raid the coast of Asia Minor. It got itself roughly handled by the Persians. Such behaviour did not ensure the transmission of Persian funds to Sparta.[20] The Athenians were allies of the King, but supporting Evagoras and the Egyptian rebel pharaoh.

The fate of Conon is given differently in various sources. One, Nepos, has it that he was executed in a Persian prison;[21] others, including Lysias and Isocrates, say that he escaped from Persian imprisonment, took refuge in Cyprus with Evagoras, and died there of sickness.[22] Lysias and Isocrates are contemporaries and so should be more reliable than the unknown sources used by Nepos, who got the story of the embassy all wrong, too. Hence, the version given by Lysias and Isocrates is preferred by most authorities, rightly. Conon suffers an abrupt reversal of his fortunes, crashing to destruction just at the height of his glory, in a manner more reminiscent of the *peripeteia* of Greek tragedy than of sober history. Thrasybulus' arch-rival was eliminated, and Thrasybulus, as a leading statesman, was available to be of service and more than willing.

THE SITUATION IN THE AEGEAN

After the return of Antalcidas' mission the Corinthian War continued on into 391, with the Spartans' punitive force endeavouring to keep fighting in Asia Minor. The new satrap, Struthas, handed them a smart defeat,[23] but in return the Spartans were later able to capture Struthas' daughter and son-in-law and obtain a large ransom.[24] With the failure of the peace negotiations the Athenians probably made the decision to build more ships for an enlarged fleet, probably about forty.

18 Xen. *Hell.*4.8.16; Diod. 14.85.
19 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.17.
20 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.18f.
21 Nepos, *Conon* 5.4.
22 Lysias 19. 40–44, Dinon, *FGrH* 528 F 18.
23 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.18–19.
24 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.21.

In the fall of 392[25] there was another abortive peace conference, this time at Sparta. This one is *not* reported by Xenophon, but we learn of it principally from Andocides and Philochorus.[26] Preliminary articles were presented by the Spartans to plenipotentiaries from Athens (among whom was Andocides), Boeotia, Corinth, and Argos. These articles tried to counter some of the objections raised at Sardis: they ensured recognition of the rights of the Athenians to their walls and a fleet, as well as possession of various islands in the Aegean; the continued existence of the Boeotian League, but without Orchomenus; and, in spite of the testimony of Philochorus, freedom for the states of the coast of Asia Minor.[27] However, the sympolity between Argos and Corinth was to be dissolved.[28]

These terms were apparently acceptable to the Athenian and Boeotian delegates, but not to the Argive and Corinthian. It seems for this reason, to judge from the tone of Andocides' speech, that the matter was referred back to Athens. Apparently Thrasybulus, as the proponent of rebuilding the Empire, intervened against the terms, since there would be no opportunity to gain more cities in Asia Minor.[29] He realized the significance of 'freeing' the coast of Asia Minor. Callistratus was also on his side, and the assembly voted not to abandon the Greeks of Asia Minor to the King.[30] This allowed them to try to protect these states and hence to revive the Empire in that area. The assembly was displeased with the efforts of the envoys,[31] and on the motion of Callistratus it voted to exile them all for neglect of duty. This was in the year 392/1.[32] Clearly Andocides was no longer a dependant of Thrasybulus, if he ever had been.

The island of Rhodes became the next area to attract Spartan attention. About the time of the battle of Cnidus in 394 the inhabitants had overthrown their oligarchical regime and established a democratic government friendly to Athens. In 391 the exiled Rhodian oligarchs persuaded the Spartans to try to restore them to power by sending out a small squadron of eight triremes under one Ecdicus.[33] This could make no headway against the Rhodian fleet of some

25 There is some dispute over the date, for which see Cook 1981, 396–401; Cawkwell 1976b, 272 and n. 13; Ryder 1965, App. 12, 165–167; Hamilton 1979, 249f.; id. 1992, 112; Urban 1991, 71–78.

26 Andoc. *de pace* 27–29; Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 149a, translated in Harding 1985, no. 23A.

27 Philochorus, loc. cit.; Cook 1981, 402–404; Hamilton 1979, 255.

28 Hamilton 1979, 255.

29 Seager 1994, 108f.

30 Philochorus, *FGrH* 328 F 149a; cf. Buck 1994, 52.

31 Cf. Aristoph. *Eccl.* 356, if Seager 1967, 107f. is right.

32 The attempt to date the mission and negotiations to 387/6 is unwise and should be abandoned. Cf. Cook 1981, 410; Edwards 1995, 106f.

33 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.20; Diod. 14.97, very confusedly, has the oligarchic faction rise in

twenty ships, and the Spartan government then sent out Teleutias with twelve more drawn from the squadron in the Gulf of Corinth, probably in late 391, after the capture of Lechaeum and the domination of the Gulf of Corinth.[34] Teleutias picked up a few more ships from Samos, now ruled by an oligarchy, and took over command from Ecdicus. He had a fleet of twenty-seven triremes.[35]

Teleutias gained a notable victory, probably in late 391, possibly in early 390,[36] when he met an Athenian squadron of ten ships under Philocrates, son of Ephialtes, and captured all of them. This Athenian squadron had been sailing to Cyprus to aid Evagoras, the old Athenian ally who was now in open revolt against Persia.[37] They were probably the remnant of the old fifth century fleet that Athens had been allowed to keep.[38] We are not told exactly what happened, but clearly the Athenians were somehow taken by surprise as they sailed along all unsuspecting. This means that a decision to aid Evagoras had been made by Athens, no doubt at the urging of Conon's supporters, in spite of any possible financial repercussions. The Spartans captured a fort on the island of Rhodes, but were unable to do much more against the democratic Rhodian government, which still kept the initiative.

The capture of the ten Athenian ships sparked a demand at Athens for counter-measures and for revenge. There was, however, a shortage of money. The building of the new fleet had absorbed most of what was available, and there was little in the treasury to fund any sort of punitive expedition. Struthas had not been especially forthcoming with funds, and keeping a fleet at sea was expensive. It cost at least half a talent a month per ship in pay, rations, and maintenance.[39] The Athenians decided, none the less, to send out a squadron of forty ships, one large enough to take on the thirty-seven Spartan ships, and as commander they appointed Thrasybulus, probably in very late 391, or possibly early in 390.[40]

It is quite clear that one of the principal reasons that the Persians had not come up with much funding for Athens was the Athenian attitude towards

revolt, defeat the democrats and then ask for Spartan help. He does not mention Teleutias or Ecdicus, but has three different names. His version should be rejected.

34 Cawkwell 1976b, 273 for the date. The ships must have been transported across the Isthmus by the trackway.

35 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.22, 23.

36 For late 391, Cawkwell 1976b, 273; for early 390, Seager 1994, 113.

37 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24.

38 Cawkwell 1976b, 275, n. 20.

39 Thuc. 6.8.1; 6.31.3; 8.45.2. Pay for sailors varied between 3 obols and 1 drachma a day, see table in Pritchett 1971–85 1:16. But there are other running costs to be factored in as well.

40 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25. For chronology see Cawkwell 1976b, 274f. and Seager 1994, 113.

affairs in Cyprus. From the Persian point of view it was most unsatisfactory, although from the Athenian very understandable. Evagoras had revolted from Persian rule. He had long been a friend and ally of Athens.[41] He had sheltered the remnants of the Athenian fleet and Conon after Aegospotami; he had helped organize the Persian fleet under Conon that won at Cnidus, where he had personally fought with distinction; he had helped in the Athenian negotiations with Dionysius, even to the offering of a dynastic marriage; and he had even been awarded Athenian citizenship.[42] He had been particularly close to Conon. The situation in the Aegean was becoming complicated. The Athenians, Persian allies, were fighting on the side of a rebel against Persia, while the Spartans, at war with Persia, were fighting on the Persian side by destroying those fighting against Persia, as Xenophon acidly points out.[43]

AFFAIRS AT ATHENS

The disappearance of Conon had given a severe shock to Athenian politics, and there were sudden and violent realignments of factions, as the leaders made adjustments and new alliances with one another. There was only one figure with the military experience and prestige to match Conon's, Thrasybulus. There were not many important differences in policy between them, except in the areas of relations with Evagoras and the role of the Persian fleet. Thrasybulus, like Conon and Agyrrhius, opposed any peace with Sparta,[44] and Thrasybulus and Agyrrhius together commanded a majority. To be sure, there were some elements that wanted peace, but these were at that time a minority. These elements had seen to the sending of the embassy to Sparta in late 392, with Andocides as a member. But they had had little success in persuading the assembly to accept the terms that had been negotiated, in the face of the opposition of Thrasybulus, Agyrrhius, Callistratus, and others. The principal result was that Andocides and the other delegates were exiled.[45] The peace party was defeated, and the war resumed, probably in May/June, 391.[46] By this time more ships were ready.

The war with Sparta was to continue, but the revolt of Evagoras put the Athenians in a dilemma. On the one hand, he had been a good and faithful friend to Athens, especially to Conon. On the other hand, the King through Struthas was in a position to give considerable financial support to the Allies

41 *IG* 2^2. 20 for an honorary decree. Tod 109 for commentary.
42 Isocr. 9.54, 67, 68, 82.
43 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.24.
44 Strauss 1986, 142 and n. 82.
45 See above, p. 111.
46 Cawkwell 1976b, 274.

against Sparta, and Struthas was pro-Athenian. The Athenians voted to support Evagoras in his revolt. There was a 'triumph of principle over expediency in the hearts of the Athenian people,' as Grote put it;[47] I suspect that there were some other considerations that made them decide to support Evagoras, such as the possibility of regaining control of the coast of Asia Minor.

The squadron sent out under Philocrates in late 391 had clearly been despatched at the behest of Conon's faction. The Assembly had been persuaded to aid Evagoras by Aristophanes and his father Nicophemus, followers of Conon.[48] Philocrates himself seems to have been a partisan of Conon, since Aristophanes went along as ambassador to Evagoras, and Plato's step-brother was a trierarch.[49] The arrest of Conon in 392 had probably persuaded many Athenians that Persian policy in Greek affairs depended largely on the views of the local satrap, and Tiribazus was obviously a danger to Athens.

Thrasybulus and his faction, on the other hand, favoured a position that would get financing to carry on the war against Sparta, and the activities of Struthas seemed to vindicate them. Thrasybulus, then, was a supporter of funding from Persia[50] and of recovering the Empire, contradictory positions in the long run. I think he was quite prepared to minimize any efforts to aid Evagoras, if they kept the Persians, in the person of Struthas, quiescent and in a position to grant aid from time to time, just as Pharnabazus had done, while he continued to rebuild the Empire and regain the Ionian coast. It seems likely that this was Thrasybulus' strategy. The first job was to get the Athenian people behind him. In late 391, shortly after the capture of Philocrates' fleet, things began to happen.

We can make a reasonable conjecture about what happened to make the Athenians turn to Thrasybulus. He was the only successful Athenian admiral of any prominence still alive. There was really no one else. Clearly he wanted badly to command the new fleet. The ships were there, even if funds for operating them were in short supply. Even so, Thrasybulus would need the support of some of Conon's followers to be voted the command. He had, therefore, to persuade the Athenian people that he would lead an expedition to aid Evagoras and take vengeance on Teleutias; he had to persuade the Persians that the expedition was really for dealing with the Spartans who were very troublesome in Asia Minor. In actuality he would be rebuilding the Empire in the Aegean and in Asia Minor and getting funds together. To carry off such double-dealing was not a task out of the ordinary for a Greek politician. To judge by Lysias' statements against Ergocles (28.4) Thrasybulus promised to

47 Grote, 9.365.

48 Strauss 1986, 150f.

49 Lys. 19.24, 25.

50 *Pace* Cawkwell 1976b, 274f., who argues that Thrasybulus was hostile to Persia, or at least to Persian control.

bring in enough funds from levies on the former members of the Delian League, and from new recruits, to rebuild and maintain the fleet, and he doubtless made other campaign statements of this sort. The fleet would be self-sufficient and maintain itself from the funds collected from the allies. Anything left over would be sent forthwith to Athens.

As a result Thrasybulus found himself in command of a fleet of forty ships, with orders to deal with the Spartans and aid Evagoras. Funds would have to be obtained during the campaign, something between twenty and forty talents a month, just to keep the fleet in being. That he did reasonably well at maintaining the fleet is made clear by the fact that he was re-elected to the generalship three times while abroad and kept the fleet in action.[51] It also seems likely, from the tenor of Lysias' accusation against Ergocles, that financial returns to Athens were somewhat disappointing.

THE CAMPAIGNS OF THRASYBULUS

The first thing that Thrasybulus did, in early 390,[52] was to turn from Rhodes to northern areas of the Aegean. The Rhodians were holding their own and really needed no help; and the Spartans would be difficult (and expensive) to dislodge from their fort, backed as they were by a powerful fleet. Instead Thrasybulus proceeded towards the Hellespont, where he might 'do some good service for Athens.'[53] It was also an area with funds available, and because of the King's friendship for the Athenians there would be no difficulties with the local Persian authorities. Thrasybulus is mentioned in an inscription as 'governing' or 'commanding' in the area.[54] He expelled a Spartan garrison from Thasos[55] and reconciled two of the Thracian chiefs of the area, Amedocus and Seuthes, to one another and to Athens.[56] He was allegedly offered the hand of Seuthes' daughter in marriage.[57] In light of the fact that Iphicrates did marry the daughter of another Thracian chief, it is not improbable that Thrasybulus was approached. He did not marry her; Lysias would certainly have told us, if he had.

51 Pritchett 1971–85, 2:52. These would be 391/0, 390/89, 389/88.

52 The precise date is a matter of dispute. See Cawkwell 1976b, 274f.

53 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.25f. See Pritchett 1971–85, 2:50f., for a summary of the campaign. Cawkwell 1976b, 274f., puts it in the winter of 391/90.

54 *IG* 2^2. 24, ὅτε [Θρασύ]βολος ἦρχεν. Translated in Harding 1985, no. 25, with bibliography.

55 Ibid.; Demosth. 20.59.

56 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.2.

57 Lys. 28.5.

Thrasybulus sailed to Byzantium, where he re-established a democracy. He then proceeded across to Chalcedon, which promptly became an Athenian ally. He established tolls on the Bosporus, collecting the old 5% tax, which was farmed to Byzantium, and restoring Athenian authority and financial arrangements in this area, making something close to the old Empire.[58] With affairs in good condition in the north, he then moved south to Lesbos, where he engaged in a lively little campaign that ended in the defeat of the local Spartan commander and the gaining of more Athenian allies, as well as more funds for the Athenian fleet, to supplement those already gained in the north.[59] He may have engaged in various brutalities in collecting funds, since Demosthenes[60] mentions the trierarch Ergocles as one of those executed for damaging Athenian interests in the Hellespont.

Before Thrasybulus joined battle and defeated the Spartan commander on Lesbos, with the aid of exiles from various Lesbian towns and some mercenaries, Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.28) has him give a speech. In it he pointed out that working together was to the advantage of all the exiles from Lesbos, that everybody would profit from the domination of Mytilene, since they all would be back in power in their own states; an Athenian victory would mean money for exiles and mercenaries. Not, perhaps, very lofty sentiments, but rousing for mercenaries and near-bankrupt exiles. It is a practical speech, reminiscent of the one Xenophon gives him at Munychia. In its concentration on money, finances, and the 'bottom line' it also probably reflects the preoccupations of Thrasybulus or any other Athenian general of the time: getting enough funding to carry on the war against Sparta; and building up the Empire again. Thrasybulus shows not the slightest interest in aiding Evagoras, especially since any assistance to him would weaken Persian support against Sparta, much more than the gradual rebuilding of the Empire might do.

After the victory in Lesbos, probably in late 390, Thrasybulus turned south, perhaps to deal with the Spartans on Rhodes or more likely for other purposes, such as gaining more adhesions to the Athenian alliance and more funds. Diodorus (14.94.3) mentions a violent storm at this point and the loss of twenty ships. For Thrasybulus to continue with half his fleet gone seems highly unlikely, and so the story of the storm and of the severe losses is generally rejected. Heavy damage from a storm to half of the ships, however, might well end up in Diodorus as their destruction. Such damage could give rise to charges that he was letting the fleet deteriorate. The strictures of

58 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.27, 28; cf. *IG* 22 28, translated in Harding 1985, no. 26, with bibliography.

59 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.29f.

60 Demosth. 19.180.

Lysias[61] on the sorry state of Thrasybulus' fleet, then, may have some basis in severe damage to several ships from the storm.[62] The charge of malversation of funds might arise from the necessity of using money that would otherwise have gone to Athens to pay for repairs.[63]

According to Lysias (28.5f.) at some time before the death of Thrasybulus the Athenians decreed that any funds obtained from the cities were to be duly logged (ἀπογράψαι), and that the ἄρχοντες with Thrasybulus were to return home for an audit. The recording of the funds received and the audit were to be in accordance with the 'old regulations' (ἀρχαίων νόμων). Lysias (28.6f.) goes on to claim that Ergocles, one of the trierarchs and a long-time associate of Thrasybulus, advised him that he should

> 'occupy Byzantium, keep the ships and marry Seuthes' daughter. "In this way," he told him, "you may cut off their slanders; you will cause them not to sit around hatching schemes against you and your friends, but rather to worry about their own skins." Thus, O fellow Athenians, as soon as they had stuffed themselves with your property and were enjoying it, they no longer considered themselves members of the city. (7) As soon as they get rich, they hate you and scheme to be under your your command no longer, but to rule you. In fear for what they have stolen, they are prepared to seize fortresses, establish an oligarchy and try every means to put you every day into the most terrible dangers.'

The echoing of an incident from Thrasybulus' fight for democracy – the seizure of a fortified place – to accuse him of establishing an oligarchy is skilful if misleading oratory. As Blass long ago pointed out,[64] it is clear that what was behind the Athenian concern was the conviction that Thrasybulus and his colleagues were not providing enough funds for the fleet and the Athenian treasury because they were corrupt. Lysias (28.17) emphasizes that complaints had been pouring in about the harshness of the collection of funds, especially from Halicarnassus.

Thrasybulus needed still more funding to pay the mercenaries he was collecting and to finance more repairs, as well as for salaries for the fleet, and so he went around, presumably for some months or even a year, gathering 'contributions' from various states. Clearly he was restoring Athenian authority in areas where it had been long gone. As he replenished his funds and rebuilt the Empire, he bypassed Rhodes and went east along the coast. In this way it could be claimed that he was moving towards Cyprus and coming to the aid of Evagoras, while in reality he was raising money and reviving the

61 Lys. 28.2, 4.
62 Frohberger 1861, 444.
63 For the importance of funds going to Athens, Blass 1887, 456.
64 Blass 1887, 456f.

Empire in the old territories on the southwestern coast. Presumably this was the time that he visited Halicarnassus. His brutality to allies and Athenians alike caused angry complaints to arrive at Athens. He got as far as Aspendus in Pamphylia, where he anchored his fleet in the Eurymedon. He had already received money from the inhabitants, when a number of them, infuriated by several acts of brigandage by some of the Athenian soldiers (presumably mercenaries), rushed the Athenian camp at night and slew Thrasybulus in his tent.[65] The incident is dated to the summer of 389 B.C. Xenophon (*Hell.* 4.8.31) says about him, μάλα δοκῶν ἀνὴρ ἀγαθὸς εἶναι, 'with the reputation of being a really good man.' This sort of commendation, terse though it is, is very rare in the pages of the *Hellenica*, especially when it is concerning a staunch Athenian democrat. Lysias (28.8), however, goes so far as to insinuate that Thrasybulus deserved death for his financial peculations and his brutality in raising funds. He does not, however, say it explicitly. 'He did well to end his life when he did.'

AFTER THRASYBULUS' DEATH

The loss of Thrasybulus was a serious blow to the Athenian ambitions in the Aegean. There was no one of his competence available to replace him. The Athenians sent out Agyrrhius to take over command of the fleet of forty ships, and Iphicrates to take over the Hellespont.[66] Agyrrhius tried to continue gathering funds and rebuilding the Empire, but he does not seem to have accomplished much. He lacked Thrasybulus' diplomatic and military skills. Iphicrates won a victory, but was unable to exploit it effectively. He was no Thrasybulus. Agyrrhius, after the Peace of Antalcidas, ended by being tried and found guilty and condemned. The charge was nominally embezzlement, but, more likely, a lacklustre performance as a general and as a fund-raiser had a good deal to do with it. Iphicrates became the great Athenian mercenary, working up in Thrace and marrying a king's daughter, just as Thrasybulus was accused of considering doing.[67]

Some other members of Thrasybulus' faction who were involved in operations in the Aegean were tried at about the same time; as in the case of Agyrrhius, it was probably their inability to produce results that in reality got them into trouble. One of the most famous trials was the prosecution of Ergocles. He was charged, according to Lysias 28, with abuse of power, oppression of allies and even Athenians, and corruption to his own profit

65 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.30.
66 Xen. *Hell.* 4.8.31, 34.
67 Lys. 28.5.

while serving with Thrasybulus. Clearly Ergocles was deeply involved in the search for funds to keep the fleet in being, and, for whatever reason, it was suspected that some of the money collected stuck to his fingers. After Thrasybulus was killed, Ergocles and others returned to Athens to face an audit. It was suspected that League funds were going to improper activities, since the fleet was alleged to be in poor condition.[68] Ergocles was tried and condemned to death, and his estates were confiscated by the state. He was alleged to have made thirty talents in crooked deals. His estate turned out to be much smaller. Others faced trial, including Ergocles' treasurer, Philocrates.[69] Quite probably Thrasybulus would also have had to undergo an audit.

One gets the impression that only Iphicrates and Chabrias were competent enough to be eventually as good as Thrasybulus. One wonders whether the Empire could ever have been fully reconstituted, even by Thrasybulus. In effect, he was fighting both Sparta and Persia, and by avoiding combat with the former while he rebuilt funds from territory claimed by the latter, he was working within severe constraints. It seems certain that if Athens at this time had not had to fight Sparta, it *might* have been able to rebuild the Empire, in spite of Persia. But Struthas was now replaced by Tiribazus, and the King was seriously annoyed by Athenian support for Evagoras and the Egyptian pharaoh. Persian aid was not simply cut off; it was again channeled to Sparta. Adventures in Cyprus, Aegina, Rhodes and the Hellespont were beyond Athenian means, and even vigorous attempts at collecting funds from wherever possible did not bring in enough to prosecute the war against Sparta on the scale necessary.

The death of Thrasybulus deprived Athens of her best general, and, if not of her will to fight, it certainly deprived her of an excellent administrator, one competent to direct a war within the limits imposed by financial constraints. After his death the Athenians found themselves faced with a resurgent Sparta, financed by Persia. They and their allies were overwhelmed, and they were forced to sign the King's Peace in 387 B.C.

68 Lys. 28.2–4.
69 Lys. 29.

CHAPTER 7

THRASYBULUS AND ATHENS 450–389 B. C.

Thrasybulus was a capable and decisive figure, a great leader, powerful enough to have left his mark on Athens and its democracy and changed Greek history. When the oligarchic attempt to set up the Four Hundred and to overthrow the democracy began to succeed in 411, Thrasybulus was one of the few who were turned to as leaders by those anxious to save democracy. This should mean that he already had a reputation as a strong democrat and that he had already made a mark as a prominent figure on the democratic side in Athenian politics. He stayed a supporter of democracy for the rest of his life.

A minor mystery of Classical scholarship is why he is often considered a 'moderate' of the stripe of Theramenes. This idea apparently arises from consideration of his social background, the fact that he was a fellow-demesman of Theramenes, and the fact that they co-operated as generals for some years. Since Thrasybulus led the opposition to the aims of the hoplite class after the overthrow of the Thirty, it seems to be a perverse interpretation to consider him as a hoplite-minded 'moderate.' He was clearly, as Thucydides makes perfectly plain, a strong supporter of the democratic constitution then in force, not of some mythical πάτριος πολιτεία. He resembles a similar aristocratic democrat of an earlier time, Pericles, even his social behaviour. Like Pericles he was reserved, honorable, and courageous, morally and physically. Clearly he was a rather old-fashioned type, no doubt slightly anachronistic in the atmosphere of the late fifth century.

After the collapse of the Four Hundred Thrasybulus became one of the leading generals of Athens, one of the key men in the state. He revived the Delian League in the North Aegean. He showed the ability to get men of different political stripes to work together, at least for a time. He got caught in the aftermath of the fall of Alcibiades, and he lost his job as general. He still served the state after that as a trierarch. After the battle of Arginusae, Thrasybulus clearly took no part in politics for a time.

It was in the period after the successful coup that established the Thirty that Thrasybulus again became an active democratic leader. He fled into exile to Boeotia and from Thebes organized and led the resistance to the Thirty and eventually overthrew them. It was a considerable feat, requiring organizatio-

nal talents and diplomatic and financial skills, as well as courage and generalship, not to mention inspiring leadership. Nearly all agree that Thrasybulus deserves full credit for the overthrow of the Thirty and for the restoration of democracy. As he had done in the North Aegean, Thrasybulus demonstrated his ability to get very disparate individuals and groups to work together effectively, at least for a time.

For several years after democracy was restored, Thrasybulus remained one of the major figures in the state until well into the Corinthian War. After the battles of Nemea and Coronea Conon replaced him in the affections of the Athenian people. Conon lasted about a year and then disappeared. For three years after this Thrasybulus waged a struggle to restore the Athenian financial structure and the Athenian Empire, while keeping Sparta in check. He was still struggling when he was killed in 389. With his death the last chance of restoring the Empire disappeared. The Second Athenian Confederacy of a decade later was a very different organization.

It is clear that there were efforts by some of his contemporaries and by historians who drew on them to deprive Thrasybulus of credit for the various deeds he did to save Athens and restore the Empire. There is a tradition that gives Theramenes the credit for bringing back Alcibiades and overthrowing the Four Hundred. Another tradition gives Alcibiades the honour of winning all the great victories in the Hellespont from 411 to 407. A third one entangles Thrasybulus closely with Theramenes in the sleazy intrigues at trial of the generals after Arginusae. There is an attempt to supplant him by Archinus for the honour of the overthrow of the Thirty. Callistratus and other faction leaders are often credited with getting Athens to join the Grand Alliance and engage in the Corinthian War. Conon is generally given the credit for restoring the fortifications of the Piraeus and the Long Walls. Even his strenuous efforts to restore Athenian finances were played down, and he was by implication accused of graft and corruption, and of brutal treatment of the allies.

Why, then, were there so many efforts to deprive Thrasybulus of any credit and glory? Rival politicians and generals tried to seize some, most activities requiring some sort of collaboration. Claims for credit and accusations of blame were picked up by various orators and historians. Clearly both ancient and modern scholarship does not know quite what to make of Thrasybulus. The anti-democratic tradition of ancient historiography has been the predominant one, unwilling to recognize any merit in most democrats and willing to ascribe any great deeds to less democratic leaders, to an Archinus over a Thrasybulus. And after all, he was defeated several times, he was responsible for brutalities in collecting funds, and he did not succeed in restoring the Athenian Empire.

I think the reason for the lukewarmness of the estimates of him by many modern scholars is that he is an anachronism, a figure from the past endea-

vouring to cope with very changed modern conditions – and he was no adaptable Alcibiades. He was frozen to the ideas and ideals of the democratic Athens of the heyday of the Athenian Empire in the fifth century, believing in the essentially beneficent mission of the Delian League and of Athens, as outlined for all in the funeral speech of Pericles. Here he is, in the closing phases of the Peloponnesian War, with Athens sliding to defeat and rule by quislings and epigoni, remembering its glories and trying to turn the clock back. He continued to do this after democracy was restored and on into the Corinthian War. But a lot of Athens had died in Sicily and at Aegispotami; Athens was no longer the state it was when it had been guided by Pericles. But that was the state that Thrasybulus thought he was living in and was trying to bring back to its former glories. Surely this is not an ignoble ideal he was following.

Thrasybulus emerges from all this as a capable man, a good organizer, a superb admiral, a mediocre general, personally brave, a competent administrator, a plain orator, an admirer of democracy, honest and honourable, though with a quick temper and a fondness for taking short cuts.

He must have seemed to his contemporaries a curious type, and, as we can see from Lysias, they thought of him as old-fashioned in speech and diction, but a dynamic leader; someone who could, for a time, pull everyone together and inspire them in their darkest hours; a man of strategic sense and vision, but one not able to perform miracles; one who believed in the greatness of his country and its Empire, after its Empire had vanished; someone a little quaint and not quite real; someone to be admired, with a sigh of regret. Winston Churchill, with his old fashioned rolling Gladstonian style of oratory and Macaulay-like style of prose, his old-fashioned views on empire, his similar abilities to unite everyone behind him for a time and perform magnificently in a crisis, and his very mixed assessments at the present, is the modern figure that springs to mind as a parallel, and I do not think it is a bad one.

APPENDIX:

CHRONOLOGY

Though the chronology of much of the period from 411 to 389 is uncertain, it is possible to lay out a rough tabulation of the events of Thrasybulus' life or of those in which he was directly or indirectly involved. It is very rough, and none of the sources had our passion for precision in dating; their very concept of time seems very foreign to us. Xenophon started out following Thucydides' system of winter and summer division for the years, but he soon abandoned it. Diodorus matches archon and consular years, and then he lumps the events of several years in an area under one year. Any historian who did care about exactly when events occurred in relation to one another was often frustrated by the plethora of lunar calendars, all intercalated differently. Hence there is much guesswork in laying out a chronology in Greek history.

In Chapter 2 the approximate limits of the date of his birth were presented, and most of the subsequent events have been noted and discussed in their appropriate places. The dates are chiefly those adopted in Kagan (1987), the olumes of the second edition of the *Cambridge Ancient History*, and by Krentz (1986b, 1995) in his Commentaries on the *Hellenica*.

450–445	Approximate date for Thrasybulus' birth
413/12	Thrasybulus becomes known as a democrat by this date
412	Thrasybulus arrives in Samos as a trierarch
late 412	Conspiracy at Samos against democracy. Thrasybulus on detached duty(?)
Mar. 411	Thrasybulus leads counter-revolution at Samos with Thrasyllus
Mar. 411	The Four Hundred installed at Athens
Apr.–May 411	Consolidation of democratic position at Samos
May–Aug. 411	Thrasybulus trains the fleet
Aug.–Sept. 411	Thrasybulus to Eresus. Escape of Mindarus to Hellespont
Sept. 411	Overthrow of the Four Hundred
late Sept. 411	Battle of Cynossema
Nov. 411	Battle of Abydos
Nov 411–Mar 410	Thrasybulus rebuilding Empire in Thrace; joined by Theramenes
Mar./Apr. 410	Battle of Cyzicus
409–408	Thrasybulus in Thrace, Thasos, Macedonia
408–407	Thrasybulus recovers Thasos and Abdera

Spring 407	Thrasybulus visits Athens with Alcibiades and Theramenes
To Fall 407	Thrasybulus in Thrace
Winter 407	Thrasybulus in Hellespont
late 407	Alcibiades to Notium
early 406	Thrasybulus moves to Phocaea
Jan/Feb. 406	Battle of Notium. Dismissal of Alcibiades and Thrasybulus
late May 406	Methymna. Conon defeated and trapped
mid-Jun 406	Athenians start manning 110 ships
mid-July 406	Battle of Arginusae
Aug/Sept. 406	Trial and condemnation of the generals
405	Battle of Aegospotami
405–404	Siege of Athens
Mar. 404	Capitulation of Athens
Apr. 404	Entry of Lysander into Athens
July 404	Installation of the Thirty Tyrants
Oct/Nov. 404	Thrasybulus goes into exile at Thebes
Nov. 404–Feb. 403	Organization of the Resistance movement under Thrasybulus
Feb./Mar. 403	Seizure of Phyle
Mar. 403	First skirmishes
late Apr. 403	Battle of Acharnae
late Apr. 403	Massacre of Eleusinians
early May 403	Seizure of Piraeus
May 403	Battle of Munychia
May–Sept. 403	Deposition of the Thirty, negotiations and skirmishes
Sept. 403	Restoration of democracy and amnesty
403/2	Reconciliation of the 3,000. Psephism of Thrasybulus disallowed
402	Death of Archinus. Psephism of *isoteleia*.
402/1	Oropus rejoins Boeotian League
401/0	Reattachment of Eleusis. Aid to Sparta against Elis
late 400	Trial of Andocides
399	Cavalry despatched to Thibron
398/7	Athenian embassy executed
397	Conon in command of a Persian fleet
397/6	Demaenetus to Evagoras
mid to late 396	Mission of Timocrates to Greece to buy a war
late 396	Boeotian War
spring 395	Lysander invades Boeotia. Boeotian-Athenian alliance
late spring 395	Battle of Haliartus
late 395	Formation of the Grand Alliance. Congress at Corinth
summer 394	Battle of Nemea Battle of Cnidus
Aug. 14 394	Eclipse before Coronea
late Aug. 394	Battle of Coronea

autumn 394	Conon liberating Asia Minor coast
spring 393	Cythera occupied by Conon. Persian-Allied conference at Corinth
late spring 393	Conon and fleet rebuilding walls of Athens
summer 393	Thrasybulus not re-elected as general. Conon pre-eminent
393/2	Thrasybulus out of office. Spartan situation desperate
spring 392	Peace mission of Antalcidas to Persia.
late spring 392	Peace conference and arrest of Conon
summer 392	Escape and death of Conon
autumn 392	Abortive peace conference; Andocides exiled
spring 391	War resumed
summer 391	Struthas; Spartan invasion of Asia Minor; revolt of Evagoras; Ecdicus sent out by Sparta to Rhodes; Thrasybulus re-elected general
fall 391	Decision to aid Evagoras and to despatch of squadron of 10 ships
late 391	Teleutias sent out with 27 triremes
late 391	Teleutias captured the 10 Athenian triremes
late 391	Thrasybulus appointed to command fleet of 40 ships
early 390	Thrasybulus sets out with 40 ships
spring 390	Thrasybulus in the Hellespont
summer-fall 390	Thrasybulus campaigning in Lesbos
late 390	Thrasybulus visits Halicarnassus
early 389	Thrasybulus campaigning off south coast of Asia Minor
summer 389	Thrasybulus killed at Aspendus

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GENERAL INDEX

Abydos, Spartan base in Hellespont 32; battle of, 411 33–35
Acarnania, in alliance against Sparta 100
Acharnae, battle of 74–75
Adeimantus, Athenian general 41
Aegospotami, battle of, 405 61, 106
Aenianes, in alliance against Sparta 101
Aesimus, Athenian politician, at Phyle 72
Agesandridas, Spartan commander, 411 33
Agesilaus, king of Sparta, campaigning in Asia Minor 96, 101; recalled to Greece, 103; crosses into Boeotia, Aug. 14, 394 103; wounded at Coronea, 104
Agis, Spartan king 21, 24; insulted by Boeotians, 68
Agoratus, metic, informer under the Thirty 63
Agyrrhius, Athenian factional leader 86–87; supports Conon 108; takes over fleet on death of Thrasybulus 118; condemned for embezzlement 118
Alcibiades, 9, 10, 13, 16; Thrasybulus and, 20–21, 29, 30; leads Spartan fleet, 412 22; negotiating with oligarchs 24, 25; reconciled to democrats in Samos 29; against the Four Hundred 30; blockading Spartans under Dorieus 33; at battle of Abydos 34–35; arrested by Tissaphernes and escapes 37; at the battle of Cyzicus 37–39; dominant leader 40; visits Athens in 407 41; activities before Notium 42–43; dismissed after Notium 45–46; possible involvement in trial of generals 59
Alcibiades the Younger, at Haliartus 100
Ambracia, in alliance against Sparta 100
Amedocus, Thracian chief 115
Amnesty, agreed in Sept., 403 83, 84
Amorges, ally of Athens, rebel against Persia 21; defeated and captured 22
Andocides, Athenian politician 9, 10; as source 16; as factional leader 86; trial of 88; Athenian delegate to peace conference at Sparta 111, 113; exiled for his efforts 111, 113
Andrewes, A., on the battle of Cyzicus 36, 37
Androcles, Athenian popular leader 9
Androclides, Boeotian factional leader 67
Antalcidas, Spartan envoy to Persia 109
Antiochus, helmsman of Alcibiades, at Notium 43–45
Antiphon, as source 16; as oligarchic politician in Four Hundred 26
Antiphon, democrat executed by the Thirty 64
Antitheus, Boeotian factional leader 67
Anytus, Athenian politician, at Phyle 72; does not gain back his estates 84; prosecutes Socrates 90–91
Archinus, Athenian politician, at Phyle 72; moved decree honouring men of Phyle 71–72, 84; dominant leader 84–86; death of, 402 85
Arginusae, battle of, 406 51–53, 106; storm after battle 55
Argos, in alliance against Sparta 100; at battle of Coronea 104
Aristocrates, Athenian politician, deserts Four Hundred 30; returns to Samos 41; general at Arginusae, 406 52; dismissed and executed 59
Aristogenes, general at Arginusae, 406 52; goes into exile after Arginusae 59
Aristophanes, comic poet, on Thrasybulus' joblessness in 393 105
Asias, Boeotian factional leader 66
Aspendus, location of murder of Thrasybulus 118
Athamanes, in alliance against Sparta 101
Athenian Empire collapse of, 412 21–22
Athens plague at 8; Sicilian expedition 8, 10, 21; finances of 8, 9, 11–12, 21, 22, 36, 50; life in, 410–390 10; democracy of, 11; unpopularity of, 11, 21; Reserve Fund expended, 412 22; oligarchy of the Four Hundred and its overthrow 23–30; golden statues melted down , 406 50; battle of Arginusae 51–53; Capitulation of, 404 61; oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants 61–66, 71–79; adjustments at after 403 84; subservient to Sparta after 403 88–90; in alliance against Sparta 96–100; at battle of Nemea 101–103; at battle of Coronea 104

Beloch, J., on Thrasybulus 17; on relations between Conon and Thrasybulus 46

Bloedow, E., on Notium 44
Boeotia, oligarchic 10; hostile to Athens 67–69; friendly to exiles from Thirty 64–67, 70; cooling to Sparta 66–70; friendly relations with Athens 86; thank-offerings to by Thrasybulus 86; alliance with Athens, 395 96–98; hostile to Sparta 100; in command at Nemea 101; in command at Coronea 104
Bury, J.B., on Thrasybulus 17
Busolt, G., on Notium 44
Byzantium, rebels against Athens 31; Thrasybulus and, 116

Callicratidas, Spartan navarch, attacks north Ionia 49; defeated and killed at Arginusae 51–53
Callistratus, factional leader, exiled Andocides, allied with Thrasybulus 111, 113
Cardia, Athenian base in Hellespont 37, 38
Cartledge, P., on Thrasybulus 17–18
Cavalry, Athenian, and massacre at Eleusis 76; 300 sent to help Sparta in Asia Minor 89; at Haliartus 100
Cephalus, Athenian factional leader 87, 90
Cephisodotus, Boeotian, welcomes Athenian exiles 65
Cephisophon, Athenian politician, at Phyle 72
Ceramicus, Spartan cemetery in 82
Chaereas, informs fleet of the revolution of the Four Hundred 28; at Cyzicus 39
Chalcedon, Thrasybulus and 116
Chalcidice, in alliance against Sparta 100
Charmides, killed at Munychia 78
Charminus, Athenian general 23, 27
Chios, rebels against Athens 22
Cimon 7
Clazomenae, rebels against Athens 22; and Alcibiades 43–45
Cleocritus, speech at Munychia 79
Cleon 9
Cloché, P., and Boeotian politics 67, 87
Cnidus, Spartan defeat at, 394 103
Coeratadas, Boeotian factional leader 66, 67
Conon 13; general at Andros, 407 41; replaces Alcibiades, 406 46, 49; at battle of Mitylene 49–50; joins Athenian fleet after Arginusae 55; at Aegospotami 61; commands Persian fleet 93, 95; victorious at Cnidus 103; liberates islands and Ionian coast 105; organizes corps of peltasts 105, 108; rivalry with Thrasybulus 106; rebuilds Long Walls 107; dominates Athens 107–108; supported by Agyrrhius 108; sent as Athenian envoy to peace talks 109; arrested by Tiribazus 110; death of 110
Cook, M.L., on Boeotian politics 67
Corinth, in alliance against Sparta 100
Corinthian War, 100–119
Coronea battle of, 394 103–105
Critias, leader of the Thirty 62–64; killed at Munychia 78
Cynossema, battle of, 411 31–32
Cyrus, Persian prince, replaces Tissaphernes 42
Cythera, garrison established by Persians on 103, 107
Cyzicus, rebels against Athens, and regained 33
Cyzicus, battle of, 411 36–39

Demaenetus, Athenian envoy to Conon 89–90, 95
Demaretus, executed by the Ten 80
Demosthenes 12
Dercyllidas, Spartan commander in Asia Minor, 398 92
Diodorus Siculus, as source 14–16; disagrees with Xenophon 33–34, 37–39 et passim; on battle of Notium 43–45; on battle of Mitylene 50; on the trial of the generals 54–60; on massacre at Eleusis 75–76; on massacre at Salamis 76; on battle of Munychia 78–79
Diomedon, Athenian general 23, 24, 27, 28; dismissed at Samos 28; general at Arginusae, 406 52; dismissed and executed 59
Dionysius of Syracuse, embassy to 108
Dionysodorus, executed by the Thirty 63
Dorieus, Spartan commander, 411 33
Dracontides, psephism of 61

Ecdicus, Spartan naval commander 111
Elaeus, Athenian base in Hellespont 32; raided by Mindarus 33
Eleusinians, massacre of 75–76
Eleusis, seized by the Thirty 76; regained by Athens 87
Eleutherae, citizens of at Phyle 72
Elis, Athenian troops aiding Sparta against 88
Ephesus, rebels against Athens 22
Ephialtes 10
Ephorus, as source 14; doubling incidents 79
Epicrates, Athenian factional leader 87, 90
Erasinides, general at Arginusae, 406 52; dismissed and executed 59
Eratosthenes, member of the Thirty Tyrants 79
Eresus, rebels against Athens 31

Ergocles, at Phyle 72; trierarch with Thrasybulus, 390 116; tried for corruption 117, 118–119
Erianthes, Boeotian factional leader 68
Erythrae, rebels against Athens 22
Euboea, in alliance against Sparta 100
Euctemon, Athenian general 23
Euryptolemus, defender of the generals after Arginusae 56
Evagoras of Salamis, ally of Athens, rebel against Persia 108; Athens sending aid to, 112–114; Thrasybulus allegedly aiding 117–118

Five Thousand, replace the Four Hundred 30; arrangements with Samian democrats 30; resigned powers to democracy 39–40
Four Hundred, revolution of the 21–30

Generals, Athenian, trial of after Arginusae 53–60
Grand Alliance of Athens, Argos, Boeotia and Corinth 100–101
Gray, V.J., on Cyzicus 36, 37; on Notium 44
Grote, G., on Thrasybulus 17

Haliartus, battle of, 395 98–99
Halicarnassus, complaints about collection of funds from 117
Hammond, N.G.L., on Thrasybulus 18
Hanson, V.D., on battle of Munychia 79
Hecatonisi Islands, in battle of Mitylene 50
Helexus of Megara, Peloponnesian commander 31
Hellespont, campaigning in 31–40
Henry, W.P., on trial of the generals 53
Hermas, sends supplies to Thrasybulus 74
Hippieus, Samian general at Arginusae, 406 52
Hippomachus, killed at Munychia 78
Hornblower, S. on Thrasybulus 18
Hyperbolus, ostracized Athenian politician, murdered at Samos 27
Inscriptions, as evidence 16
Iphicrates, takes over Hellespont on death of Thrasybulus 118

Ismenias, Boeotian factional leader 66, 67, 69, 70; welcomes Athenian exiles 65; engineers fight with Phocis 96; victories in northern Greece 101

Justin, as source 16

Kagan, D., on Thrasybulus 18; on oligarchic attempt on Samos 23; on Cynossema 32; on Notium 44
Krentz, P., on Cyzicus 37; on battle of Mitylene 50

Lengauer, W., on Thrasybulus' speech at Munychia 78
Leon, Athenian general 23, 24, 27, 28; dismissed at Samos 28
Leon of Salamis, executed by the Thirty 64
Leontiades, Boeotian factional leader 66; supports fight against Phocis 96
Lesbos, rebels against Athens 22
Leucas, in alliance against Sparta 100
Locris, Boeotian ally 96; treaty with Athens, 395 97
Lycurgus, executed by the Thirty 64
Lysander, named Spartan navarch, 407 42; at Notium 43–45; at Athens after peace 61; assembles army after Munychia 81; harmost of Athens 81; invades Boeotia 96; death of, 395 99
Lysias, as source 15; escapes from Thirty 64; sends supplies to Thrasybulus 73–74
Lysias (2), general at Arginusae, 406 52; rescued after Arginusae 58; dismissed and executed 59
Lysimachus, Hipparch of the Thirty and the Ten 79, 80

Madytus, locality in Hellespont 34
Mantitheus, escapes from Tissaphernes 37; guards Hellespont 41
Medius of Larissa, in alliance against Sparta 101
Melos, captured by Conon, 393 107
Methymna, captured by Callicratidas 49, 50
Miletus, rebels against Athens 22; Athenian Debacle at, 412 22, 23; Spartan fleet at, 411 31; Spartan fleet moves from to Hellespont 31
Mindarus, Spartan commander in Asia Minor, 411 31; defeated at Cynossema 31–32; defeated at Abydos 33–35; defeated and killed at Cyzicus 37–39
Mitylene, battle of, 49–50, 106; Conon blockaded at 50, 55
Morrison, J.S., and Boeotian politics 67
Munychia, locality in Piraeus 77; battle of 77–79

Nemea, battle of, 394 101–103
Nepos, as source 16; on Thrasybulus 20

Niceratus, son of Nicias, executed by the Thirty 64
Nicias 9
Notium, battle of, 406 44–45, 106

Old Oligarch 21
Oligarchs, Athenian, on Samos 23–25; overthrown 26–29
Oligarchs, at Athens 25–26
Onomacles, Athenian general 23
Orchomenus, at battle of Coronea 104
Oropus, joins Boeotia 88
Oxyrhynchus Historian (P), as source 14–15; source for Cyzicus 37; source for Notium 44; on Boeotian politics 67

P, see Oxyrhynchus Historian
Paralus, Athenian state ship 27; brings news to Athens of events on Samos 28
Pausanias, author, as source 16
Pausanias, Spartan king, skirmishes with Thrasybulus 81–82; arranges affairs at Athens 81–83; invades Boeotia 96; defeat of, 395 99
Peisander, Spartan navarch, killed at Cnidus 103
Pellene, at battle of Nemea 102
Pericles, 7, 9, 121
Pericles, the younger, general at Arginusae, 406 52; dismissed and executed 59
Persian Empire, denounces treaty with Athens 21; signs treaty with Sparta 22
Pharax, Spartan navarch, arrests Athenian embassy 89
Pharnabazus, Persian satrap 34, 37; at Abydos 35; at Cyzicus 39; sails with Conon 105
Pheidon, member of the Thirty Tyrants and the Ten 79
Philocrates, Athenian general, defeated by Teleutias 112, 114
Philocrates (2), treasurer of Ergocles 119
Phocaea, Thrasybulus at, 406 43–45; Spartans retreat to, 406 53
Phocis, Spartan ally 96
Phormisius, Athenian factional leader 86
Phrynicus, Athenian general, at Miletus 22; arrives at Samos 23; dismissed as general 24
Phyle, base of Thrasybulus in Attica 71–74
Piraeus, occupied by Thrasybulus 77
Pisander, oligarchic politician 24, 25
Plutarch, as source 16; on Notium 43
Protomachos, general at Arginusae, 406 52; goes into exile after Arginusae 58

Rhodes, 39; campaigns around 111–112

Salaminians, massacre of 76
Samos, democratic revolution at, 412 23; main Athenian base 23, 45, 56; fleet supports oligarchy 24; oligarchic coup foiled 27–28; oaths of loyalty to democracy sworn 28
Scirinus, Athenian general 23
Scironides, Athenian general 24
Seager, R., on Thrasybulus 18
Sestos, Athenian base in Hellespont 32, 37
Seuthes, Thracian chief 115
Socrates, role at trial of the generals 53; trial of 90–91
Sparta, oligarchic 10; signs treaty of friendship with Persia 22; refuses to share loot with allies 68; rude behaviour to Boeotians 68–69; supports Ionian cities against Persia 89–90, 92–93; invades Persia 93; and the Corinthian War 95–108; peace attempt with Persia, 392 109; peace conference at, fall 392 111
Ste. Croix, G.E.M. de, on Thrasybulus 17
Strauss, B., on Athenian factions 86–87
Strombichides, Athenian general 23; executed by the Thirty 63
Struthas, Persian satrap, replaces Titibazus 110; fighting with Sparta 110; replaced by Tiribazus 119

Tegeans, at battle of Nemea 102
Teleutias, Spartan navarch 112; defeats Athenian squadron, 391 112
Ten, The, Board selected after Munychia 79; embassy to Sparta 80; loaned 100 talents by Sparta 81; settle with Thrasybulus 82–83
Teos, rebels against Athens 22
Thebes, at battle of Nemea 102
Theocles, at Phyle 72
Theramenes, Athenian politician 9, 10; deserts Four Hundred 30; at Cyzicus 36–39; visits Athens, 407 41; dismissed after Notium 46; trierarch at Arginusae 51; joint commander of rescue squadron 55; and the trial of the generals 54–60; attacks generals in Athens 56–59; rejected as general, 405 60; arranges capitulation to Sparta 61; leader of the Thirty with Critias 62, 63; and early purges 63; executed by the Thirty 71
Thespians, at battle of Nemea 102
Thibron, sent as general to Ionia by Sparta, 399 89, 92
Thirty Tyrants, established 61–62; functions of

62; purges and executions under 63–64; lose first skirmishes at Phyle 74; lose battle of Acharnae 74–75; defeated at Munychia 77–79; deposed after Munychia 79; embassy to Sparta 81; settled at Eleusis 83; lose Eleusis 87

Thrasybulus, son of Lycus, from Steiria 7, 9, 14; character of, 19–20, 47, 121–123; opinion of Athens 10, 121; views on Athenian Empire 20; robbed of credit 16, 122–123; modern scholarship on, 17–18; Alcibiades and 20–21, 29, 30, 31, 122; birth 19; family 19; early life 20; oratory of 21; as trierarch at Samos 23, 24; leads opposition to oligarchy on Samos 26–27; elected general at Samos 28; recalls Alcibiades to Samos 29; commands at Cynossema 31–32; commands at Abydos 34–35; gathering funds in Thrace 36; commands at Cyzicus 36–39; activities 411–407 40–43; visits Athens, 407 41; at Phocaea 43–44; dismissed after Notium 46, 49; trierarch at Arginusae 51–53; joint commander of rescue squadron 55; and the trial of the generals 54–60; attacks generals in Athens 56–59; fled to Boeotia under Thirty 64–66; aided by Boeotians while in exile 65, 69–70; occupies Phyle 71; wins battle of Acharnae 74–75; occupies Piraeus 77; speech at Munychia 78; victorious at Munychia 77–79; prepares to move on Athens 80; settles with the Ten 82–83; speech to the Ten 83; does not gain back his estates 84; outstripped by Archinus 84–86; and *isoteleia* for followers 85; as factional leader 86–87; dominant in Athens 87–105; and pro-Spartan policy to 396 89–90; alleged moderate 91–92, 121; and Boeotian alliance, 395 97; at battle of Haliartus 99; begins rebuilding Long Walls 99; at battle of Nemea 102–103; at battle of Coronea 104–105; dismissed after Coronea 105; rivalry with Conon 106; eclipsed by Conon 107–109; allied with Callistratus 111; allied with Callistratus and Agyrrhius 111, 113; opposes peace terms proposed at Sparta 111, 113; appointed to command fleet, 391 112; dominant in Athens, 391 114; in Hellespont 115–116; campaigns of, 390–389 115–118; at Lesbos, 390 116; damage to fleet, 390/89 116–117; death of, 389 12, 19, 118, 119

Thrasybulus of Collytus, opponent of Alcibiades 46; at Phyle 72; Athenian factional leader 87

Thrasycles, Athenian general 23

Thrasydaeus of Elis, supplies to Thrasybulus 74

Thrasyllus, leads opposition to oligarchy on Samos 26–27; elected general at Samos 28; negotiating with Alcibiades 30, 31; at Cynossema 31–32; at Abydos 34; sent to Athens 36; general at Arginusae 52; suggests rescue squadron 54; dismissed and executed 59

Three Thousand, provision for 62; depose Thirty Tyrants and choose the Ten 79; agree to amnesty 83; debts of paid off 84

Thucydides, 10, 23, 27, 28, 29; as source 12; on Thrasybulus at Cynossema 32

Thymochares, Athenian general 33

Timocrates of Rhodes, Persian envoy to Greece 93, 95–96

Timolaus of Corinth , delegate to Congress 101

Tiribazus, Persian satrap 109; arrests Conon 110; replaced by Struthas 110; replaces Struthas 119

Tissaphernes, Persian satrap 24, 29; imprisons Alcibiades 37; replaced by Cyrus 42; regains satrapy after death of Cyrus 89; attempts to regain Ionian cities for Persia 89

Tithraustes, Persian satrap 109

Xenophon, as source 12–13; disagrees with Diodorus 33–34; on Cyzicus 37–38; on Notium 43–45; on battle of Mitylene 50; on battle of Arginusae 51–53; on the trial of the generals 53–60; on massacre at Eleusis 75–76; on battle of Munychia 77–78; on Boeotian-Athenian alliance 97

Zea, harbour in Piraeus 77

INDEX OF ANCIENT AUTHORS AND SOURCES

Aeschines, 3.190, p.72

Aristophanes, *Ecclesiazousai* 202–204, p. 109

Aristotle, *Athenaion Politeia* 34.3, p. 72; 40.4, p. 87; Rhetorica 1400 b 20, p. 108

Diodorus Siculus, 13.100–103.2, pp. 54–57; 13.45.8, p. 35; 13.46.2–3, p. 35; 13.49.1, p. 38; 13.49.6, p. 39; 13.50.3, p. 38; 13.71.1, p. 43; 13.73.3–5, p. 45; 13.74.1, p. 46; 13.77.1–79.7, p. 50; 13.97.1, p. 51; 13.99.2, p. 51; 14.32.1, p. 65; 14.32.4, p. 75; 14.32.5, p. 76; 14.33.2–3, p. 78; 14.94.3, p. 116

Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, (P) 6.2, p. 40; 8.1–4, p. 44; 8.2, p. 45; 9.1–3, pp. 89–90; 19.1, p. 69; 20.1, p. 69; 20.2, p. 67

Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 263–264 , p. 11

IG2^2. 24, p. 115

Justin, 5.4, p. 69

Lysias, 12.5, p. 63; 13.10, p. 60; 15.1, p. 61; 18.9–10, p. 82; 25.9, p. 87; 27.3, p. 65; 28.4, p. 114; 28.5–7, p. 117; 28.8, p. 118; fr. 24.1, p. 65

Nepos, *Alcibiades*, 7.3, p. 46; *Thrasybulus*, 1.1, p. 16; 1.3, pp. 20–21; 3.2, p. 84

Pausanias, 1.29.3, p. 16; 3.9.8, p. 95

Plutarch, *Alcibiades*, 26.6, p. 21; 35.8, p. 43; 36.2, p. 42; 36.3, p. 46; *Lysander*, 5.3, p. 46; 28.2–6, p. 98; *Moralia*, 835F, p. 74

Thucydides, 2.35–46, p. 92; 2.65.8–9, p. 92; 8.47.2, p. 23; 8.66.1, p. 25; 8.75.2, p. 27; 8.88.1–3, p. 29; 8.89.1–3, p. 30

Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 1.1.23, p. 39; 1.5.10–15, p. 44; 1.5.11, p. 43; 1.6.15–23, p. 50; 1.6.24, p. 50; 1.6.31, p. 52; 1.6.33, p. 54; 1.6.35, 36, p. 55; 1.7.1–4, p. 57; 1.7.4, pp. 56, 57; 1.7.5–6, pp. 59–60; 1.7.17, p. 56; 1.7.29, p. 54; 1.7.30, pp. 54, 56; 1.7.32, p. 55; 2.3.11, p. 61; 2.3.12, p. 63; 2.4.2, p. 71; 2.4.6, p. 75; 2.4.8–10, pp.75–76; 2.4.9, p. 78; 2.4.12, p. 77; 2.4.19, p. 78; 2.4.20–22, p. 79; 2.4.25, p. 80; 2.4.29, p. 81; 2.4.31, p. 81; 2.4.35–43, p. 82; 2.4.40–42, p. 83; 2.4.43, p. 87; 3.4.1, p. 93; 3.5.16, p. 97; 3.5.18–20, p. 98; 3.5.1–2, p. 95; 3.5.7–15, pp. 96–97; 4.2.20, p. 102; 4.3.12, p. 103; 4.3.17, p. 104; 4.8.10, p. 107; 4.8.28, p. 116; 4.8.31, pp. 13, 118

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